

Political Trust and Support for Social Welfare:
The Role of Ambivalence

Stephen C. Craig
Department of Political Science
University of Florida
P. O. Box 117325
Gainesville, FL 32611-7325
sccraig@ufl.edu

Jason Gainous
Department of Political Science
University of Louisville
Ford Hall Room 205
Louisville, KY 40292
jason.gainous@louisville.edu

Michael D. Martinez
Department of Political Science
University of Florida
P. O. Box 117325
Gainesville, FL 32611-7325
martinez@ufl.edu

Abstract: Although the decline in Americans' levels of political trust since the 1960s has been viewed with alarm by some scholars, others maintain that the trend reflects growing skepticism (rather than genuine cynicism) about government's capacity to deal effectively with important social problems – and that this development poses relatively little threat to the overall health of the polity. We extend the argument by hypothesizing that many citizens are, in fact, ambivalent in that they simultaneously hold positive *and* negative feelings about government and the role that it should play in society today. Based on our analysis of data from a 2004 telephone survey of Florida residents, we conclude that (a) ambivalence about the federal, state, and local levels of government in the United States is fairly common; (b) ambivalence has consequences for people's opinions on matters of public policy, specifically, those with conflicted feelings are less likely to endorse progressive action in the social welfare realm; (c) self-identified conservatives are more ambivalent about government than liberals; and (d) the negative relationship between ambivalence and social welfare liberalism is especially pronounced among conservatives.

Paper presented for delivery at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, August 31-September 3, 2006. Copyright American Political Science Association.

The titles pretty much say it all: *Why Americans Hate Politics* (Dionne 1991); *The Malevolent Leaders* (Craig 1993); *Congress as Public Enemy* (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995); *Why People Don't Trust Government* (Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997); *The Angry American* (Tolchin 1999); and *What Is It About Government that Americans Dislike?* (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001). Jonathan Yardley of the *Washington Post* captured the overall mood described in these books when, looking ahead to the presidential campaign of 1988, he wrote that "[a]fter more than a quarter-century as a registered voter and working journalist, I have lost virtually all interest in politics – not public affairs, but politics. . . . Where once I believed that politics is an honorable, if not noble, calling, I now see it as the refuge of opportunists and self-aggrandizers, if not scoundrels" (Yardley 1987: 25). A few years later, the remarks of focus group participants around the country led researchers to conclude that Americans had come to view their political system as being "impervious to public direction, a system run by a professional political class and controlled by money, not votes. What is more, people do not believe this system is able to solve the pressing problems they face" (Kettering Foundation 1991: iv).

In trying to understand "why Americans hate politics and politicians" (Nelson 1995), part of the answer clearly lies with the nation's political culture, which has always contained a strong commitment to individualism and a corresponding aversion to the unrestricted exercise of state power; as a result, popular suspicion of government and politics has been the norm for more than two-hundred years (Craig 1993). Beginning in the 1960s, however, our traditional skepticism and "mild discontent" began to give way to what appeared to be a deeper and more pervasive negativism – to a heightened level of "outrage and loathing" (Orren 1997: 79) among the general public that posed a threat to the effectiveness of decision makers and institutions and, over time, perhaps even to the stability of the political system itself. According to Orren, such intense

dissatisfaction with government ultimately

harms democracy. It hampers governing in a constitutional structure that intentionally makes action difficult without strong popular approval. It is the oxygen that fuels the incendiary tone and negativity of today's political discourse. It hinders the task of recruiting and retaining capable public servants. From the left, right, and center it invites quick fixes to complex problems – term limits, tax revolts, third-party panaceas, extremist appeals both inside and outside the major parties – and it discourages steady and pragmatic solutions (Orren 1997: 79).

The clouds parted briefly following the September 11th terrorist attacks in New York City and Virginia, when public trust and confidence in government surged to levels not seen for more than three decades (Chanley 2002).¹ Although no one expected this situation to last indefinitely,² some observers did wonder whether it might signal the beginning of a "realignment" of citizens' attitudes toward their elected leaders (Stille 2001). As it happens, the respite proved temporary and recent surveys have shown heightened levels of dissatisfaction with government, at least at the national level.³

The long-term erosion of political trust has altered our understanding of public opinion and political behavior in the United States. Although fears that declining trust might seriously threaten system stability (Miller 1974) proved unfounded, lower trust is known to be associated with a number of "elite-challenging" attitudes and behaviors;⁴ these include a reduced likelihood of compliance with the law, anti-incumbent and third-party voting, and support for governmental reforms having a mostly populist bent (direct democracy, anti-tax legislation, term limits, campaign finance reform, devolution).⁵ Further, Hetherington has linked heightened opposition

to left-leaning policy in recent years to declining levels of political trust, that is, a loss of faith in the "delivery system for most progressive public policy. Even if people support progressive policy goals [such as eradicating poverty and racial discrimination], they do not support the policies themselves because they do not believe that the government is capable of bringing about desired outcomes" (Hetherington 2005: 5).

These studies notwithstanding, however, differences of opinion and interpretation remain concerning the meaning and consequences of contemporary popular attitudes about government. Some scholars maintain, for example, that *low* trust should be viewed as the norm in American politics and, consequently, that the decline since 1964 is less in need of explanation than the higher trust levels observed in the early 1960s and the periodic spikes that occur during periods of war or national crisis (Alford 2001). Others have suggested that the most frequently employed indicators of political trust⁶ are measuring traditional American *skepticism* about government rather than active mistrust, and that only the latter – which probably has not changed much in recent years – is likely to have serious consequences for governability or system stability (Cook and Gronke 2005).

Alternatively, perhaps it is *ambivalence* more than skepticism that characterizes citizens' attitudes about government in the post-1964 era. Ambivalence exists when an individual holds simultaneous positive and negative beliefs (cognitive ambivalence) or feelings (affective ambivalence) about an attitude object, in this case, governmental leaders and institutions.⁷ While the cross-sectional data examined in this paper cannot tell us whether citizens are more or less ambivalent today than in the past, we will be able to (a) assess the frequency of ambivalent feelings toward government at all levels (national, state, local) among voters in one state; (b)

examine the relationship between ambivalence and political trust; and (c) determine whether ambivalence helps to shape people's policy preferences. In particular, we will take a closer look at Hetherington's (2005: 3) claim that declining trust "has played the central role in the demise of progressive public policy in the United States over the last several decades."

Ambivalence about Government

Researchers traditionally have assumed that attitudes can be measured as if they lie somewhere along a bipolar continuum that ranges from positive (or favorable) to negative (or unfavorable), with a neutral point in between (Thurstone 1928; Thurstone and Chave 1929; see Eagly and Chaiken 1993 for a review). This unidimensional view conforms to our intuitive sense that people tend to think in bipolar terms about most things. When they watch a movie or eat a meal, they usually classify it as either "good" or "bad" (or, representing the continuum's neutral point, as "so-so"); and, in the political and social realm, individuals and institutions are often described as being "trustworthy," or "untrustworthy." On the surface, describing something as both one thing *and* the other seems counterintuitive. Yet in real life we can, and do, evaluate objects as if they contained separate components. Politicians, for example, are seen as being liberal on some issues but conservative on others (Abelson et al. 1982), with the summation of these perceptions presumably telling us whether they fall, overall, into one category or the other. Feldman (1995: 266) described this process as the "distributions of considerations" and argued that an opinion expressed in response to a survey question provides only an estimate of the central tendency of an individual's attitudes or beliefs on that subject.

When someone's evaluations or beliefs about an attitude object are in conflict, we

describe that person as being *ambivalent*. The concept of ambivalence is not new (e.g., Scott 1969; Kaplan 1972), especially to social psychologists who have often used experimental data to demonstrate empirically the existence of an ambivalence dimension based on the assumption that attitudes can indeed contain separate positive and negative components (Klopper and Madden 1980; Katz and Hass 1988; Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin 1995; Priester and Petty 1996; Armitage and Conner 2000; Hodson et al. 2001). But whereas ambivalence is frequently taken into account in attitudinal research generally (see Ajzen 2001), the study of ambivalence with regard to political objects has only recently begun to blossom (see Craig and Martinez 2005a, 2005b). And only one study of which we are aware has looked directly at citizens' ambivalence about the institutions of government in the United States. In doing so, McGraw and Bartels (2005) measured ambivalence according to whether survey respondents exhibited inconsistency (or conflict) in their evaluations of Congress, President Clinton, and the Supreme Court with regard to four characteristics: doesn't get much accomplished, too involved in partisan politics, doesn't care what ordinary people think, and corrupt. They found, first, that *cognitive* ambivalence toward each of the three branches of the national government was fairly common among the American public in the late-1990s; second, that those who were ambivalent about one branch were not always ambivalent about the others (correlations between the different sets of indicators ranged from moderate to nonexistent); and third, that ambivalence was basically unrelated to ideology or partisanship.

With these findings as backdrop, let us consider once again the possibility that the high trust levels of the Eisenhower-Kennedy period were an aberration and that, accordingly, the widespread mistrust that has existed throughout much of the past forty years (and become such a

source of concern to those who worry about the health of the polity) is closer to the historical norm. As it happens, students of public opinion during the pre-1964 era often described the American public as being of two minds in their attitudes about government. One study reported that ambivalence was evident in several areas including, for example, many people criticizing almost any government agency they were asked about while simultaneously expressing great pride in officeholders and institutions, or opposing government interference with business while nonetheless expecting elected leaders to solve pressing social problems. According to Hyman and Sheatsley (1954: 41), these contradictions probably stemmed from the public's combining "a deep respect for American institutions and offices with a healthy skepticism about the men who fill them." Similarly, Mitchell (1959: 691-93) concluded that "Americans hold ambivalent attitudes towards politics and those who make it an occupation. . . . On the one hand, power-holders tend to be admired for what they can accomplish, particularly in the economic sphere of action. On the other hand, power-holders are regarded with some fear and distrust for the deprivations they may inflict." For Mitchell, this suggested that the average citizen "tends to expect the worst in politics but hopes for the best (p. 695)."

Of course, the public opinion studies cited by Hyman and Sheatsley and by Mitchell were not designed to measure ambivalence directly. The conclusions drawn by these authors (and others; see Bennett 2001) were based on the *appearance* of conflict in the expressed opinions of survey respondents, with no effort being made to determine whether conflict actually was present (much less whether people were conscious of it).⁸ In the analysis that follows, we employ a measure of ambivalence adapted from Kaplan's (1972) method of gauging simultaneously conflicting reactions to a single object. Unlike McGraw and Bartels (2005), we do not

distinguish between attitudes toward different branches of the national government; rather, we search for ambivalence across levels of government, that is, national, state, and local. Most evidence regarding the post-1964 decline in political trust points to rising dissatisfaction with the national government,⁹ and it is generally understood that citizens today have greater confidence in their state and local leaders than in those who run the government in Washington (Jennings 1998; Hetherington and Nugent 2001; Shaw and Reinhart 2001; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002).¹⁰ But what about ambivalence? While our data do not permit us to look for shifts that may have occurred over time, or for differences in ambivalence across national-level institutions, we are able to go beyond the studies of the 1940s and 1950s (and of the 1990s and 2000s for that matter) by examining ambivalence not just about government in the abstract, but about the three levels of government that share power within our federal system. This is especially useful as we seek to compare the impact of trust and ambivalence on attitudes regarding one aspect of public policy about which there is considerable discord about the proper role of government generally, and of the national government in particular.

Our main focus is a consideration of the impact of political trust and ambivalence on citizens' social welfare policy attitudes. Many Americans undoubtedly think of "social welfare" in terms of government checks, food stamps, subsidized housing, and the like; indeed, it is often defined as involving programs designed to ameliorate the social and economic disadvantages experienced by less fortunate members of society (Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Conceived more broadly, it includes the allocation of benefits such as good schools, retirement income, and medical care to poor and non-poor alike. This, of course, is the difference between *distributive* and *redistributive* policy, and a considerable amount of research (including our own; see Table 1

below) shows that Americans support the former (where benefits are widely shared) more than the latter (where those who pay the bulk of the costs do not receive the benefits).¹¹ Nevertheless, for reasons that are outlined in the following section, we have combined the two sets of preferences into a single index. The question we pose is simply this: Is opposition to "progressive public policy," at least within the social welfare realm, more strongly associated with low trust or with ambivalence about government in the United States?¹² Our results suggest the latter and, perhaps surprisingly, indicate that general ambivalence (regarding federal, state, and local levels together) matters more than ambivalence toward the principal providers of social welfare benefits, that is, the government in Washington.

Data and Measurement

The data used here are from a telephone poll conducted between May 10-22, 2004 by the *Florida Voter* survey organization. Six hundred and seven respondents were chosen randomly from a list of registered voters in the state of Florida. Only those whose names were drawn from the list were actually included in the sample; if needed, up to four callbacks were made to each working number in an effort to obtain a completed interview. A total of 67 questions were asked in the survey, which included measures of political trust, ambivalence about government, social welfare liberalism, and a variety of control variables. The margin of error is plus or minus four percentage points.¹³

Independent Variables: Trust and Ambivalence

Political trust is measured by an additive index constructed from two questions modeled

after standard ANES trust indicators (how often those who run the government can be trusted, whether government is run by a few big interests or for the benefit of all citizens), plus one question that asked respondents which of two statements comes closer to representing their own views: that government is almost always wasteful and inefficient, or that it often does a better job than people give it credit for. (See the appendix to this paper for complete question wordings.¹⁴) Alpha is 0.59, with both single items and the full index centered between 0 and 1. The Florida survey also included a single question (discussed more fully below) that was developed by Cook and Gronke (2005) to capture one's "active" trust or mistrust of government.

Our measure of *affective* ambivalence about government (as distinct from the cognitive aspect captured by McGraw and Bartels 2005) is based on experimental work done by social psychologists and adapted by Craig, Kane, and Martinez (2002) for use in surveys. The technique is a version of the semantic differential (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum 1957), as modified by Kaplan (1972) in an effort to show that people's overall attitudes are made up of both positive and negative elements. In order to separate the two, Kaplan divided semantic differential scales at the neutral point and asked respondents to indicate *both* how positively *and* how negatively they viewed an attitude object. For the present study, Kaplan's language was adapted to accommodate the limitations of a telephone survey. An initial series of questions tapping respondents' support for social welfare programs (see below) was introduced as follows:

I'm now going to read you a series of *statements* about the kinds of things some people think the government should be doing to address certain problems that are facing the country. After each, I'd like you to rate the statement on a 4-point scale to indicate how *positively* you feel toward it. . . .

Immediately following the social welfare battery, the identical format was used for a second set of questions:

Next, I'd like to do the same thing except with a list of different *government institutions* and *groups* that are active in politics. Once again: If you do not have any positive feelings toward the institution or group, give it the lowest rating of 1; if you have some positive feelings, rate it a 2; if you have generally positive feelings, rate it a 3; and if you have extremely positive feelings, rate it a 4. Please rate each institution or group based solely on how positively you feel about it, *while ignoring or setting aside for the moment any negative feelings you may have*. The first group is. . . .

Positive feelings were then measured regarding (1) the federal government in Washington; (2) the state government in Tallahassee; and (3) local government in the city or town where you live.¹⁵ After a number of filler questions (Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin 1995), negative feelings toward the different levels of government were assessed according to the same 1 to 4 scale.¹⁶

Because Kaplan's (1972) model for measuring ambivalence fails to account for the presence of polarized beliefs, we calculated an ambivalence score for each level of government using an algorithm developed by Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin (1995):

$$\text{Ambivalence} = [(P + N)/2] - |P - N|$$

where P is the positive reaction score and N is the negative reaction score. Scores for each item range from -0.5 ("extremely" positive and no negative feelings, or "extremely" negative and no positive) to +4.0 ("extremely" positive *and* negative feelings for the same statement; see Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002: 291-92). For purposes of the analysis presented here, scores of -0.5

and 0.0 ("generally" positive and no negative, or vice versa) are both considered to reflect an absence of ambivalence. Our multivariate models of social welfare liberalism were tested using separate measures of ambivalence toward federal, state, and local government, as well with an index that combined the three indicators ($\alpha = 0.61$).

Dependent Variable: Social Welfare Liberalism

Social welfare liberalism is measured by combining positive and negative answers to a series of items whose format is identical to that used for the ambivalence questions. Specifically, following (first) the introduction outlined in the previous section, and then (later in the interview; see appendix) by its negative counterpart, respondents were asked to indicate their feelings about seven aspects of social welfare policy; that is, they were asked how they felt about statements that the government should

- ensure that every citizen has adequate medical insurance;
- provide programs to help homeless people find a place to live;
- ensure that every child has access to a good education;
- provide programs that improve the standard of living of poor Americans;
- see to it that everyone who wants a job has one;
- provide childcare programs to assist working parents; and
- ensure that the retirement benefits that citizens have built up over the years are protected.

An index of social welfare liberalism (with scores centered between 0 and 1) was calculated by taking the sum of positive responses and inverted negative responses to these seven policy items.

Although substantive direction is made consistent by inverting the negative, we recognize that there may be some variation in how people respond to positive and negative question frames (see Abelson et al. 1982; Conover and Feldman 1986; Ottati, Steenbergen, and Riggle 1992). To verify the validity of our measure that combines answers to the two frames, we conducted reliability analyses of the positive feelings alone ($\alpha = 0.83$), the inverted negative feelings alone ($\alpha = 0.87$), and the overall index ($\alpha = 0.87$). We also ran separate regressions for positive and inverted negative feelings using the standard predictors of attitudes about social welfare (discussed in greater detail below). If the combined measure is valid, we would expect to see similar results for the magnitude and reliability of estimates across models. This is indeed the case, with the only meaningful difference being that income is a reliable predictor only in the positive feelings model.

As noted earlier, our data reinforce the notion that Americans are more likely to support distributive than redistributive social welfare programs. In Table 1, for example, we see that government efforts to provide a quality education for children and to protect citizens' retirement benefits are the most popular among registered voters in Florida, while programs to assist the homeless and to ensure that everyone has a job are endorsed less often. The relative popularity of these policies aside, however (and according to the figures displayed in column 3, respondents felt more positively than negatively about *all* of them¹⁷), a principal-components factor analysis revealed that all seven load on a single factor, six of them (retirement benefits is the exception) quite strongly.¹⁸

Table 1 about here

Control Variables

The literature suggests that certain core values are associated with citizens' attitudes about social welfare (Feldman 1988; Feldman and Zaller 1992; McCann 1997; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; Goren 2001; also see Gilens 1995).¹⁹ In particular, we expect to find that a general commitment to *egalitarianism* (not necessarily tied to economic leveling) is positively correlated, and that *economic individualism* (defined as a belief in the freedom to accumulate wealth) is negatively correlated with support for social welfare. To measure these concepts, respondents were read a series of companion statements and asked to say which came closer to their own opinion (see appendix). For egalitarianism, the choices centered around whether the country would benefit from (a) treating people more equally or (b) worrying less about making sure that everyone receives equal treatment. For economic individualism, the contrast involved (a) support for an activist government to ensure that people have jobs and to deal with complex economic problems versus (b) endorsement of the free market and the idea of letting each person get ahead on his own. The two sets of items were combined into indices with scores centered between 0 and 1 (high values reflecting stronger support for individualist or egalitarian values).²⁰ Respondents also were asked to indicate the importance they attached to various goals that the nation might choose to pursue, including both equality and a free marketplace.²¹

Prior research has embraced the idea that individuals' attitudes are shaped by feelings as well as cognitions (Breckler and Wiggins 1989; Esses, Haddock, and Zanna 1993; Millar and Tesser 1989). Studies suggest, for example, that feelings about the perceived beneficiaries of social welfare provide an affective base for attitudes about such policy (Kinder and Winter 2001; Nelson 1999; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Cook and Barrett 1992; Bobo and Kluegel

1993; Gilens 1995; also see Jacoby 2005). Apart from the obvious (poor people), many citizens think of African Americans as being among the principal beneficiaries of governmental welfare programs. Accordingly, *feelings about welfare beneficiaries* are measured by an index based on answers to four questions tapping respondents' positive and negative affect toward "poor people" and "blacks." As with our measure of social welfare liberalism, we simply inverted negative scores and added them to the positive responses, then centered the overall index between 0 and 1 (alpha = 0.77 for positive feelings, 0.87 for negative feelings, 0.70 for the four items together).

We also anticipate that *ideology* will (1) affect citizens' social welfare attitudes directly (conservatives being less supportive) and, based on the work of Rudolph and Evans (2005), (2) condition the relationship between political trust and governmental ambivalence on the one hand, and social welfare liberalism on the other; it is measured by respondents' self-placement on a scale ranging from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative). *Partisanship* is captured using the traditional 7-point scale, with Democrats expected to be more supportive of social welfare than Republicans.²² Other control variables in our multivariate analyses are *income* (Goren 2001), *race* (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Tate 1994; Gilens 1995; Kinder and Winter 2001), and *gender* (Gilens 1988; Kaufman and Petrocik 1999; Goren 2001), with the affluent, blacks, and women more likely than those with lower incomes, non-blacks, and men, respectively, to score high on social welfare liberalism.²³

Results

From the results shown in the top portion of Table 2, it is clear that voters in Florida, like their counterparts throughout the country, are not confident that government authorities can be

trusted to perform their jobs effectively and to represent the best interests of the general public in doing so. These indicators were designed to tap citizens' beliefs about government as a whole, rather than about the national government specifically (which is why the first item refers to "the people who run our government" rather than "the government in Washington," which is the standard ANES wording), and so we are hesitant to make any direct comparisons with studies that focus on the top tier in the U. S. federal system. We also should concede the arbitrariness of our decision to use item midpoints as the threshold for determining who is mistrustful (or cynical) and who is not. With these caveats in mind, however, it is nevertheless interesting to note that the percentage of respondents identified as mistrusting according to our alternative-choice measure of trust (Government Wasteful) is substantially lower than on the remaining two items. This suggests that the American public may not view its government as negatively as we sometimes are led to believe by the ANES trust index and similar measures. The same point has been made by Cook and Gronke (2005) and, indeed, our version of their active trust/mistrust question confirms that many more people fall near the middle than at either the positive or negative extreme; specifically, when asked to locate themselves on a scale ranging from 0 ("government can almost always be counted on to do the wrong thing") to 10 ("government can almost always be counted on to do the right thing"), 53.2 percent selected the midpoint of 5 ("government is right about half of the time and wrong the other half") and another 14.9 percent were positioned at either 4 or 6. These findings raise doubts about what it is that traditional trust questions, which often portray Americans today as deeply cynical, are actually measuring.

Table 2 about here

More critical for the argument at hand, the same is true for our measures of ambivalence

about government. Ambivalence as defined here involves a combination of positive *and* negative feelings, and the data reveal that many Florida voters do experience conflict – especially toward the government in Washington (77.1 percent with scores greater than zero), but to some extent toward state (69.5 percent) and local government (68.7 percent) as well. Further, people who are ambivalent about one level of government also tend to be ambivalent about the others (tau-b for national-state is .382, for national-local .154, and for state-local .282, all coefficients significant at $p < .05$). Although these relationships are far from overwhelming, they are strong enough that we have combined the three measures into a single index ($\alpha = 0.61$) for purposes of the analyses that follow. For the index, 88.3 percent of respondents have scores greater than zero; this constitutes evidence that most of them are not resolutely cynical, but rather that they harbor mixed feelings about government at all levels.

We should point out, by the way, that our measures of political trust, active trust/mistrust (Cook and Gronke 2005), and ambivalence about government capture three distinct orientations. Trust and active trust/mistrust are positively correlated (tau-b = .317, $p < .01$), though not to the degree that one might expect if the two indicators were tapping the same attitude. And neither is correlated with ambivalence, which is an interesting finding in its own right: Ambivalence is as common among citizens who exhibit a generally positive view of government as it is among those whose overall outlook tends to be more negative.²⁴

As for the relationship between these variables and social welfare liberalism, our findings are a bit of a surprise. The bivariate correlations, shown in Table 3, indicate that neither political trust nor active trust/mistrust is associated, at conventional levels of significance, with citizens' attitudes about social welfare policy. In fact, such relationships as we see (and they are obviously

very weak) are in the opposite direction from what we predicted based upon Hetherington's work, that is, support for social welfare programs is more likely to be found among those with higher rather than lower levels of trust, active or otherwise. In line with our expectations, however, ambivalence about government is negatively (if not particularly strongly) associated with social welfare liberalism. The surprise in this instance is that there is so little difference in the magnitude of the three individual coefficients. We anticipated that ambivalence about the federal government would have the greatest impact because it is Washington that is primarily responsible for the kinds of programs represented in our social welfare liberalism index. As it happens, the federal coefficient is actually a little weaker than its state and local counterparts.

Table 3 about here

As depicted in Table 4, these relationships hold up fairly well in a multivariate setting. Once again, neither traditional political trust nor active trust/mistrust has any impact on social welfare liberalism, while opposition to progressive programs continues to be greater, *ceteris paribus*, among respondents who are more ambivalent about government (as measured by the three-item index). In addition, the results of our most fully specified fourth model in Table 4 indicate that liberal views are especially likely to be found among those with positive feelings about blacks and poor people, a strong commitment to egalitarian values, a belief that equality is an important societal goal, less support for economic individualism, plus African Americans and Democratic identifiers. While ordered logit coefficients are more difficult to interpret than linear regression and binary logit coefficients, it is fair to say that the effect of ambivalence is weak compared to the effects of other variables. Nevertheless, unlike traditional trust and active trust/mistrust, the impact of ambivalence is statistically discernible from zero, and its inclusion

contributes to a more complete model of social welfare liberalism.²⁵

Table 4 about here

One possible explanation for our failure to observe a relationship between traditional political trust (as well as active trust/mistrust) and social welfare liberalism is suggested by the work of Rudolph and Evans (2005), who found opposition to both distributive and redistributive spending to be greater among conservatives, for whom government spending of any sort (except perhaps on programs related to defense and national security) might be considered a violation of their fundamental ideological beliefs.²⁶ Before conducting a multivariate test for the moderating effects of ideology, we wished to determine whether self-identified liberals and conservatives differed in their respective levels of trust (active and otherwise), ambivalence, and social welfare liberalism. As shown by the t-tests presented in Table 5, they did. Presumably as a result of the Republican majorities in both Washington and Tallahassee at the time of our survey (Citrin and Luks 2001; Keele 2005), conservatives exhibited higher levels of traditional trust – but not of active trust, where the two groups were statistically the same²⁷ – than did liberals. Conservatives also were more ambivalent (significantly so on the overall index and on feelings toward the state government in Tallahassee) and, as expected, less supportive of social welfare programs. None of this tells us, however, whether ideology plays the moderating role hypothesized by Rudolph and Evans.

Table 5 about here

In fact, just as we were unable to replicate Hetherington's observed relationship between trust and social welfare liberalism, the results outlined in Table 6 provide no evidence that this relationship is stronger among conservatives (who have the most to lose, at least symbolically,

when government spending rises) than among liberals. The main effects of the trust and active trust variables are statistically trivial, as are their interactions with the dummy variable for conservative ideology. The same is not true for ambivalence, however, as the sign of the conservative x ambivalence interaction is in the expected (negative) direction and significant; in other words, the impact of governmental ambivalence on social welfare attitudes is more pronounced among conservatives than among moderates and liberals. Further, the main effect of ambivalence is once again apparent, indicating that support for social welfare programs is weaker even among non-conservatives who express mixed positive and negative feelings about government in the United States.

Table 6 about here

Conclusion

The findings presented above suggest several important points. First, because traditional measures of political trust seem to be measuring skepticism rather than outright cynicism about government (Cook and Gronke 2005), the loss of trust since the 1960s may not be as serious a development as some have thought. Second, there is some evidence from the 1940s and 1950s that many Americans were ambivalent about government in the sense of possessing a mix of positive and negative beliefs and/or feelings; without long-term trend data we cannot determine how much this has changed over the past 50-60 years, but our direct measures of affective ambivalence leave little doubt that ambivalence about government at the federal, state, and local levels is a fairly common phenomenon in contemporary American politics (also see McGraw and Bartels 2005). Third, while neither traditional political trust (Hetherington 2005) nor active trust/

mistrust appear to be a primary source of support for social welfare programs, ambivalence does have a significant if modest impact: Citizens with conflicted feelings about government are less likely to endorse progressive policy action in the social welfare realm. Fourth, the relationship between ambivalence and social welfare liberalism is stronger among conservative identifiers than among their liberal counterparts (see Rudolph and Evans 2005).

Especially given that (1) our data are from a single state rather than the nation as a whole, and (2) several of our key indicators differ to some degree from those employed by other scholars, it obviously would be premature for us to reject the Hetherington thesis (either in its original form or as amended by Rudolph and Evans) altogether. We do believe, however, that it is imperative for scholars to continue investigating citizens' conflicting views about governmental leaders and institutions (and many other things), the extent to which such ambivalence can help us to understand better the post-1964 era of diminished public trust, and the impact that both cognitive and affective ambivalence have on a range of other political attitudes and behaviors. The consequences of ambivalence, in particular, warrant closer examination. For now it appears that ambivalence about government reduces the likelihood of support for social welfare programs, especially among people who normally oppose higher levels of governmental activity and spending in those areas. We suspect that this may turn out to be only the tip of the iceberg.

Notes

1. In fact, confidence in the national government began to rise in the mid-1990s, peaking in 2001-02 and then started falling once again (Pew Center for the People and the Press 2006).

2. Hetherington and Nelson (2003; also see Chanley 2002; Alford 2001; Brands 2001; Hetherington and Rudolph 2006) argue that rally-induced surges in political trust tend to be short-lived because the crisis-induced events that inspire them prime citizens to evaluate government according to different criteria than usual, for example, national security and the war on terrorism (policy areas where people are more inclined to approve of whatever actions leaders may take, at least until those actions prove ineffective).

3. We are aware of no long-term trend data that would allow us to determine how trust in state and local governments has risen or fallen since the 1960s. It does not appear, however, that much has changed during the period since 9/11 (Cole and Kincaid 2006). We will have more to say about citizens' attitudes toward the different levels of government later in this paper.

4. On the idea of "elite-challenging" behavior, see Inglehart (1977); Craig (1993).

5. See Tyler and Degoey (1996); Scholz and Lubell (1998); Hetherington (1999); Craig, Kreppel, and Kane (2001); Lowery and Sigelman (1981); Sears and Citrin (1985); Karp (1995); Rudolph (2005); Hetherington and Nugent (2001); Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn (2000); Hetherington and Globetti (2002); Hetherington (2005); Rudolph and Evans (2005).

6. We refer here mainly to the questions asked regularly in American National Election Study surveys: (a) How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right – just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time? (b) Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for

themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? (c) Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it? (d) Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked at all? If there is a consensus based on analyses of the ANES index and similar measures, it is that "(c)itizens trust government when it has performed well and withdraw trust when they are displeased with the state of things" (Stimson 2004: 153; also see Citrin and Luks 2001; Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; Chanley 2002; Bishop 2005; Hetherington 2005). Political trust has a strong partisan component as well, which is to say that supporters of the in-party (most notably, the party of the president) tend to be more trusting than those who support the opposition (Citrin and Luks 2001; Keele 2005; also see Craig et al. 2006).

7. We make no effort to measure ambivalence at the regime level (Easton 1965). There is considerable evidence both past (Almond and Verba 1963) and present (Smith 2006) which leads us to suspect that, at least in the United States, it would be relatively low.

8. More recently, after examining respondents' open-ended comments regarding social welfare policy, Zaller and Feldman (1992: 585) concluded that "[m]ost people possess opposing considerations on most issues, that is, considerations that might lead them to decide the issue either way." As has been noted elsewhere (Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002), this kind of inferential approach to measuring ambivalence is problematic and potentially misleading since the ability to enumerate reasons for both supporting and opposing a policy does not, in and of itself, signify the presence of an underlying conflict. The same point applies to people's attitudes about government: holding "opposing considerations" such as those described above could

reflect any number of factors other than ambivalence (Alvarez and Brehm 1995: 1056-57).

9. Indeed, the lead question of the ANES battery outlined in note 6 specifically directs respondents' attention to "the government in Washington."

10. For somewhat different perspectives, see Uslander (2001); Rahn and Rudolph (2005); Gershtenson and Plane (2006). According to Jennings (1998; also see Hetherington and Nugent 2001), this ranking results from diminished confidence in the national government rather than from an increase in the absolute level of confidence in state and local governments.

11. For example, see Bennett and Bennett (1990); Bardes and Oldendick (2003).

12. Although the argument here can be applied to a range of policies, from foreign aid to affirmative action to the ownership of firearms (Hetherington 2005; Hetherington and Globetti 2002; Jiobu and Curry 2001), it does not necessarily embrace "all things that government does." According to Hetherington (2005: 4), "people do not need to trust the government much when they benefit from it. Instead, people need to trust the government when they pay the costs but do not receive the benefits," that is, when they are required to make sacrifices that might otherwise be viewed as punitive or unfair. As Rudolph and Evans (2005) noted, however, the notion of "sacrifice" is not limited to matters involving dollars and cents. In their study, mistrust was found to be associated with greater opposition to distributive as well as redistributive spending, much more so among those for whom government spending in general often entails a violation (or "sacrifice") of their ideological principles: self-identified conservatives.

13. Using American Association for Public Opinion Research's final disposition standards (AAPOR 2000; also see <http://www.aapor.org/pdfs/standarddefs2004.pdf>), the response rate was 39.2 percent. Additional information regarding the survey can be obtained from *Florida Voter*

directly (954-584-0204), or from the Graduate Program in Political Campaigning in the Political Science Department at the University of Florida (352-392-0262). We addressed the pervasive problem of missing data in analyses of survey research by using a multiple imputation process. Using this procedure, five replicate datasets were created based on the data, where the missing data in each replication are substituted with draws from the posterior distribution of the missing value conditional on observed values (Little and Rubin 1987; see also Horton and Lipsitz 2001). The analyses that follow are based on the mean results of the five replicate imputed datasets.

14. Because the third item regarding governmental waste and inefficiency is probably unfamiliar to most scholars who have done research on political trust (and different from the 4-item ANES index utilized in Hetherington 2005), we also ran our analyses using just the "trust government" and "few big interests" questions. Results did not differ in any significant way from what is reported below.

15. This particular battery (and its negative counterpart) also measured citizens' feelings toward the Republican Party, the Democratic Party, poor people, blacks, and whites.

16. The introduction for this second set of questions simply changed the words "positive" and "positively" to "negative" and "negatively." If a respondent seemed unsure or confused at any point (answering either positive or negative items), the interviewer repeated the instructions as many times as necessary.

17. This is not to say that different question wording, or a listing that included more controversial government programs (such as food stamps or race-targeted spending; see Jacoby 2005), would produce the same results.

18. The eigenvalue for this factor was 3.696, explaining 52.8 percent of the variance.

19. Other core values may be important as well. For example, Feldman and Steenbergen (2001: 659) found that *humanitarianism*, defined as "the belief that people have responsibilities toward their fellow human beings and should come to the assistance of others in need" also is a significant predictor of support for social welfare.

20. Although inter-item correlations ($\tau\text{-}b = .16$ for individualism, $.22$ for egalitarianism, $p < .01$ in each instance) were not as high as we might have liked, they were sufficient to warrant our using the two indices in our analysis.

21. Research points to the existence of value hierarchies (Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992; Jacoby 2002). If social welfare attitudes are shaped, in part, by egalitarian and individualist values (Feldman 1988; Feldman and Zaller 1992; McCann 1997; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; Goren 2001), and if many place greater importance on one as opposed to the other, it is reasonable to expect that the latter will contribute to the structure of their attitudes about social welfare.

22. Separate dummy variables were created for Democrat and Republican identification (0 = not Democrat and 1 = Democrat, 0 = not Republican and 1 = Republican). All independents and independent leaners were coded as 0.

23. Race is a dummy variable coded 1 for black, 0 for non-black. Because Latinos in the aggregate are more liberal, at least on certain issues, than whites (Welch and Sigelman 1993; DeSipio 1996; Uhlaner, Gray, and Garcia 2000; Alvarez and Bedolla 2003), we might normally expect their level of support for social welfare to be similar to that found among blacks and women. Unfortunately, this proposition cannot be tested because our survey did not distinguish among different groups of Latino citizens. We know, for example, that Cubans tend to be more

conservative than other Latinos (especially Puerto Ricans, but also Mexicans; see de la Garza et al. 1992), and there is a large Cuban population in Florida. As a result, it is not surprising to learn that the Latinos in the *Florida Voter* survey do not, on average, differ significantly from whites in terms of the variables that are most critical to our analysis.

24. Those who are ambivalent about state government in Florida are slightly *more* likely to say that the people who run our government can be trusted ($\text{tau-b} = .08, p < .05$), while those who express ambivalence about their local government are slightly *less* inclined to believe that government often does a better job than it is given credit for ($\text{tau-b} = -.07, p < .05$). All other correlations involving the trust and ambivalence indices, as well as their individual components, are statistically equivalent to zero.

25. We also estimated three other models, each of which contained one of the component terms from the ambivalence index. Across the board, ambivalence is associated with greater opposition to social welfare programs ($p < .05$ for both state and local, $p < .10$ for federal).

26. Liberals are those who score 1, 2, or 3 on the seven-point scale, while conservatives are those who score 5, 6, or 7.

27. At the risk of overinterpretation, our first reaction to this finding is that the active trust/mistrust question evokes a longer-term perspective than traditional trust measures; this may have led some conservative respondents to focus on government in general rather than on the short-term advantage enjoyed by their preferred party in 2004.

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Appendix

Question wordings for most variables in our analysis are provided below. High scores reflect greater trust, ambivalence, and active trust of government; greater liberalism on social welfare issues; stronger commitment to individualism and egalitarianism; more positive feelings toward welfare beneficiaries; conservative self-identification; Democratic partisanship; and black, high income, and female on demographics.

Political Trust. (1) How much of the time do you think you can trust the people who run our government to do what is right – just about always, most of the time, only some of the time, or almost never? (2) Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? Do you feel strongly or not so strongly about this? (3) Next, I'm going to read two statements and ask you to tell me which one comes closer to your own opinion. You might agree to some extent with both, but we want to know which one is closer to your views: Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient; or Government often does a better job than people give it credit for. Do you feel strongly or not so strongly about this? (*Answers to the second and third items were originally coded from 1 to 5, with those who offered a "mixed" response placed in the middle.*)

Affective Ambivalence about Government. See text for complete wordings.

Active Trust/Mistrust of Government. People have different views about how well government works. Imagine a scale with scores ranging from zero through 10, where "0" means that government can almost always be counted on to do the *wrong thing*, "10" means that government can almost always be counted on to do the *right thing*, and "5" means that government is *right about half of the time and wrong the other half*. Where on this scale would you place yourself?

Social Welfare Liberalism. I'm now going to read you a series of statements about the kinds of things some people think the government should be doing to address certain problems that are facing the country. After each, I'd like you to rate the statement on a 4-point scale to indicate how *positively* [*negatively*] you feel toward it. If you do not have any positive [*negative*] feelings, give it the lowest rating of 1; if you have some positive [*negative*] feelings, rate it a 2; if you have generally positive [*negative*] feelings, rate it a 3; and if you have extremely positive [*negative*] feelings, rate it a 4. Please rate each statement based solely on how positively [*negatively*] you feel about it, *while ignoring or setting aside for the moment any negative* [*positive*] feelings you may have. The first statement is . . . (1) The government should ensure that every citizen has adequate medical insurance. (2) The government should provide programs to help homeless people find a place to live. (3) The government should ensure that every child has access to a good education. (4) The government should provide programs that improve the standard of living of poor Americans. (5) The government should see to it that everyone who wants a job has one. (6) The government should provide child care programs to assist working parents. (7) The government should ensure that the retirement benefits that citizens have built up over the years are protected.

Economic Individualism. [Which of the following statements is closer to your own opinion?] (1) The government should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living; or The government should just let each person get ahead on their own. Do you feel strongly or not so strongly about this? (2) We need a strong government to handle today's complex economic problems; or The free market can handle these problems without government being involved. Do you feel strongly or not so strongly about this? (*Answers were originally coded from 1 to 5, with*

those who offered a "mixed" response placed in the middle.)

Egalitarianism. [Which of the following statements is closer to your own opinion?] (1) We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country; or We should do more to make sure that everyone is treated equally. Do you feel strongly or not so strongly about this? (2) If people were treated more equally in this country, we would have many fewer problems; or This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are. Do you feel strongly or not so strongly about this? (*Answers were originally coded from 1 to 5, with those who offered a "mixed" response placed in the middle.*)

Importance of Core Values. As you know, not everyone agrees on the different goals or values that our nation ought to pursue. I'm going to list three different goals and have you tell me how important each of them is to you personally. (a) The first goal is equality, by which we mean a narrowing of the gap in wealth and power between rich and poor. How important is equality to you – extremely important, important, only somewhat important, or not important at all? . . . (b) And the third goal is a free marketplace, by which we mean all citizens having a chance to get ahead on their own without the government getting involved. How important is a free marketplace to you – extremely important, important, only somewhat important, or not important at all? (Note: The second goal, not examined in this paper, had to do with "traditional values, by which we mean encouraging people to live their lives according to a higher moral code.")

Feelings about Welfare Beneficiaries. [Asked as part of the same batteries of questions that were used to measure social welfare liberalism and ambivalence about government; see above for exact wording.] Positive and negative feelings toward (a) poor people and (b) blacks.

Ideology. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. On a scale of one

through seven, where "1" is very liberal and "7" is very conservative, where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this?

Party Identification. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (If Republican or Democrat) Would you call yourself a strong (Republican/Democrat) or a not very strong (Republican/Democrat)? (If Independent) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?

Race. Is your race or ethnic identity white, African-American, Hispanic, or something else?

Income. Again, I want to thank you for your cooperation on this completely confidential survey? Would you say your household's approximate yearly income bracket is . . . (a) less than \$10,000; (b) between \$10,000 and \$30,000; (c) between \$30,000 and \$50,000; (d) between \$50,000 and \$70,000; (e) \$70,000 or more?

Gender. [Recorded by the interviewer without asking, unless it was necessary to do so.]

Table 1
Distribution of Responses and Factor Loadings for Social Welfare Liberalism

<u>Policy Area</u>	<u>Mean Score</u>	<u>Standard Deviation</u>	<u>Percent Liberal</u>	<u>Factor Loading</u>
Medical	6.61	1.79	72.7	.78
Homeless	5.82	1.69	55.0	.78
Education	7.18	1.33	83.5	.66
Standard of Living	6.00	1.61	59.6	.79
Job Guarantee	5.82	1.85	54.9	.79
Child Care	5.95	1.82	59.1	.73
Retirement Benefits	7.13	1.35	81.7	.53

Note: Data are from a statewide (Florida) survey of registered voters conducted in May 2004. Table entries indicate (a) mean score for each item (ranging between 2 and 8, with higher scores reflecting positive feelings); (b) associated standard deviation; (c) percentage of respondents with scores above the scale midpoint (more positive than negative); and (d) loadings based on a principal components factor analysis, varimax rotation. N = 607 using a multiple imputation process for dealing with missing data (see note 13).

Table 2
 Distribution of Responses for Political Trust, Active Trust/Mistrust,
 and Ambivalence about Government

	<u>Mean Score</u>	<u>Standard Deviation</u>	<u>Percent Mistrusting/Ambivalent</u>
<u>Political Trust</u>			
Do What Is Right	0.44	0.25	63.1
Big Interests	0.31	0.37	65.4
Government Wasteful	0.48	0.39	44.0
Political Trust Index	0.41	0.25	64.6
<u>Active Trust/Mistrust</u>			
Wrong Thing/Right Thing	5.12	1.65	73.0
<u>Ambivalence</u>			
Federal Government	1.22	1.03	77.1
State Government	1.10	1.09	69.5
Local Government	1.09	1.11	68.7
Ambivalence Index	3.41	2.43	88.3

Note: Data are from a statewide (Florida) survey of registered voters conducted in May 2004. Table entries indicate (a) mean score for each item (ranging between 0-1 for individual trust items as well as the overall index, 0-10 for active trust/mistrust, -0.5 and +4.0 for ambivalence items, -1.5 and +12.0 for the ambivalence index); (b) associated standard deviation; and (c) percentage of respondents with scores below the midpoint for trust, at or below the midpoint for active trust/mistrust, and above zero for ambivalence. N = 607 using a multiple imputation process for dealing with missing data (see note 13).

Table 3
 Bivariate Correlations between Political Trust, Active Trust/Mistrust,
 Ambivalence about Government, and Social Welfare Liberalism

	<u>Social Welfare Liberalism</u>
<u>Political Trust</u>	
Do What Is Right	-.01
Big Interests	-.05
Government Wasteful	-.01
Political Trust Index	-.04
<u>Active Trust/Mistrust</u>	
Wrong Thing/Right Thing	-.06
<u>Ambivalence</u>	
Federal Government	-.06*
State Government	-.11*
Local Government	-.10*
Ambivalence Index	-.11*

Note: Data are from a statewide (Florida) survey of registered voters conducted in May 2004. Table entries are Kendall's tau-b, with an asterisk (*) indicating significance at $p < .05$ (2-tailed test). Missing values were replaced using multiple imputation.

Table 4
Modeling Social Welfare Liberalism

	<u>Model 1</u>	<u>Model 2</u>	<u>Model 3</u>	<u>Model 4</u>
Political Trust Index	-0.27 (0.28)	-0.03 (0.31)	-0.10 (0.31)	0.08 (0.34)
Active Trust/Mistrust	--	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)
Ambivalence about Government	--	--	-0.13* (0.03)	-0.09* (0.03)
Feelings/Beneficiaries	--	--	--	2.75* (0.36)
Economic Individualism	--	--	--	-1.92* (0.26)
Individualism Importance	--	--	--	-0.05 (0.26)
Egalitarianism	--	--	--	0.74* (0.26)
Egalitarianism Importance	--	--	--	1.60* (0.27)
Ideology	--	--	--	-0.07 (0.05)
Republican	--	--	--	-0.15 (0.21)
Democrat	--	--	--	0.40* (0.19)
Black	--	--	--	0.93* (0.27)
Female	--	--	--	0.06 (0.15)
Income	--	--	--	0.06 (0.08)
-2 log likelihood	1531.44	2525.38	3674.34	3658.24
Nagelkerke Pseudo R ²	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.39
N	607	607	607	607

Note: Data are from a statewide (Florida) survey of registered voters conducted in May 2004. Table entries are ordered logit estimates (threshold levels not shown, standard errors in parentheses), with an asterisk (*) indicating significance at $p \leq .05$ (2-tailed test). Missing values were replaced using multiple imputation.

Table 5
 Difference of Means for Political Trust, Active Trust/Mistrust, Ambivalence about
 Government, and Social Welfare Liberalism by Ideology

	<u>Liberals</u>	<u>Conservatives</u>	<u>t</u>	<u>P-Value</u>
<u>Political Trust</u>				
Do What Is Right	0.38	0.47	3.51	0.00
Big Interests	0.19	0.37	4.86	0.00
Government Wasteful	0.44	0.49	1.19	0.24
Political Trust Index	0.34	0.44	4.17	0.00
<u>Active Trust/Mistrust</u>				
Wrong Thing/Right Thing	5.02	5.10	-1.00	0.32
<u>Ambivalence</u>				
Federal Government	1.13	1.25	1.20	0.23
State Government	0.84	1.20	3.24	0.00
Local Government	0.98	1.14	1.40	0.16
Ambivalence Index	2.94	3.59	2.57	0.00
<u>Policy Preferences</u>				
Social Welfare Liberalism	0.80	0.70	-5.07	0.00

Note: Data are from a statewide (Florida) survey of registered voters conducted in May 2004. Table entries are mean scores (centered between 0 and 1 for political trust and social welfare liberalism), along with the associated t-statistics and probability (equal variances assumed) that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between liberals and conservatives on these items. Missing values were replaced using multiple imputation.

Table 6
Testing for the Moderating Effects of Ideology

	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Standard Error</u>	<u>95% Confidence Interval</u>
Political Trust Index	0.06	0.34	-0.60 to 0.72
Active Trust/Mistrust	0.02	0.05	-0.07 to 0.12
Ambivalence about Government	-0.09	0.03	-0.15 to -0.02
Feelings/Beneficiaries	2.68	0.38	1.94 to 3.42
Economic Individualism	-1.93	0.27	-2.47 to -1.40
Individualism Importance	-0.05	0.26	-0.55 to 0.46
Egalitarianism	0.79	0.27	0.27 to 1.31
Egalitarianism Importance	1.62	0.28	1.07 to 2.16
Republican	-0.22	0.21	-0.63 to 0.19
Democrat	0.36	0.19	-0.02 to 0.74
Black	0.89	0.27	0.35 to 1.42
Female	0.09	0.15	-0.20 to 0.37
Income	0.05	0.08	-0.10 to 0.20
Conservative	-0.11	0.16	-0.43 to 0.20
Conservative x Political Trust	-0.00	0.20	-0.39 to 0.38
Conservative x Active Trust/Mistrust	0.02	0.02	-0.02 to 0.07
Conservative x Ambivalence	-0.03	0.02	-0.07 to 0.00
-2 log likelihood	3656.83		
Nagelkerke Pseudo R ²	0.40		
N	607		

Note: Data are from a statewide (Florida) survey of registered voters conducted in May 2004. Table entries are ordered logit coefficients (threshold levels not shown), associated standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals. Missing values were replaced using multiple imputation.