DRAFT!!





POS 6476

Bureaucratic Politics in the U.S.

Spring, 2014
W 8-10

216 Anderson Hall


Prof. David Hedge

Office:  218 Anderson

Phone:  273-2367

E-mail:  dhedge@ufl.edu

Office Hours:  M,F 10:30-12:00 and by appt


     Public bureaucracies are at the very center of government and for that matter American society.    This semester we will consider how bureaucracies relate to one another and their political, economic, and social environments in (primarily) the American political system. More particularly, we will examine the means by which citizens and their governments achieve (or not) accountability and control of the administrative sector. Among the topics we will consider are the growth of the administrative sector, political control of bureaucracy, “bottom-up’ democracy, regulatory federalism, and networks.   A number of questions guide that analysis.


     How has the administrative sector changed over the course of American history?  What factors are responsible for those changes?  What is the nature and source (s) of bureaucratic power in America?


    What tools do various political actors use to control and oversee public bureaucracies?  How effective are those tools?  


    What role does the bureaucratic sector play in American politics and governance?


    How do the problems of accountability and control play out in a federal system of government or where responsibility for policy is shared with the private sector?


Required Texts


Richard Nathan. 1975. The Plot that Failed:  Nixon and The Administrative Presidency. John Wiley. (used copies available through ebay, Barnes and Noble or Amazon.com)


David E. Lewis. 2003. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design.  Stanford University Press.


Daniel P. Carpenter. 2001. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy:  Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928.  Princeton University Press.

    

Additional readings are available on-line through the UF library or can be found on the course cd (labeled @below).


Expectations


1. Class time will be spent reviewing the week's readings.  While the readings are often extensive, I expect them to be read (and on time) and I expect you to be prepared to summarize, critique, and draw implications from each of the assigned readings (you will be asked to write a brief 1-2 page reaction paper most weeks). My role will simply be to guide the discussion.  I do not intend to lecture.  As with all my courses, I do not take attendance. Nonetheless I expect you to attend each class and participate in class discussion.


2. Nearvthe midpoint of the semester I will ask you to write a synthesis paper that summarizes and critiques the literature on political control of the bureaucracy. 


3.  Each of you will also write a 15-page research paper on some aspect of bureaucratic life.  My intention is to use some of class time most weeks to talk to each of you individually about your papers. Students will present the products of their research during the last two weeks of class.


Grading


    33% Class Participation and Weekly Reaction Papers

    33% Synthesis Papers

    33% Research Paper


Incompletes are only given in rare and deserving cases and at the discretion of the instructor. Student who believe that they will not be able to complete all the requirements for the course in due time have to discuss an “I” (Incomplete) grade with the instructor before the research paper is due. Students will have to sign an “Incomplete Contract” (available at http://www.clas.ufl.edu/forms/) and complete all their requirements by a set date. Students should be aware that “I” grades become punitive after one term.


Honor Code: Academic honesty and integrity are fundamental values of the University community. An academic honesty offense is defined as the act of lying, cheating, or stealing academic information so that one gains academic advantage. In the event that a student is found cheating or plagiarizing, s/he will receive a zero for the assignment and will be reported to Student Judicial Affairs. For more information, go to: http://www.dso.ufl.edu/studentguide/studentrights.php


Students with disabilities requesting classroom accommodation must first register with the Dean of Students Office. The Dean of Students Office will provide documentation to the student who must then provide this documentation to the Instructor when requesting accommodation. Anyone with a disability should feel free to see the professor during office hours to make the necessary arrangements.



Course Outline, Schedule, and Readings 


January 8 -- Introduction to Course

    

January 15 -- The Rise of the Administrative Sector



Michael Nelson. 1982. "A Short Ironic History of American National Bureaucracy." Journal of Politics.
44:747-778.  e-journal


Daniel P. Carpenter. 2001.  The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Intro, Ch. 1,2, and Conclusion, Princeton University Press

Steven Skownorek. 1981. Preface, Ch. 1 and Epilogue.  Building a New American State:  The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920.  Cambridge University Press. @


January 22 -- The Administrative Presidency


Richard Nathan. 1975. The Plot that Failed: Richard Nixon and the Administrative Presidency.


Richard Waterman.  1989Introduction, Ch. 1,2,5,  Presidential Influence and the Administrative State. University of Tennessee Press.


David Hedge. 2013.  "George W. Bush and Political Control of the Bureaucracy," White House Studies.


  January 29-Congressional Control and Oversight I


Terry M. Moe. 1985. “Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB.” American Political Science Review 79 (December): 1094–1117. e-journal


B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman.  1991. “The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy.” American Political Science Review. 85 (September): 801-28. e-journal


Daniel Carpenter. 1996.  “Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation.”  American Political Science Review. 90 (June): 283-302. e-journal


Barry Weingast and Mark Moran.1983. "Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? Regulatory policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission." Journal of Political Economy 91(5): 765. e-journal


Charles R. Shipan. 2004.  "Regulatory Regimes, Agency Actions, and the Conditional Nature of Congressional Influence."  American Political Science Review. 98 (August):  467-480. e-journal


Jason McDonald,  2010. "Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions."American Political Science Review.  104 (November):  766-782.  e-journal


February 5-- Congressional Control and Oversight II


   Matthew D. McCubbins. 1999.  “Abdication or Delegation? Congress, the Bureaucracy, and the Delegation Dilemma.” Regulation, 22 (2) 30 -37.  e-journal


   Balla, Steven J. 1998. “Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy.” American Political Science Review 92 (September): 663-673. e-journal


   David Hedge and Renee Johnson. 2002. “The Plot that Failed: The Republican Revolution and Political Control of the Bureaucracy.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 12 (3) 333-351.  e-journal 


  Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee. 2010. “Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal Rule-making “Ossified”? Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 20 (2): 261-282. e-journal


  Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Fall): 243-277.  e-journal


 Recommended:    


  Matthew D. McCubbins and  Thomas Schwarz.1985. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms." American Journal of Political Science. 28(1): 165. e-journal


   Balla, Steven J., and John R. Wright. 2001. “Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy.” American Journal of Political Science 45, (October): 799-812 e-journal


February 12 – Presidents, Congress, and Agency Design


  David E. Lewis. 2003. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design.  Stanford University Press.


February 19 --The Courts and Bureaucracy


  James Q. Wilson. 1989. Chapter 15 “Courts.” in Bureaucracy:  What Governments Do and Why They Do It.  Basic Books.


  Kenneth Meier and John Bohte. 2007. “Judicial Controls on Bureaucratic Power,” pp. 151-156.  in Politics and the Bureaucracy:  Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government. Thompson Wadsworth.


  William Gormley. 1989. Chapter 3, "Due Process" in Taming the Bureaucracy (Princeton University Press).


  Brandice Canes-Wrone. 2003.  “Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts.”  American Journal of Political Science. 47 (April) 205-214.  e-journal


  Joseph Smith. 2005. “Congress Opens the Courthouse Doors:  Statutory Changes Under the Clean Air Act.”  Political Research Quarterly.  58 (March) 139-149.  e-journal

 

  Reginald Sheehan. 1990.   “Administrative Agencies and the Court:  A Reexamination of the Impact of Agency Type on Decisional Outcomes.”  Western Political Quarterly.  pp. 875-885.  e-journal


February 26 – SYNTHESIS PAPER DUE


March 5 -- SPRING BREAK


March 12 -- Interest Groups and the Question of Capture


James Q. Wilson. 1989, Chapter 5, “Interest,” in Bureaucracy:  Why Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It.


Richard Posner. 1974.  "Theories of Economic Regulation." The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science. 5 (August):  335-358.


Jeffrey Cohen. 1986.  The Dynamics of the “revolving door” on the FCC.”  American Journal of Political Science.   e-journal


  Gordon and Hafer.  2005.  “Flexing Muscle:  Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to Bureaucracy.”  American Political Science Review.  e-journal

    

 Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee. 2006. “A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy.” Journal of Politics, Vol. 68, No. 1 (February): 128-139.  e-journal


Terry Moe, 1989. "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure." in Chubb and Peterson, ed. Can Governments Govern?  (Brookings, Washington, D:C)


March 19 --Networks I -- Federalism


Scholz, J. T. & Wei, F.H. (1986). “Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System.”American Political Science Review, 80, 1249-70. e-journal.


Hedge, D.M., Scicchitano, M.J., & Metz, P. (1991).  “The Principal-agent Model and Regulatory Federalism.” Western Political Quarterly, 44, 1055-1080.  e-journal


Woods, Neal D. (2008). “Serving Two Masters? State Implementation of Federal Regulatory Policy.” Public Administration Quarterly. 32, 571-595.   e-journal


Chubb, John, 1985.  "The Political Economy of Federalism."  American Political Science Review. 79 (December:  994-1015. e-journal


RECOMMENDED:

 

Bradbury, John C. (2006). “Regulatory Federalism and Workplace Safety:  Evidence from OSHA Enforcement.” Journal of Regulatory Economics. 29, 221-224.  e-journal. 79: 994-1015.  e-journal

 

Wilk, Eric M. and Charles M. Lamb (2010).  “Federalism, Efficiency, and Civil Rights Enforcement.”  Political Research Quarterly. 1-13.


March 26  – Networks 2 -  Private-Public Partnerships


Jonathon G.S. Koppell. 2003.  Ch. 1-3.  The Politics of Quasi-Government  Hybrid Organizations and the Dynamics of Bureaucratic Control. Cambridge University Press.


Christine A. Kelleher. 2008. “A Political Consequence of Contracting:  Organized Interests and State Agency Decision Making.”   Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory.  19: 579-602.


Kristina T. Lambright. 2008. “Agency Theory and Beyond:  Contracted Provider’s Motivations to Properly Use Service Monitoring Tools.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory.  19:  207-227.


April 2 -- Work on Papers


April 9-- Work on Papers


April 16 – Student Presentations


April 23 – Student Presentations


Monday, April 29 – Research Paper Due



 6933

Bureaucratic Politics in the U.S.

Spring, 2012

W 8-10

216 Anderson Hall


Prof. David Hedge

Office:  218 Anderson

Phone:  273-2367

E-mail:  dhedge@ufl.edu

Office Hours:  Monday 1-4:00 and by appt.


     Public bureaucracies are at the very center of government and for that matter American society.    This semester we will consider how bureaucracies relate to one another and their political, economic, and social environments in (primarily) the American political system. More particularly, we will examine the means by which citizens and their governments achieve (or not) accountability and control of the administrative sector. Among the topics we will consider are the growth of the administrative sector, political control of bureaucracy, “bottom-up’ democracy, regulatory federalism, and networks.   A number of questions guide that analysis.


     How has the administrative sector changed over the course of American history?  What factors are responsible for those changes?  What is the nature and source (s) of bureaucratic power in America?


    What tools do various political actors use to control and oversee public bureaucracies?  How effective are those tools?  


    What role does the bureaucratic sector play in American politics and governance?


    How do the problems of accountability and control play out in a federal system of government or where responsibility for policy is shared with the private sector?


Required Texts


Richard Nathan. 1975. The Plot that Failed:  Nixon and The Administrative Presidency. John Wiley. (used copies available through ebay, Barnes and Noble or Amazon.com)


David E. Lewis. 2003. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design.  Stanford University Press.


Kenneth Meier and Laurence O’Toole. 2006. Bureaucracy in a Democratic State. John Hopkins University Press.

    

Additional readings have been placed on reserve ® in the graduate student room on the 3rd floor of Anderson Hall and others are available on-line through the UF library.


Expectations


1. Class time will be spent reviewing the week's readings.  While the readings are often extensive, I expect them to be read (and on time) and I expect you to be prepared to summarize, critique, and draw implications from each of the assigned readings (you will be asked to write a brief 1-2 page reaction paper most weeks). My role will simply be to guide the discussion.  I do not intend to lecture.  As with all my courses, I do not take attendance. Nonetheless I expect you to attend each class and participate in class discussion.


2. At the midpoint of the semester I will ask you to write a synthesis paper that summarizes and critiques the literature on political control of the bureaucracy. 


3.  Each of you will also write a 15-page research paper on some aspect of bureaucratic life.  My intention is to use some of class time most weeks to talk to each of you individually about your papers. 


Grading


    25% Class Participation and Weekly Written Assignments

    25% Synthesis Paper

    50% Research Paper


Incompletes are only given in rare and deserving cases and at the discretion of the instructor. Student who believe that they will not be able to complete all the requirements for the course in due time have to discuss an “I” (Incomplete) grade with the instructor before the research paper is due. Students will have to sign an “Incomplete Contract” (available at http://www.clas.ufl.edu/forms/) and complete all their requirements by a set date. Students should be aware that “I” grades become punitive after one term.

Grading Scale:


90-100 A           87-89    A-

84-86    B+        80-83    B

77-79    B-         74-76    C+

70-73    C          67-69    C-

64-66    D+        60-63    D   

Below 60  F

 

Please note: a C- is not a qualifying grade for major, minor, Gen Ed, Gordon Rule, or College Basic distribution credit. For more information, go to: http://www.registrar.ufl.edu/catalog/policies/regulationgrades.html


Honor Code: Academic honesty and integrity are fundamental values of the University community. An academic honesty offense is defined as the act of lying, cheating, or stealing academic information so that one gains academic advantage. In the event that a student is found cheating or plagiarizing, s/he will receive a zero for the assignment and will be reported to Student Judicial Affairs. For more information, go to: http://www.dso.ufl.edu/studentguide/studentrights.php


Students with disabilities requesting classroom accommodation must first register with the Dean of Students Office. The Dean of Students Office will provide documentation to the student who must then provide this documentation to the Instructor when requesting accommodation. Anyone with a disability should feel free to see the professor during office hours to make the necessary arrangements.



Course Outline, Schedule, and Readings 


January 11 -- Introduction to Course

    

January 18 -- The Rise of the Administrative Sector


James Q.  Wilson.  1975. “The Rise of the Bureaucratic State.” The Public Interest.  41: 77-103.  e-journal


Michael Nelson. 1982. "A Short Ironic History of American National Bureaucracy." Journal of Politics.
44:747-778.  e-journal


Kenneth Meier and John Bohte. 2007. Chapter 3, “Bureaucratic Power and its Causes.” in Politics and Bureaucracy:  Policy Making in the Fourth Branch of Government. Thompson Wadsworth.  @


Steven Skownorek. 1981. Preface, Ch. 1 and Epilogue.  Building a New American State:  The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920.  Cambridge University Press. @


January 25 -- Congressional Control and Oversight I


Lawrence Dodd and Richard Schott. 1986. “Congressional Oversight and the Federal Bureaucracy.” In Congress and the Administrative State. John Wiley and Sons.


Terry M. Moe. 1985. “Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB.” American Political Science Review 79 (December): 1094–1117. e-journal


B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman.  1991. “The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy.” American Political Science Review. 85 (September): 801-28. e-journal


John D. Huber, Charles R. Shipan, and Madelaine Pfahler. 2001. “Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy.” American Journal of Political Science 45 (April): 330-345.  e-journal


 Daniel Carpenter. 1996.  “Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation.”  American Political Science Review. 90 (June): 283-302. e-journal


Barry Weingast and Mark Moran.1983. "Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? Regulatory policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission." Journal of Political Economy 91(5): 765. e-journal


February 1 -- Congressional Control and Oversight II


   Matthew D. McCubbins. 1999.  “
Abdication or Delegation? Congress, the Bureaucracy, and the Delegation Dilemma.” Regulation, 22 (2) 30 -37.  e-journal


   Balla, Steven J. 1998. “Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy.” American Political Science Review 92 (September): 663-673. e-journal


   David Hedge and Renee Johnson. 2002. “The Plot that Failed: The Republican Revolution and Political Control of the Bureaucracy.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 12 (3) 333-351.  e-journal 


  Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee. 2010, “Administrative Procedures

and Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal Rule-making “Ossified”? 

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 20 (2): 261-282. e-journal


  Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987 

“Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control.” Journal of

Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Fall): 243-277.  e-journal


 Recommended:    


  Matthew D. McCubbins and  Thomas Schwarz.1985. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms." American Journal of Political Science. 28(1): 165. e-journal


   Balla, Steven J., and John R. Wright. 2001. “Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy.” American Journal of Political Science 45, (October): 799-812


February 8 -- The Administrative Presidency


Richard Nathan. 1975. The Plot that Failed: Richard Nixon and the Administrative Presidency.


Marissa Golden. What Motivates Bureaucrats? Politics and Administration During the Reagan Years.


Wood, B. Dan. 1988. “Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements.” American Political Science Review 82 (March): 213–234.


David Hedge. 2009.  "George W. Bush and Political Control of the Bureaucracy," presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto.


February 15 – Presidents, Congress, and Agency Design.


  David E. Lewis. 2003. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design.


February 22 --The Courts and Bureaucracy


  James Q. Wilson. 1989. Chapter 15 “Courts.” in Bureaucracy:  What Governments Do and Why They Do It.  Basic Books.


  Kenneth Meier and John Bohte. 2007. “Judicial Controls on Bureaucratic Power,” pp. 151-156.  in Politics and the Bureaucracy:  Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government. Thompson Wadsworth.


  William Gormley. 1989. Chapter 3, "Due Process" in Taming the Bureaucracy (Princeton University Press).


  Brandice Canes-Wrone. 2003.  “Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts.”  American Journal of Political Science. 47 (April) 205-214.  e-journal


  Joseph Smith. 2005. “Congress Opens the Courthouse Doors:  Statutory Changes Under the Clean Air Act.”  Political Research Quarterly.  58 (March) 139-149.  e-journal

 

  Reginald Sheehan. 1990.   “Administrative Agencies and the Court:  A Reexamination of the Impact of Agency Type on Decisional Outcomes.”  Western Political Quarterly.  pp. 875-885.  e-journal


February 29 – SYNTHESIS PAPER DUE 


March 14 -- Interest Groups and the Question of Capture


James Q. Wilson. 1989, Chapter 5, “Interest,” in Bureaucracy:  Why Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It.


Jeffrey Cohen. 1986.  The Dynamics of the “revolving door” on the FCC.”  American Journal of Political Science.   e-journal


  Gordon and Hafer.  2005.  “Flexing Muscle:  Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to Bureaucracy.”  American Political Science Review.  e-journal

    

 Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee. 2006. “A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy.” Journal of Politics, Vol. 68, No. 1 (February): 128-139.  e-journal


March 21 – “Bottom Up” Democracy I 


Kenneth Meier and Laurence O’Toole. 2006. Bureaucracy in a Democratic State.


March 28 – “Bottom Up” Democracy II –Representative Bureaucracy


Selden, Sally. 1997. Chapter 1, pp 3-9 and Chapter 3 in The Promise of Representative Bureaucracy. Armonk NY: ME Sharpe.


Romzek, Barbara, and J. Stephen Hendricks. 1982. “Organizational Involvement and

Representative Bureaucracy: Can We Have It Both Ways?” American Political Science

Review 76 (March): 75–82. e-journal


Kelly, Rita Mae and Meredith Newman. 2001. The Gendered Bureaucracy: Agency Mission, Equality of Opportunity, and Representative Bureaucracies. Women & Politics 22 (3): 1- 33. e-journal


Wilkins, Vicky, and Lael R. Keiser. 2006. “Linking Passive and Active Representation by Gender.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 16 (January), 87-102.  e-journal


Meier, Kenneth J., Robert D. Wrinkle, and J.L. Polinard. 1999. Representative Bureaucracy and Distributional Equity: Addressing the Hard Question. Journal of Politics 61 (4): 1025-39. e-journal


April 4 -- Networks I -  Federalism


Scholz, J. T. & Wei, F.H. (1986). “Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System.”American Political Science Review, 80, 1249-70.


Hedge, D.M., Scicchitano, M.J., & Metz, P. (1991).  “The Principal-agent Model and Regulatory Federalism.” Western Political Quarterly, 44, 1055-1080.


Bradbury, John C. (2006). “Regulatory Federalism and Workplace Safety:  Evidence from OSHA Enforcement.” Journal of Regulatory Economics. 29, 221-224.


Woods, Neal D. (2008). “Serving Two Masters? State Implementation of Federal Regulatory Policy.” Public Administration Quarterly. 32, 571-595


April 11 – Networks 2 -  Private-Public Partnerships


Jonathon G.S. Koppell. 2003.  Ch. 1-3.  The Politics of Quasi-Government  Hybrid Organizations and the Dynamics of Bureaucratic Control. Cambridge University Press.


Christine A. Kelleher. 2008. “A Political Consequence of Contracting:  Organized Interests and State Agency Decision Making.”   Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory.  19: 579-602.


Kristina T. Lambright. 2008. “Agency Theory and Beyond:  Contracted Provider’s Motivations to Properly Use Service Monitoring Tools.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory.  19:  207-227.


April 18 – Work on Papers


April 25 – Work on Papers


Monday, April 30 – Research Paper Due