Notes to Epilogue

1. On Shakespeare's relation to and use of Chaucer, consult Thompson 1978:111-65.

2. The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. Evans 1974:461; on the issue of value in the play, see, further, Rabkin 1967:31-63.

3. The text of Troilus and Cressida is peculiarly vexed: "/mirror'd/" in the present passage is a good example of the kinds of cruces the play contains; the First Folio and the Quarto show "married" rather than "/mirror'd/" which is supplied only in the Singer and Collier manuscripts. This sort of crux is insoluble short of a new text of the play suddenly turning up. But my reading of Chaucer's TC does lend weight to the choice of "/mirror'd/," since it suggests that Shakespeare too might have noted the emphasis on Narcissus in the poem.

4. On this matter I find particularly helpful the essay by Roland Barthes, "From Work to Text," and that by Michel Foucault, "What Is an Author?" in Harari 1979:73-82, 141-60, respectively. While I do not cede every position these essays take, I do think they are helpful in the isolation and definition of many problems.

5. For a discussion of this issue from the perspective of the late medieval ethical poetic, see Allen 1982:29-34, 288-300.

6. Such a description will be found in Gimpel 1976:3-7; consult, further, Le Goff 1977:162-80, "Métier et profession d'après les manuels de confesseurs du Moyen Âge." {274/275}

7. The first of these examples, wood for fires, I choose precisely because depletion of forests for technological purposes was a serious problem in the Middle Ages; see Gimpel 1976:75-80.

8. On this point, in regard to Chaucer, see Brewer 1976:229.

9. My use of Wesen here derives mainly from "The Question Concerning Technology" (trans. Lovitt) 1977:3-35; Lovitt gives a very helpful note on the term on pp. 3-4 of his translation; I also rely on the essay "The Age of the World Picture" (trans. Lovitt), 1977:115-54. By way of commentaries on Heidegger's thought, I have consulted Harries 1978:65-79; Mehta 1967: 1 14-27.

10. This, of course, is the Heideggerean position. One of its heirs, perhaps the most valiant and certainly the most loyal, has been the political philosophy of Arendt. At the center of our existence as she understands it is our desire and need to appear (Arendt 1977-78:1.27):

Could it not be that appearances are not there for the sake of the life process but, on the contrary, that the life process is there for the sake of appearances? Since we live in an appearing world, is it not much more plausible that the relevant and the meaningful in this world of ours should be located precisely on the surface?

11. Extraordinary witness to this truth may be seen in Michael Roemer's film Dying (1976). Consult, further, the discussion of the film by Ariès 1981 :590-92.

12. If I may adapt Pascal's famous formula--"Console toi, tu ne me /Jesus Christ/ chercherais pas, si tu ne m'avais trouvé" ("Be comforted, you would not seek me had you not already found me"; Pensées no. 553)--"One would not love the beloved for the beloved's sake had not one already loved God in the beloved."

13. See Galbraith and Salinger 1978:77; Smith 1981:14-18, 25-27, 61. I think I should make a special point of noting here that my discussion is intentionally outside the boundaries of professional economics; I am, perhaps perversely, looking only for common sense, in ordinary language.

14. Wealth, on the other hand, is limited by the things of which it consists; and common sense suggests that it can be stored as capital insofar as not all wealth can be expended at once. On this common-sense understanding, it can also be noted that all societies are capitalistic, even the communist, where it is only a matter of different hands holding the capital. (275/276}

15. Cf. the remarks on "pleonexia" (uncontrolled greed) and its Aristotelian context in MacIntyre 1981:145-46, 171.

16. See Sayce 1971:230-48 (237, 241-43, 245 especially). {276}