Compiled by Murat Aydede
(2/12/2006; ~320 entries)
This is a partially annotated bibliography containing largely philosophical literature on pain. It also contains some scientific works that are of particular interest to philosophers or are useful to a general audience. It focuses on psychological, epistemological and metaphysical issues rather than ethical or religious ones. It is a work in perpetual progress and by no means complete. I’ll try to complete (or, replace) the annotations in time -- some of them are downloaded either from PsychInfo or Phil Index, and are not always very useful. I would appreciate if the authors provide me with short abstracts of their own articles that appear below. Corrections, modifications, suggestions and new entries are also welcome. (I’ll organize the entries into cross-referenced sections in the future.)
Here are the categorization
terms for the entries. They are
sorted roughly according to the first category in the category field in bold.
1. pain access
2. pain adverbialism
3. pain affect
4. pain animal
5. pain asymbolia
6. pain choice
7. pain concept
8. pain dennett
9. pain disassociation
10. pain general
11. pain history
12. pain imaging
13. pain infant
14. pain insensitivity
15. pain language
16. pain location
17. pain nature
18. pain perception
19. pain phenomenology
20. pain privacy
21. pain science
(these
items are selected with the interests of philosophers and the general audience
in mind)
22. pain sense-data
23. pain surgery
24. pain value
25. adverbialism
26. appearance theory
27. pleasure
28. sense-data
[adverbialism]
Sellars, W. (1975). "The Adverbial Theory of the Objects of
Sensation." Metaphilosophy, 6: 144–160.
One
of the earliest defenses of adverbialism in general.
[adverbialism]
Kraut, R. (1982). "Sensory States and Sensory Objects." Nous,
16(2): 277–293.
Kraut
defends adverbialism by combining it with topic-neutral analyses of sensory
states in terms of their standard causal nexus.
[adverbialism]
Tye, M. (1984). "The Adverbial Approach to Visual
Experience." The Philosophical Review, 93(2): 195–225.
Contains
a brief and critical survey of adverbialist theories, and elaborates one Tye
thinks is the best defensible theory.
Responds to Jackson’s (1975, 1977) criticisms.
[adverbialism]
Lycan, W. G. (1987). "Phenomenal Objects: A Backhanded
Defense." Philosophical Perspectives (Metaphysics), 1:
513–526.
Lycan
defends the view that talk of phenomenal objects in perception is inevitable
but argues that these individuals are intentional objects, thus don't pose any
threat to physicalism. He supports
his view by a detour of what a proper understanding of adverbialism requires.
[adverbialism]
Caruso, G. (1999). "A Defense of the Adverbial Theory." Philosophical
Writings, 10: 51–65.
[adverbialism ; pain
perception ; appearance theory]
Chisholm, R. M. (1957). Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
[adverbialism ; pain
perception]
Jackson, F. (1977). Perception: A Representative Theory. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Defends
a spatiotemporally locatable subjective and private sense-data as immediate
objects of perceptual awareness
[adverbialism ; pain
perception]
Ducasse, C. J. (1952). Moore's Refutation of Idealism. The Philosophy
of G. E. Moore, P. A. Schilpp (Ed.), New York: Tudor.
One
of the earliest defenses of adverbialism in general.
[adverbialism ; pain
perception]
Jackson, F. (1975). "On the Adverbial Analysis of Visual
Experience." Metaphilosophy, 6: 127–135.
The
adverbial analysis holds that to have an image which is f is to sense f-ly; the
attribute f goes to the mode f-ly. what account should it hold of having an
image which is f and g. do both of the attributes go to separate modes, or do
we have a new compound mode, f-g-ly? in this paper i argue that both of these
answers, and the variants on them, face substantial difficulties.
[adverbialism ;
sense-data]
Robinson, H. (1994). Perception. London ; New York, NY:
Routledge.
[adverbialism ; pain
perception]
Lycan, W. G. (1987). Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
MIT Press.
[pain adverbialism]
Aune, B. (1967). Knowledge, Mind, and Nature: An introduction to
Theory of Knowledge and the Philosophy of Mind. New York: Random House.
Pains
are relations to damaged body parts, adverbialism, precursor to perceptual view
of pain
[pain adverbialism]
Tye, M. (1984). "Pain and the Adverbial Theory." American
Philosophical Quarterly, 21: 319–328.
In
this paper, I lay out an adverbial analysis for pain and I defend it against
possible objections. I also try to
show that there are reasons for preferring the adverbial account I sketch to
what is perhaps the most popular view, namely that pain statements involve
existential quantifications over pain events, where pain events are taken to be
identical with microphysical events located in the brain.
[pain adverbialism ;
pain perception]
Douglas, G. (1998). "Why Pains Are Not Mental Objects." Philosophical
Studies, 91(2): 127–148.
Harold
Langsam (1995) explicitly defends the thesis that pain is a mental object', and
it is a major goal of this paper to dispute this view, and argue that pain is
more accurately described adverbially as the way that we perceive or sense
something, rather than something we perceive or sense. I also argue that the
mental object' view of pain is the source of other problems and disputes in
this area, and more generally regarding the issue of qualia.
[pain access]
Malcolm, N. (1958). "Knowledge of Other Minds." Journal of
Philosophy, 55: 969–978.
Wittgensteinean
view of pain attributions
[pain access]
Nelson, J. O. (1966). "Can one tell that he is awake by pinching
himself?" Philosophical Studies, 27: 81–84.
Nelson
claims to have discovered an "intrinsic mark" for distinguishing
waking and dreaming states. he argues that it is logically impossible to
"dream a pain". His central argument is that one cannot be deceived
about being in pain, but if one could "dream a pain" then we would
have to suppose that the dream pain did not "really exist", i.e. that
one was deceived in thinking that one was in pain.
[pain access]
Margolis, J. (1966). "After-Images and Pains." Philosophy,
41: 41–347.
The
author notes that many current theories of meaning insist that the
intelligibility of first-person reports necessarily depends on the
verifiability of those reports. The author argues "that that doctrine
cannot be maintained for the case of after-images (and images) and, therefore,
need not be maintained for the case of pains (and similar sensations)."
[pain access]
Hodges, M., and W. R. Carter (1969). "Nelson on Dreaming a
Pain." Philosophical Studies, 20: 43–46.
The
article criticizes John O. Nelson's ("Can one tell that he is awake by
pinching himself?" in Philosophical Studies 27:81-84 (1966)) claim
to have discovered an "intrinsic mark" for distinguishing waking and
dreaming states. he argues that it is logically impossible to "dream a
pain". His central argument is that one cannot be deceived about being in
pain, but if one could "dream a pain" then we would have to suppose
that the dream pain did not "really exist", i.e. that one was
deceived in thinking that one was in pain. The argument is certainly
fallacious, depending 1) on an ambiguity concerning "really exists"
and 2) on the assumption that p entails believing that p. interestingly enough
this final assumption is shared by Nelson and his most famous opponent
Descartes.
[pain access]
Canfield, J. V. (1975). 'I Know That I Am in Pain' is Senseless. Analysis
and Metaphysics, K. Lehrer (Ed.), Dordrecht: Reidel: 129–144.
[pain access]
Dalrymple, H. (1980). "Can a Person Know That He Is in Pain?"
Southwest Philosophical Studies, 5: 55–63.
Ordinary
language philosophers often claim that a philosophical theory is wrong if it
has consequences that no sane person can accept. Some of these same
philosophers have also seemed to argue that first person sentences referring to
the utterer's mental states should not be regarded as reports of something the
utterer knows. In this paper I
argue for the rejection of this view on the grounds that it has the sort of
skeptical consequences that its proponents have attributed to other theories
and rightly deplored.
[pain access]
Blum, A., and R. Carasso (1988). "Pain Corrigibility." Manuscrito,
11: 127–128.
We
try to show how it is that being in pain is not equivalent to knowing that one
is in pain.
[pain access]
Goldstein, I. (2000). "Intersubjective Properties by Which We
Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States." Philosophy,
75: 89–104.
By
what properties do we name pain, pleasure, and other kinds of mental states?
Wittgenstein identifies two possible ways. (1) Direct acquaintance: A person
feels a sensation and sets about to use the word thereafter for the same
sensation. (2) Outward signs: a person pins his use of the word to the
sensation's outward signs. Wittgenstein thinks psychological words can be
learned only through method two. People rest various strong claims on
Wittgenstein's thesis.
[pain access]
Dartnall, T. (2001). "The Pain Problem." Philosophical
Psychology: 14(1) 95–102.
If
pain exists only inasmuch as it is experienced, it seems that the pain did not
exist when you were asleep, and so could not have woken you up. I shall argue
that you were woken by a pain sensation that you did not know you had, so that
the distinction between what is and what is known holds even for the contents
of consciousness. This illuminates the relationship between consciousness and
attention, and casts light on the classical empiricist tradition that
identifies the foundations of knowledge with direct experience. (edited)
[pain access; pain
nature]
Garfield, J. L. (2001). "Pain Deproblematized." Philosophical
Psychology, 14(1): 103–107.
In
this paper I demonstrate that the "pain problem" Dartnall claims to
have discovered is, in fact, no problem at all. Dartnall's construction of the
apparent problem, I argue, relies on an erroneous assumption of the unity of
consciousness, an erroneous assumption of the simplicity of pain as a
phenomenon ignoring crucial neurophysiological and neuroanatomical information,
a mistaken account of introspective knowledge according to which introspection
gives us inner episodes veridically and in their totality and a model of
consciousness that depicts the mind as an attic of inner objects towards which
attention might or might not be directed. Once these errors are dispelled, no
problem remains. (edited)
[pain access]
Dartnall, T. (2001). "The Pain Problem: Reply to Garfield." Philosophical
Psychology, 14(1): 109–112.
I
am grateful for Garfield's comments, which clarify my position. He says, for
example, that I am a phenomenalist. I am not a phenomenalist. I say that there can
be contents of consciousness that we are not aware of, in the same sense that
there really is a chair next door and a gorilla outside my window--a real, live
gorilla, with big teeth and no conditional statements. His other comments are
equally illuminating.
[pain access ; pain
concept]
Hinton, R. T. (1975). "Is the Existence of Pain a Scientific
Hypothesis?" Philosophy, 50: 97–100.
There
is an argument (Radford Philosophy 1972) which tries to show that pain
is not a theoretical entity inferred from observed behavior. It is that the
existence of theoretical entities may be refuted by experiment, but to deny the
existence of pain would be to change the meaning of the word. The argument is
based on the assumption that there is a clear criterion of meaning change and
it does not consider the possibility that changes in theory also involve
changes in meaning. It is argued that the languages of theory and of pain have
important similarities in spite of the contingent differences highlighted by
Radford's argument.
[pain access ; pain
nature]
Leighton, S. R. (1986). "Unfelt Feelings in Pain and
Emotion." Southern Journal of Philosophy, 24: 69–79.
This
paper defends views of emotion that make feelings necessary to (or sufficient for)
occurrent emotion against a prominent objection, namely that while occurrent
emotion states may be unfelt, there can be no sense to an unfelt feeling. by
considering pains, it is argued that feelings while not noted may be felt. this
sense of an unfelt feeling prevents the objection having the power it is
assumed to have.
[pain access ; pain
privacy]
Hudson, H. (1961). "Why Are Our Feelings of Pain Perceptually
Unobservable?" Analysis, 21: 97–100.
[pain access ; pain
privacy]
Carter, W. R. (1972). "Locke on Feeling Another's Pain." Philosophical
Studies, 23: 280–285.
Don
Locke has claimed that it is possible for one person to feel another person's
pain, but not possible for two or more people to own or share one pain. Locke
discusses an alleged possible case in which one person is hooked up to another
person's nervous system and subsequently feels what are, according to Locke,
the first person's pain. Against Locke, it is argued that if two people were to
feel one pain then it would be true that these people shared a pain, and so
false that pains are 'l-private' in Locke’s sense. Finally, doubts are
raised as to whether Locke's imagined physiological connections would enable
two people to feel what was, numerically, the same pain.
[pain access ; pain
privacy]
Wadia, P. S. (1973). "Multi-Person Pains." Mind,
82(327): 450–451.
Discussion
of Siamese twins' pain
[pain access ; pain
privacy]
Palmer, D. (1975). "Unfelt Pains." American Philosophical
Quarterly, 12: 289–298.
This
paper considers the traditional view that all pains, insofar as they exist,
must be felt or noticed. the first section of the paper shows that some
arguments at least implicitly presumed to support this traditional view are
fallacious. The second part of the paper considers a broader thesis about all
mental states from which the traditional thesis about pains follows. It is
shown that this broader thesis is untenable. Finally it is argued by appeal to
common cases that the traditional view of pains has such distasteful
consequences that we are forced to seek an alternative. an alternative is
suggested.
[pain access ; pain
privacy]
Morris, K. J. (1996). "Pain, Injury and First/Third-Person
Asymmetry." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56(1):
125–136.
[pain access; pain concept;
pain nature]
Radford, C. (1972). "Pain and Pain Behaviour." Philosophy,
47: 189–205.
[pain affect]
Pitcher, G. (1970). "The Awfulness of Pain." The Journal
of Philosophy, 67(14): 481–492.
Sets
out the dialectics of the debate between those who say that the unpleasantness
is not a necessary aspect of pain and those who claim that it is. Argues that recent scientific findings
(Melzack-Wall gate Control Theory) may resolve this old philosophical debate.
[pain affect]
Noren, S. J. (1974). "Pitcher on the Awfulness of Pain." Philosophical
Studies, 25: 117–122.
In
a recent article, "The Awfulness of Pain," George Pitcher has
presented an argument for the thesis that all pains are unpleasant. As his
argument uses the well-known Melzack-Wall theory of pain, he views his argument
as an instance of how philosophical problems can be dissolved empirically. This
paper attempts to show that Pitcher's argument is fallacious and that the
empirical theory of pain is irrelevant to settling the philosophic problem of
whether all pains are unpleasant. It is further claimed that even if there are
better reasons for holding that all pains are unpleasant there would still be
difficult conceptual problems involving the possibility of masochism, fakirism,
etc. Finally, it is suggested that '...is pleasant' etc., may be best construed
as evaluative and not as descriptive predicates, thus undermining the need for
Pitcher's thesis.
[pain affect]
Pitcher, G. (1976). Pain and Unpleasantness. Philosophical
dimensions of the neuro-medical sciences: proceedings of the second
Trans-disciplinary Symposium on Philosophy and Medicine, S. F. Spicker and
H. T. Engelhardt (Eds.), Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel.
Philosophical
dimensions of the neuro-medical sciences: proceedings of the second
Trans-disciplinary Symposium on Philosophy and Medicine, held at Farmington,
Connecticut, May 15-17, 1975
[pain affect; pleasure]
Aydede, M. (2000). "An Analysis of
Pleasure vis-à-vis Pain." Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 61(3): 537–570.
I take up the issue of whether pleasure is a kind of
sensation (a feeling episode) or not.
This issue was much discussed by philosophers of the 1950's and 1960's, and no
resolution was reached. There were mainly two camps in the discussion: those
who argued for a dispositional account
of pleasure, and those who favored an episodic feeling (sensational) view of pleasure. Here, relying on some
recent scientific findings I offer an account of pleasure which neither
dispositionalizes nor sensationalizes pleasure. As is usual in the tradition, I
compare pleasure with pain, and try to see its similarities and differences. I
argue that pain and pleasure experiences have typically a complex phenomenology
normally not so obvious in introspection. After distinguishing between affective and sensory
components of these experiences, I argue that although pain experiences
normally consist of both components proper to them, pleasure, in
contradistinction to pain, is only the affective component of a total
experience that may involve many sensations proper and cognitions. Moreover, I
hold that although the so-called "physical" pleasure is itself not a
sensation proper, it is nevertheless an episodic affective reaction (in a
primitive sense) to sensations proper.
[pain affect]
Sufka, K. J., and M. P. Lynch (2000). "Sensations and Pain
Processes." Philosophical Psychology, 13(3): 299–311.
This
paper discusses recent neuroscientific research that indicates a solution for
what we label the "causal problem" of pain qualia, the problem of how
the brain generates pain qualia. In particular, the data suggest that pain
qualia naturally supervene on activity in a specific brain region: the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC). The first section of this paper discusses several
philosophical concerns regarding the nature of pain qualia. The second section
overviews the current state of knowledge regarding the neuroanatomy and
physiology of pain processing. The third section highlights the recent research
by Rainville et al.
[pain affect]
Grahek, N. (2001). Feeling Pain and Being in Pain. Oldenburg,
Denmark: BIS-Verlag, University of Oldengurg.
The
most extensive and careful discussion of so-called “reactive
disassociation” cases by a philosopher. Grahek concludes that pain asymbolia is the only genuine
form of having pain without the negative affect.
[pain affect]
Clark, Austen (ms.). "Painfulness is Not a Quale." Philosophy
Department, University of Connecticut.
Argues
that painfulness is not a quale in the traditional strong sense of the word, and
proposes a psychofunctionalist account of pain and painfulness.
[pain affect ; pain
nature]
Noren, S. J. (1976). "The Efficacy of Pain." Journal of
Critical Analysis, 6: 71–76.
[pain affect ; pleasure]
Penelhum, T. (1957). "The Logic of Pleasure." Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 17(4): 488–503.
Compares
pain and pleasure states and their concepts in the context of criticizing
Ryle’s quasi-behaviorist treatment of pleasure states. One of the best discussions of this
issue from the generation of “linguistic philosophy”.
[pain affect ; pleasure]
McCloskey, M. A. (1971). "Pleasure." Mind, 80(320):
542–551.
Compares
the concepts of pain and pleasure much like Penelhum 1957. Very useful.
[pain affect ; pleasure]
Sprigge, T. L. S. (2000). "Is the Esse of Intrinsic Value
Percipi?: Pleasure, Pain and Value." Philosophy, 47(Suppl):
119–140.
If
there is such a thing as a genuine property appropriately called
"intrinsic value" this property must be such that recognition that
something does, or would, possess it, has a necessary tendency to motivate
towards sustaining that thing in existence or producing it (if possible). There
is just one thing which possesses that property and that is the property of
being pleasurable (properly conceived) which, therefore, is the same as
intrinsic value. (The same, mutatis mutandis, applies to intrinsic disvalue and
painfulness.) Why this seems not to be so is explained.
[pain affect ; pleasure;
pain value]
Weiss, P. (1942). "Pain and Pleasure." Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 3(2): 137–144.
[pain affect ; pleasure;
pain value]
Edwards, R. B. (1975). "Do Pleasures and Pains Differ
Qualitatively?" Journal of Value Inquiry, 9: 270–281.
Mill
did not explain adequately his claim that pleasures and pains differ
qualitatively. I try to make sense of this claim, maintaining that the
"lower" pleasures are localized bodily pleasures and the
"higher" pleasures are non-localized. treatments of hedonism have
been hampered by the linguistic assumption that where two or more things are
called by the same name, they share a common property. This assumption is false
when applied to pleasures and pains. Pleasure and pain are intentional concepts
and pleasures and pains differ in quality with variations in their intentional
objects.
[pain affect ; pleasure;
pain value]
Edwards, R. B. (1979). Pleasures and Pains: A Theory of Qualitative
Hedonism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
The
book tries to make sense out of mill's unexplained contention that pleasures and
pains differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively, which most philosophers
have dismissed as nonsense. It gives a new critique of quantitative hedonism,
explores the relationship between hedonistic and pluralistic theories of
intrinsic good and evil, and defends a qualitatively hedonistic position. It
explores mill's conception of rational methodology in ethics, his
"proof" of utilitarianism, and his "larger meaning of
proof." It discusses electrode-induced happiness, qualitative senses of
"more pleasant" and the intentionality of "pleasure" and
"pain" concepts.
[pain affect ; pleasure;
pain value]
Goldstein, I. (1989). "Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional, Intrinsic
Values." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50(2):
255–276.
[pain affect; pain
value]
Puccetti, R. (1975). "Is Pain Necessary?" Philosophy,
50: 259–269.
Examination
of a well-documented case of insensitivity to pain indicates that pain
sensations associated with tissue damage have biological usefulness. Contrary
to the view of some writers, other kinds of physical pain are not mysterious
but understandable on straightforward Darwinian principles. The suggestion that
we could be made so as to withdraw from tissue-damaging stimuli without pain
relates interestingly to physicalistic theories of the mind-body relation. It
is argued that such views, specifically epiphenomenalism and the identity
theory, fail to explain the occurrence of pain sensations, for on these
theories there would be no evolutionary disadvantage to the species if they did
not occur.
[pain affect; pain
value]
Goldstein, I. (1983). "Pain and Masochism." Journal of
Value Inquiry, 17: 219–224.
That
pleasure is wanted and pain unwanted is not a truism. There are people who do
not want to enjoy life and who want to suffer pain. Not every desire for pain
is 'masochistic', however. Like sadism, masochism entails irrationality and
abnormality. The picture of the masochist as a rational, calculating hedonist
seeking pain solely for the pleasure it brings him is oversimplified. Masochism
is a perversion. A peculiar outlook on pain is entailed by masochism.
[pain affect; pain
value]
Goldstein, I. (1988). The Rationality of Pleasure-Seeking Animals. Inquiries
into Values, S. H. Lee (Ed.), Lewiston: Mellen Press: pp. 131–136.
Pleasure-seeking
animals, including the most primitive, are to some extent rational.
intrinsically, pleasure is better than pain; there is reason to desire pleasure
and prefer it to pain. in desiring pleasure and avoiding pain, an animal's
dispositions towards these experiences are appropriate and guided by reason.
[pain affect; pain
value]
Hall, R. J. (1989). "Are Pains Necessarily Unpleasant?" Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 49(4): 643–659.
Argues
for a negative answer. For hall, unpleasantness consists of a spontaneous
quasi-cognitive con-reaction to pain sensation proper.
[pain affect; pain
value]
Rachels, S. (2000). "Is Unpleasantness Intrinsic to Unpleasant
Experiences?" Philosophical Studies, 99: 187–210.
Unpleasant experiences
include itches, backaches, phantoms pains and moments of embarrassment. What
does their unpleasantness consist in? Philosophers have offered the following
answers:
1. The unpleasantness
of an experience consists in its representing bodily damage. (Damage)
2. The unpleasantness
of an experience consists in its inclining the subject to fight its
continuation. (Motivation)
3. The unpleasantness
of an experience consists in the subject’s disliking it. (Dislike)
4. The unpleasantness
of an experience consists in features intrinsic to it. (Intrinsic Nature)
Each of these theories
stands or falls with its corresponding view of pleasure. So, I will assess
Motivation, for instance, alongside the idea that the pleasantness of an
experience consists in its inclining the subject to fight for its continuation.
In the end, I will favor Intrinsic Nature.
[pain affect; pain
value; pain value]
Goldstein, I. (1980). "Why People Prefer Pleasure to Pain." Philosophy,
55: 349–362.
Why
do we dislike pain? Why do we prefer pleasure? There are three answers to
consider: (1) We have a "reason" for wanting pleasure and shunning
pain. Our attitudes are guided by a rational insight about the experiences. (2)
Pleasure and pain do not provide reason for preferring one to the other. It is
a contingent fact about our constitution that we want pleasure and dislike
pain. (3) That pleasure is wanted and pain unwanted is a tautology. Pleasure is
"defined" as a wanted experience, pain as an unwanted one. Hume, Hare, and Spencer, who held the
second and third positions, are discussed. I defend the first position.
[pain animal]
Squire, A. N. N. (1985). "On Animals and Pain." Between
the Species, 1: 19–20.
[pain animal]
Nollman, J. I. M. (1987). "To Judge the Pain of Whales." Between
the Species, 3: 133–137.
[pain animal]
Carruthers, P. (1989). "Brute Experience." Journal of
Philosophy, 86(5): 258–269.
[pain animal]
Carruthers, P. (1992). The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.