PHI6326

SEMINAR IN PHILOSOPHY OF MIND:  PHYSICALISM

 

You may find the course syllabus here.

 

Here is a schedule of the dates you are required to make a contribution to the discussion list.

 

Assigned readings will be announced via the email discussion list on a weekly basis.  Except for the book by Andrew Melnyk, those readings will be made available on this website as PDF files.  Remember that you'll need the password to open & download them.

 

Assigned papers:

 

For 1-14:

 

Kim, Philosophy of Mind (2nd edition):  Chapter1, Chapter4, Chapter5, Chapter6.

Stoljar, "Physicalism" entry in SEP.

Witmer, "Physicalism" entry in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Science.

 

For 1-28:

 

J. J. C. Smart.  1978. "The Content of Physicalism."  Philosophical Quarterly 28:  339-341.

Tim Crane and D. H. Mellor.  1990.  "There is No Question of Physicalism."  Mind 99:  185-206

Barbara Montero.  1999.  "The Body Problem."  Nous 33:  183-200.

Daniel Stoljar.  2001.  "Two Conceptions of the Physical."  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62:  253-281.

 

ADDENDUM:  Tim Crane and D. H. Mellor. 1995.  "Postscript to 'There is No Question of Physicalism'."  In Paul K. Moser and J. D. Trout, eds., Contemporary Materialism:  A Reader.  Routledge.  Pages 85-89.

 

For 2-4:

 

Jessica Wilson. 2006. "On Characterizing the Physical." Philosophical Studies 131(1): 61-99.

David Spurrett and David Papineau.  1999. "A Note on the Completeness of 'Physics'." Analysis 59(1): 25-29.

Carl Gillett and D. Gene Witmer. 2001. "A 'Physical' Need: Physicalism and the Via Negativa." Analysis 61(4): 302-309.

Barbara Montero and David Papineau. 2005. "A Defence of the via negativa Argument for Physicalism." Analysis 65, pt. 3(287): 233-237.

 

For 2-11:

 

Terence Horgan.  1993.  "From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World."  Mind 102: 555-586.

Andrew Melnyk.  2003.  A Physicalist Manifesto.  Chapters 1-2.

NOTE:  There is a typo on p. 56 of Melnyk's book.  There are two indented theses on that page, both labelled "GS".  The second is supposed to be "GSR."

 

For 2-18:

 

We're playing catch up.

 

Read/review the Melnyk book, chapters 1-2, as earlier assigned.

Read:  Jaegwon Kim, 1998.  Mind in a Physical World.  MIT Press.  Chapter 1 ("The Mind-Body Problem:  Where We Now Are.")

Perhaps review as well chapter 6 of Kim's introductory text/survey Philosophy of Mind (2nd edition), which is focused on functionalism.

 

For 2-25:

 

Continue with the Melnyk book, chapters 1-2.

 

Two new readings (both pretty short):

Carl Gillett.  2002.  "The Dimensions of Realization:  A Critique of the Standard View."  Analysis 62:  316-323.

D. Gene Witmer.  Unpublished.  "Realization and the Promise of Explanatory Import."  (Short FPA version from November 2007.)

 

For 3-3:

 

We've yet to discuss the two new readings from last time, so the agenda for 3-3 will be those two (Gillett's paper and my own) and then this one as well:

Sydney Shoemaker.  2001.  "Realization and Mental Causation."  In Carl Gillett and Barry Loewer, eds., Physicalism and Its Discontents.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press.

 

For 3-10:

No meeting - spring break!

 

For 3-17:

 

Melnyk's book, chapter 3, "Realizationism and R*d*ct**n*sm."

Steven Horst.  2007.  "The Demise of Reductionism."  Chapter 3 from Beyond Reduction:  Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science.  Oxford University Press.

 

Additional reading:  My review of Horst's book.

 

For 3-24:

 

Philip Kitcher.  1984.  "1953 and All That.  A Tale of Two Sciences."  The Philosophical Review 93:  335-373.

Melnyk's book, chapter 4:  "Causation and Explanation in a Realizationist World."

 

For 3-31:

 

We're playing catch up again.  For 3-31 we'll focus just on Kitcher's paper (above) and Melnyk's chapter 4.

 

For 4-7:

 

For this session, we will have to end early, as I need to attend a special faculty assembly at 3 p.m.

Melnyk's book, chapter 5 ("The Evidence Against Realization Physicalism")

 

For 4-14:

 

Melnyk's book, chapter 6 ("The Evidence For Realization Physicalism."

 

For 4-21:

 

We have two tasks for our final session:  to finish up our discussion of Melnyk's book and to discuss a priori physicalism and my immodest attempt to solve the problem of consciousness, viz.:  D. Gene Witmer.  2006.  "How To Be A (Sort of) A Priori Physicalist." Philosophical Studies 131:  185-225.

 

The first draft of your term paper is due by Friday, May 2nd, no later than 5 p.m. The final draft is due by Friday, May 23rd, no later than 5 p.m.

Remember:  I will assign a preliminary grade for bureaucratic purposes, but the final grade is determined by the final draft you hand in later, and the same dire threat applies.