DRAFT!!
POS 6476
Bureaucratic Politics in the U.S.
Spring, 2013
T 5-7
216 Anderson Hall
Prof. David Hedge
Office: 218 Anderson
Phone: 273-2367
E-mail: dhedge@ufl.edu
Office Hours: MWF 8:30-10:00 and by appt
Public bureaucracies are at the very center of government and for that matter American society. This semester we will consider how bureaucracies relate to one another and their political, economic, and social environments in (primarily) the American political system. More particularly, we will examine the means by which citizens and their governments achieve (or not) accountability and control of the administrative sector. Among the topics we will consider are the growth of the administrative sector, political control of bureaucracy, “bottom-up’ democracy, regulatory federalism, and networks. A number of questions guide that analysis.
How has the administrative sector changed over the course of American history? What factors are responsible for those changes? What is the nature and source (s) of bureaucratic power in America?
What tools do various political actors use to control and oversee public bureaucracies? How effective are those tools?
What role does the bureaucratic sector play in American politics and governance?
How do the problems of accountability and control play out in a federal system of government or where responsibility for policy is shared with the private sector?
Required Texts
Richard Nathan. 1975. The Plot that Failed: Nixon and The Administrative Presidency. John Wiley. (used copies available through ebay, Barnes and Noble or Amazon.com)
David E. Lewis. 2003. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design. Stanford University Press.
Daniel P. Carpenter. 2001. The Forging of
Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy
Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928. Princeton
University Press.
Additional readings are available on-line through the UF library or can be found on the course cd (labeled @below).
Expectations
1. Class time will be spent reviewing the week's readings. While the readings are often extensive, I expect them to be read (and on time) and I expect you to be prepared to summarize, critique, and draw implications from each of the assigned readings (you will be asked to write a brief 1-2 page reaction paper most weeks). My role will simply be to guide the discussion. I do not intend to lecture. As with all my courses, I do not take attendance. Nonetheless I expect you to attend each class and participate in class discussion.
2. At the midpoint of the semester I will ask you to write a synthesis paper that summarizes and critiques the literature on political control of the bureaucracy.
3. Each of you will also write a 15-page research paper on some aspect of bureaucratic life. My intention is to use some of class time most weeks to talk to each of you individually about your papers.
Grading
33% Class Participation and
Weekly Reaction Papers
33% Synthesis Papers
33% Research Paper
Incompletes are only given in rare and deserving cases and at the discretion of the instructor. Student who believe that they will not be able to complete all the requirements for the course in due time have to discuss an “I” (Incomplete) grade with the instructor before the research paper is due. Students will have to sign an “Incomplete Contract” (available at http://www.clas.ufl.edu/forms/) and complete all their requirements by a set date. Students should be aware that “I” grades become punitive after one term.
Honor Code: Academic honesty and integrity are fundamental values of the University community. An academic honesty offense is defined as the act of lying, cheating, or stealing academic information so that one gains academic advantage. In the event that a student is found cheating or plagiarizing, s/he will receive a zero for the assignment and will be reported to Student Judicial Affairs. For more information, go to: http://www.dso.ufl.edu/studentguide/studentrights.php
Students with disabilities requesting classroom accommodation must first register with the Dean of Students Office. The Dean of Students Office will provide documentation to the student who must then provide this documentation to the Instructor when requesting accommodation. Anyone with a disability should feel free to see the professor during office hours to make the necessary arrangements.
Course Outline, Schedule, and Readings
January 8 -- Introduction to Course
January 15 -- The Rise of the Administrative Sector
Michael Nelson. 1982. "A Short Ironic History of
American National Bureaucracy." Journal of Politics.
44:747-778. e-journal
Daniel P. Carpenter. 2001. The Forging of
Bureaucratic Autonomy. Princeton University Press, Intro, Ch.
1,2, and Conclusion and either
a) Ch. 3, 4, 5 (postal service) or b) Ch. 6,7,8,9 (USDA).
Steven Skownorek. 1981. Preface, Ch. 1 and Epilogue. Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920. Cambridge University Press. @
Richard Nathan. 1975. The Plot that Failed: Richard Nixon and the Administrative Presidency.
David Hedge. Forthcoming, 2013. "George W.
Bush and Political Control of the Bureaucracy," White House
Studies.
Terry M. Moe. 1985. “Control and Feedback in Economic
Regulation: The Case of the NLRB.” American Political Science
Review 79 (December): 1094–1117. e-journal
B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman. 1991. “The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy.” American Political Science Review. 85 (September): 801-28. e-journal
Daniel Carpenter. 1996. “Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation.” American Political Science Review. 90 (June): 283-302. e-journal
Barry Weingast and Mark Moran.1983. "Bureaucratic
discretion or congressional control? Regulatory policymaking by
the Federal Trade Commission." Journal of Political Economy
91(5): 765. e-journal
Charles R. Shipan. 2004. "Regulatory Regimes, Agency
Actions, and the Conditional Nature of Congressional
Influence." American Political Science Review. 98
(August): 467-480. e-journal
Jason McDonald, 2010. "Limitation Riders and Congressional
Influence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions."American Political
Science Review. 104 (November): 766-782.
e-journal
February 5-- Congressional Control and Oversight II
Matthew D. McCubbins. 1999. “Abdication or Delegation? Congress, the Bureaucracy, and the Delegation Dilemma.” Regulation, 22 (2) 30 -37. e-journal
Balla, Steven J. 1998. “Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy.” American Political Science Review 92 (September): 663-673. e-journal
David Hedge and Renee Johnson. 2002. “The Plot that Failed: The Republican Revolution and Political Control of the Bureaucracy.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 12 (3) 333-351. e-journal
Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee. 2010. “Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal Rule-making “Ossified”? Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 20 (2): 261-282. e-journal
Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Fall): 243-277. e-journal
Recommended:
Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwarz.1985. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms." American Journal of Political Science. 28(1): 165. e-journal
Balla, Steven J., and John R. Wright.
2001. “Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and Congressional
Control of the Bureaucracy.” American Journal of Political
Science 45, (October): 799-812 e-journal
February 12 – Presidents, Congress, and Agency Design
David E. Lewis. 2003. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design.
February 19 --The Courts and Bureaucracy
James Q. Wilson. 1989. Chapter 15 “Courts.” in Bureaucracy: What Governments Do and Why They Do It. Basic Books.
Kenneth Meier and John Bohte. 2007. “Judicial Controls on Bureaucratic Power,” pp. 151-156. in Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government. Thompson Wadsworth.
William Gormley. 1989. Chapter 3, "Due Process" in Taming the Bureaucracy (Princeton University Press).
Brandice Canes-Wrone. 2003. “Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts.” American Journal of Political Science. 47 (April) 205-214. e-journal
Joseph Smith. 2005. “Congress Opens the Courthouse Doors: Statutory Changes Under the Clean Air Act.” Political Research Quarterly. 58 (March) 139-149. e-journal
Reginald Sheehan. 1990. “Administrative Agencies and the Court: A Reexamination of the Impact of Agency Type on Decisional Outcomes.” Western Political Quarterly. pp. 875-885. e-journal
February 26 – SYNTHESIS PAPER DUE
March 5 -- SPRING BREAK
March 12 -- Interest Groups and the Question of Capture
James Q. Wilson. 1989, Chapter 5, “Interest,” in
Bureaucracy: Why Government Agencies Do and Why They Do
It.
Richard Posner. 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation."
The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science. 5
(August): 335-358.
Jeffrey Cohen. 1986. The Dynamics of the “revolving door” on the FCC.” American Journal of Political Science. e-journal
Gordon and Hafer. 2005. “Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to Bureaucracy.” American Political Science Review. e-journal
Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee. 2006. “A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy.” Journal of Politics, Vol. 68, No. 1 (February): 128-139. e-journal
March 19 --Networks I -- Federalism
Hedge, D.M., Scicchitano, M.J., & Metz, P.
(1991). “The Principal-agent Model and Regulatory
Federalism.” Western Political Quarterly, 44, 1055-1080.
e-journal
Bradbury, John C. (2006). “Regulatory Federalism
and Workplace Safety: Evidence from OSHA Enforcement.”
Journal of Regulatory Economics. 29, 221-224. e-journal
Woods, Neal D. (2008). “Serving Two Masters? State
Implementation of Federal Regulatory Policy.” Public
Administration Quarterly. 32, 571-595. e-journal
Chubb, John, 1985. "The Political Economy of
Federalism." American Political Science Review. 79
(December: 994-1015. e-journal
Jonathon G.S. Koppell. 2003. Ch. 1-3. The Politics of Quasi-Government Hybrid Organizations and the Dynamics of Bureaucratic Control. Cambridge University Press.
Christine A. Kelleher. 2008. “A Political Consequence of Contracting: Organized Interests and State Agency Decision Making.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 19: 579-602.
Kristina T. Lambright. 2008. “Agency Theory and
Beyond: Contracted Provider’s Motivations to Properly Use
Service Monitoring Tools.” Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory. 19: 207-227.
April 2 -- To Be Announced
April 9-- Work on Papers
April 16 – Work on Papers
April 23 – Work on Papers
Monday, April 29 – Research Paper Due
6933
Bureaucratic Politics in the U.S.
Spring, 2012
W 8-10
216 Anderson Hall
Prof. David Hedge
Office: 218 Anderson
Phone: 273-2367
E-mail: dhedge@ufl.edu
Office Hours: Monday 1-4:00 and by appt.
Public bureaucracies are at the very center of government and for that matter American society. This semester we will consider how bureaucracies relate to one another and their political, economic, and social environments in (primarily) the American political system. More particularly, we will examine the means by which citizens and their governments achieve (or not) accountability and control of the administrative sector. Among the topics we will consider are the growth of the administrative sector, political control of bureaucracy, “bottom-up’ democracy, regulatory federalism, and networks. A number of questions guide that analysis.
How has the administrative sector changed over the course of American history? What factors are responsible for those changes? What is the nature and source (s) of bureaucratic power in America?
What tools do various political actors use to control and oversee public bureaucracies? How effective are those tools?
What role does the bureaucratic sector play in American politics and governance?
How do the problems of accountability and control play out in a federal system of government or where responsibility for policy is shared with the private sector?
Required Texts
Richard Nathan. 1975. The Plot that Failed: Nixon and The Administrative Presidency. John Wiley. (used copies available through ebay, Barnes and Noble or Amazon.com)
David E. Lewis. 2003. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design. Stanford University Press.
Kenneth Meier and Laurence O’Toole. 2006. Bureaucracy in a Democratic State. John Hopkins University Press.
Additional readings have been placed on reserve ® in the graduate student room on the 3rd floor of Anderson Hall and others are available on-line through the UF library.
Expectations
1. Class time will be spent reviewing the week's readings. While the readings are often extensive, I expect them to be read (and on time) and I expect you to be prepared to summarize, critique, and draw implications from each of the assigned readings (you will be asked to write a brief 1-2 page reaction paper most weeks). My role will simply be to guide the discussion. I do not intend to lecture. As with all my courses, I do not take attendance. Nonetheless I expect you to attend each class and participate in class discussion.
2. At the midpoint of the semester I will ask you to write a synthesis paper that summarizes and critiques the literature on political control of the bureaucracy.
3. Each of you will also write a 15-page research paper on some aspect of bureaucratic life. My intention is to use some of class time most weeks to talk to each of you individually about your papers.
Grading
25% Class Participation and Weekly Written Assignments
25% Synthesis Paper
50% Research Paper
Incompletes are only given in rare and deserving cases and at the discretion of the instructor. Student who believe that they will not be able to complete all the requirements for the course in due time have to discuss an “I” (Incomplete) grade with the instructor before the research paper is due. Students will have to sign an “Incomplete Contract” (available at http://www.clas.ufl.edu/forms/) and complete all their requirements by a set date. Students should be aware that “I” grades become punitive after one term.
Grading Scale:
90-100 A 87-89 A-
84-86 B+ 80-83 B
77-79 B- 74-76 C+
70-73 C 67-69 C-
64-66 D+ 60-63 D
Below 60 F
Please note: a C- is not a qualifying grade for major, minor, Gen Ed, Gordon Rule, or College Basic distribution credit. For more information, go to: http://www.registrar.ufl.edu/catalog/policies/regulationgrades.html
Honor Code: Academic honesty and integrity are fundamental values of the University community. An academic honesty offense is defined as the act of lying, cheating, or stealing academic information so that one gains academic advantage. In the event that a student is found cheating or plagiarizing, s/he will receive a zero for the assignment and will be reported to Student Judicial Affairs. For more information, go to: http://www.dso.ufl.edu/studentguide/studentrights.php
Students with disabilities requesting classroom accommodation must first register with the Dean of Students Office. The Dean of Students Office will provide documentation to the student who must then provide this documentation to the Instructor when requesting accommodation. Anyone with a disability should feel free to see the professor during office hours to make the necessary arrangements.
Course Outline, Schedule, and Readings
January 11 -- Introduction to Course
January 18 -- The Rise of the Administrative Sector
James Q. Wilson. 1975. “The Rise of the Bureaucratic State.” The Public Interest. 41: 77-103. e-journal
Michael Nelson. 1982. "A Short Ironic History of
American National Bureaucracy." Journal of Politics.
44:747-778. e-journal
Kenneth Meier and John Bohte. 2007. Chapter 3, “Bureaucratic Power and its Causes.” in Politics and Bureaucracy: Policy Making in the Fourth Branch of Government. Thompson Wadsworth. @
Steven Skownorek. 1981. Preface, Ch. 1 and Epilogue. Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920. Cambridge University Press. @
January 25 -- Congressional Control and Oversight I
Lawrence Dodd and Richard Schott. 1986. “Congressional Oversight and the Federal Bureaucracy.” In Congress and the Administrative State. John Wiley and Sons.
Terry M. Moe. 1985. “Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB.” American Political Science Review 79 (December): 1094–1117. e-journal
B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman. 1991. “The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy.” American Political Science Review. 85 (September): 801-28. e-journal
John D. Huber, Charles R. Shipan, and Madelaine Pfahler. 2001. “Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy.” American Journal of Political Science 45 (April): 330-345. e-journal
Daniel Carpenter. 1996. “Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation.” American Political Science Review. 90 (June): 283-302. e-journal
Barry Weingast and Mark Moran.1983. "Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? Regulatory policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission." Journal of Political Economy 91(5): 765. e-journal
February 1 -- Congressional Control and Oversight II
Matthew D. McCubbins. 1999. “
Abdication or Delegation? Congress, the Bureaucracy, and the
Delegation Dilemma.” Regulation, 22 (2) 30 -37. e-journal
Balla, Steven J. 1998. “Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy.” American Political Science Review 92 (September): 663-673. e-journal
David Hedge and Renee Johnson. 2002. “The Plot that Failed: The Republican Revolution and Political Control of the Bureaucracy.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 12 (3) 333-351. e-journal
Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee. 2010, “Administrative Procedures
and Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal Rule-making “Ossified”?
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 20 (2): 261-282. e-journal
Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987
“Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control.” Journal of
Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Fall): 243-277. e-journal
Recommended:
Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwarz.1985. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms." American Journal of Political Science. 28(1): 165. e-journal
Balla, Steven J., and John R. Wright. 2001. “Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy.” American Journal of Political Science 45, (October): 799-812
February 8 -- The Administrative Presidency
Richard Nathan. 1975. The Plot that Failed: Richard Nixon and the Administrative Presidency.
Marissa Golden. What Motivates Bureaucrats? Politics and Administration During the Reagan Years.
Wood, B. Dan. 1988. “Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements.” American Political Science Review 82 (March): 213–234.
David Hedge. 2009. "George W. Bush and Political Control of the Bureaucracy," presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto.
February 15 – Presidents, Congress, and Agency Design.
David E. Lewis. 2003. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design.
February 22 --The Courts and Bureaucracy
James Q. Wilson. 1989. Chapter 15 “Courts.” in Bureaucracy: What Governments Do and Why They Do It. Basic Books.
Kenneth Meier and John Bohte. 2007. “Judicial Controls on Bureaucratic Power,” pp. 151-156. in Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government. Thompson Wadsworth.
William Gormley. 1989. Chapter 3, "Due Process" in Taming the Bureaucracy (Princeton University Press).
Brandice Canes-Wrone. 2003. “Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts.” American Journal of Political Science. 47 (April) 205-214. e-journal
Joseph Smith. 2005. “Congress Opens the Courthouse Doors: Statutory Changes Under the Clean Air Act.” Political Research Quarterly. 58 (March) 139-149. e-journal
Reginald Sheehan. 1990. “Administrative Agencies and the Court: A Reexamination of the Impact of Agency Type on Decisional Outcomes.” Western Political Quarterly. pp. 875-885. e-journal
February 29 – SYNTHESIS PAPER DUE
March 14 -- Interest Groups and the Question of Capture
James Q. Wilson. 1989, Chapter 5, “Interest,” in Bureaucracy: Why Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It.
Jeffrey Cohen. 1986. The Dynamics of the “revolving door” on the FCC.” American Journal of Political Science. e-journal
Gordon and Hafer. 2005. “Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to Bureaucracy.” American Political Science Review. e-journal
Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee. 2006. “A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy.” Journal of Politics, Vol. 68, No. 1 (February): 128-139. e-journal
March 21 – “Bottom Up” Democracy I
Kenneth Meier and Laurence O’Toole. 2006. Bureaucracy in a Democratic State.
March 28 – “Bottom Up” Democracy II –Representative Bureaucracy
Selden, Sally. 1997. Chapter 1, pp 3-9 and Chapter 3 in The Promise of Representative Bureaucracy. Armonk NY: ME Sharpe.
Romzek, Barbara, and J. Stephen Hendricks. 1982. “Organizational Involvement and
Representative Bureaucracy: Can We Have It Both Ways?” American Political Science
Review 76 (March): 75–82. e-journal
Kelly, Rita Mae and Meredith Newman. 2001. The Gendered Bureaucracy: Agency Mission, Equality of Opportunity, and Representative Bureaucracies. Women & Politics 22 (3): 1- 33. e-journal
Wilkins, Vicky, and Lael R. Keiser. 2006. “Linking Passive and Active Representation by Gender.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 16 (January), 87-102. e-journal
Meier, Kenneth J., Robert D. Wrinkle, and J.L. Polinard. 1999. Representative Bureaucracy and Distributional Equity: Addressing the Hard Question. Journal of Politics 61 (4): 1025-39. e-journal
April 4 -- Networks I - Federalism
Scholz, J. T. & Wei, F.H. (1986). “Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System.”American Political Science Review, 80, 1249-70.
Hedge, D.M., Scicchitano, M.J., & Metz, P. (1991). “The Principal-agent Model and Regulatory Federalism.” Western Political Quarterly, 44, 1055-1080.
Bradbury, John C. (2006). “Regulatory Federalism and Workplace Safety: Evidence from OSHA Enforcement.” Journal of Regulatory Economics. 29, 221-224.
Woods, Neal D. (2008). “Serving Two Masters? State Implementation of Federal Regulatory Policy.” Public Administration Quarterly. 32, 571-595
April 11 – Networks 2 - Private-Public Partnerships
Jonathon G.S. Koppell. 2003. Ch. 1-3. The Politics of Quasi-Government Hybrid Organizations and the Dynamics of Bureaucratic Control. Cambridge University Press.
Christine A. Kelleher. 2008. “A Political Consequence of Contracting: Organized Interests and State Agency Decision Making.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 19: 579-602.
Kristina T. Lambright. 2008. “Agency Theory and Beyond: Contracted Provider’s Motivations to Properly Use Service Monitoring Tools.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 19: 207-227.
April 18 – Work on Papers
April 25 – Work on Papers
Monday, April 30 – Research Paper Due