IV. SPACE TO PLACE: PRACTICE AND PHENOMENOLOGY (I)
Guide to Readings and Discussion Questions
We are now moving from "practice theories" to some of the "phenomenological philosophies" that contributed to their development, again with emphasis on "space". This week's authors explore the different qualities attributed to places-defining places-through the experiences and perceptions of the bodies that inhabit and move to and through them. A good place to begin is Archaeologist Christopher Tilley's path-breaking A Phenomenology of Landscape: Places, Paths and Monuments (1994), which introduced to archaeology many of the topics we've already seen in the literature. In the discussion he brings together the ideas of the major phenomenologists as well as the practice/agency theorists (Giddens, Bourdieu, de Certeau, Foucault)-so it serves as a bridge from practice to phenomenology.
How did Tilley characterize the new geography and new archaeology, in terms of their approach to space and their subsequent development of methods and models to analyze space? (pp. 8-10)

How does Tilley then characterize a generic phenomenological perspective and its applications in more recent analyses in geography? What does this imply about what archaeologists could/should be doing?

In sorting through the literature on space and place, what other classificatory oppositions regarding spatial qualities or places does Tilley introduce in this chapter? How useful are these, how well explained, or, are they problematic?

Regarding politics and power, what critique does Tilley raise of all the phenomenological literature, and how valid do you think it is?

In Michel de Certeau's (1984) The Practice of Everyday Life, we will examine two major ideas that are often cited: 1) his distinction between tactics and strategies (which can be spatialized), and 2) his thoughts on "spatial stories"
Like Giddens' work, de Certeau's form of analysis of practice in everyday life is meant to apply to contemporary Western capitalist culture, with intentions towards "the individual subject in political life." What does he mean by "marginal" or "common" people versus "elites, and where does "consumption" (consumers) fit into his ideas?

How does de Certeau define the "tactics" and "strategies" of practice, and how do they fit into his characterization of society as divided between the dominators and dominated? What are their spatial characteristics? (Try to get beyond the stultifying language.) How is this a potentially useful way to understand the production and manipulation of space in asymmetrical societies?

How does de Certeau transfer a literary genre-narrative-into a spatial setting as a means to explore the internal practice-based structure of space and the operations that give rise to representations of space and place? How do time, movement, and thus the body fit in? Although this chapter deals with representations, spatial stories are much more and are integral to practice.

What distinctions did de Certeau make between "spaces" and "places"? What is the link to strategies and tactics? How useful did you find this terminology and distinction?

What is de Certeau's important distinction between "tours"(or itineraries) and "maps" in the representations of space/place?In the historical development of"maps," how does the notion of "proper place" become relevant?

Looking at some of the "operations" that "mark out boundaries" what does de Certeau contribute concerning the dichotomy of "frontiers" and "bridges"?

With some understanding of these ideas from de Certeau, now consider how effectively archaeologist Cynthia Robin made use of them in her study (of a Late Classic Maya hamlet) that "highlighted" his work.
Ultimately, which ideas of his did she use (and how well), and which ones could she have productively used that, in this study, she did not?
Moving now more deeply into Phenomenology, we will contrast two major components: phenomenologies of 'perception" (this week) and of "being" (next week). Philosopher Edward Casey's (1996) "How to Get from Space to Place" is a further guide to phenomenology in anthropology more specifically.
According to Casey, how has the "natural attitude" towards space that is critiqued by Husserl and other phenomenologists an especial impediment for anthropologists?

Explain the "Archytian Axiom" and how it makes sense in contrast with the "natural attitude"by highlighting the "local" over the "general" and the role of perception and experience in knowledge.

What does Casey see as the role of cultural and social structures in perception and emplacement? (note: this is where anthropology can contribute to phenomenology)

How do we as Western scientists, as anthropologists, recoup the pre-Cartesian, pre-Gallilean notions of space and place?

How does Casey explain how the anthropological study of culture can and should now incorporate the manifest centrality of place and body?

What does Casey mean by the phrases "places gather" and "places hold"?

What is the relationship of place to event? How does this idea help to provide the basis for a theory of space and time as place?

Finally, we can explore the Phenomenology of Perception with a small excerpt from the book of this name by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Note his emphasis on psychology, especially abnormal psychology-as much of phenomenology has been directed to and developed by psychologists. Casey (48, n.10) says of Merleau-Ponty's book, he "rarely speaks of place as such, but on my reading it is entailed in everything he says about the lived body and its 'setting' (milieu), 'landscape' (paysage), or 'world' (monde)." This is in Chapter 3: "The Spatiality of One's Own Body and Motility"-with emphasis on the embodiment of spatial experience and the movement of the body.
How does Merleau-Ponty contrast the usual notion of "body image" with his own concept? How does it relate to the rejection of the notion of abstract, homogenous space we've become familiar with?

What does Merleau-Ponty say is the relationship between the body and space?

What is the relationship of motility (movement) to the body and to space, and to perception? How do these ideas compare to Bourdieu's subsequent explanation of habitus?