

Chapter Eight

Strings Attached: Outside Money in Colorado's Seventh Congressional District

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Every general election political pundits select a handful of “tossup” congressional races they deem too close to call.¹ In 2002, Colorado's newly carved Seventh Congressional District lived up to its competitive billing.² Despite being outpolled on Election Day by 2,502 votes, Republican Bob Beauprez ultimately won the district by 121 votes over Democrat Mike Feeley.³ Unlike other closely fought congressional races, interest groups stayed above the fray, focusing their collective energy instead on Colorado's U.S. Senate race. Instead, most of the heavy hitting in Colorado's Seventh was carried out by the Republican and Democratic national congressional campaign committees. The expenditures made by the two national parties—which dwarfed the spending by the candidates—had a nationalizing effect, as the outside money restricted the ability of the candidates to control the substantive issues debated during the campaign. While alarmed by the vitriol of the negative TV ads and direct mail produced

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¹ “CQ's House Race Ranking Update,” *CQ Daily Monitor*, July 15, 2002, p. 22; “Competitive House Races,” *New York Times*, September 27, 2002, p. A21; and Peggy Lowe, “Feeley Closes Gap against Beauprez,” *Rocky Mountain News*, October 30, 2002, p. A20.

² Floyd Ciruli, “Close Races Were Challenge to Polling,” *Denver Post*, November 24, 2002, p. E1.

³ Although Feeley won more votes cast on Election Day, Beauprez bested Feeley in early voting and absentee balloting. When the polls closed on 5 November, Beauprez led Feeley by 386 votes. It took three county clerks two weeks to count the more than 1,900 valid provisional ballots cast on Election Day in the district. Following the tabulation of provisional ballots on November 21, Beauprez led Feeley by 122 votes—81,520 to 81,408—out of more than 170,000 votes cast. On December 10, following a mandatory recount, Beauprez emerged victorious, winning with 81,789 votes to Feeley's 81,668. Michele Ames, “Court May Settle Race in Seventh,” *Rocky Mountain News*, November 15, 2002, p. A5.

on their behalf, both Beauprez and Feeley became increasingly beholden to the directives of their respective congressional parties as the election neared.

Although the use of outside money in federal campaigns is well documented, what is less known is the daily coordination that occurs between the candidates and the national parties. As stakeholders in the contest, the national congressional committees had a powerful incentive to ensure a yield on their investments, namely, that their candidate emerge victorious. In addition to making coordinated hard and soft money expenditures in behalf of the two candidates, both congressional campaign committees plied the candidates' staffs with pointed directives from their Washington, D.C. perches. Reflecting on the campaign a month after the election, Congressman-elect Beauprez deadpanned, "The national party swung pretty hard."⁴

Inside the Seventh District

Shaped like an unlucky horseshoe encompassing Denver's older suburbs, the boundaries of the new district were established in January, 2002, by a court ruling that approved a Democrat-sponsored redistricting plan. Although the district was comprised of roughly equal numbers of registered Republicans (120,009), Democrats (120,119), and "Unaffiliated" voters (122,888), state Democratic Party leaders thought the district leaned their way. Of the precincts that would eventually comprise the Seventh, Al Gore defeated George Bush by slightly less than 8 percent (about 2,000 votes) in 2000.⁵

⁴ Michael Janofsky, "Colorado Awaits Result of Electoral Photo Finish," *New York Times*, December 4, 2002, p. A20.

⁵ Feeley's own polling firm found the new district leaned slightly Republican in terms of *likely* voters—those registered voters who had cast ballots in the 1998 primary and general elections or who voted in the 2000 general and 1999 or 2001 off-year general elections. Chris Keating, Harstad Strategic Research, Research Director, interview by Daniel Smith, Denver, Colo., 13 November 2002.

The district resulted from a decade of explosive growth in Colorado in which the state's population ballooned to 4.3 million.⁶ The Seventh was the state's second most racially and ethnically diverse congressional district. In 2002, minorities accounted for more than 31 percent of the population, including 19.6 percent Hispanics and 5.8 percent African Americans. Nearly 40 percent of the residents were renters, and one in ten constituents was 65 years of age or older.⁷

The Candidates and Their Campaigns

As anticipated, the new district attracted several talented candidates in the primaries. On the Republican side, Beauprez, the sitting state party Chairman, entered the race after receiving phone calls from White House political counselors Karl Rove and Ken Mehlman, as well as a visit by National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) Chair, Representative Tom Davis (R-Va.).⁸ Although the frontrunner, the fifty-four-year-old banker was not a shoo in as the party's nominee. Indeed, Beauprez failed to win the top line at the GOP's district assembly caucus in May. In the primary, his three opponents labeled him a carpetbagger (Beauprez and his wife resided north of the district) and accused him of conducting push polls and authorizing his bank to run favorable radio ads. Beauprez outspent his opponent, airing close to \$150,000 worth of television and \$40,000 of radio ads. The straight-laced Republican withstood the intraparty wrangling and held on to win the primary with 38 percent of the vote.⁹

⁶ Colorado's population rose from 3.3 million in 1990 to 4.3 million in 2000. U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002), "Ranking Tables for States" (www.census.gov [2 September 2002]).

⁷ Burt Hubbard, "New 7th District is Middle-class," *Rocky Mountain News*, January 26, 2002, p. B3.

⁸ Julia Martinez, "Feeley, Beauprez for the 7th," *Denver Post*, August 14, 2002, p. A1.

⁹ Feeley accused Beauprez of conducting push polls in the general election, though it was likely phone calls paid for by the NRCC. Peggy Lowe, "GOP Hopeful Blasted; 'Push Poll' Claimed," *Rocky Mountain News*, September 25, 2002, p. A28.

State and national Democratic Party leaders, including House Minority Leader Representative Dick Gephardt (D-Mo.), lured Feeley, a former state senator, to run for the seat. Term-limited in 2000, Feeley had represented a predominately Republican constituency in Jefferson County for eight years. Upon his retirement from the state Senate, the forty-nine-year-old lawyer joined a Denver law firm, Baker and Hostetler. Due to some opportunistic lobbying in the private sector and overzealous support from organized labor, many party faithful initially shied away from Feeley.¹⁰ Sensing rank-and-file dissent, Feeley eschewed the party's caucus in May and instead petitioned his way on to the mid-August primary ballot. During the signature-gathering process, the former Marine knocked on nearly 7,500 doors.¹¹ Feeley's gambit to circumvent the party caucus and take his campaign directly to the citizens—along with \$37,125 worth of television ads—proved successful, as he defeated Dave Thomas, the Jefferson County District Attorney, with 56 percent of the vote.¹²

Following their respective primary victories on August 13, both candidates endeavored to shape the agenda for the general election, with both camps vowing to run issue-based, positive campaigns.¹³ On the hustings, the two candidates spoke passionately about the issues, though Beauprez was far more scripted than Feeley. Beauprez discussed the grave concerns about transportation and water in the district as well as how he could

¹⁰ Ellen Golombek, President of the Colorado AFL–CIO, spoke passionately for Feeley in February at the Jefferson County Democratic Party's Jackson Dinner. According to the Colorado AFL–CIO's political director, it "was not a question" that labor would support Feeley. Tyler Chafee, Political Director, Colorado AFL–CIO, interview by Daniel Smith, Denver, Colo., 7 November 2002.

¹¹ Bob Ewgen, "Where Politics is Clean and Fun," *Denver Post*, September 7, 2002, p. B23.

¹² Julia Martinez, "Feeley, Beauprez for the 7th," August 14, 2002. Primary television ad totals are derived from the candidates' ad-buy sheets on file with metro Denver TV stations.

¹³ Erik Greathouse, Feeley Campaign, Campaign Manager, interview by Daniel Smith, Lakewood, Colo., 9 September 2002; Sean Murphy, Beauprez Campaign, Campaign Manager, interview by Daniel Smith, Aurora, Colo., 12 October 2002. Both candidates remained cordial throughout the campaign. M. E. Sprengelmeyer, "Capitol Hill's Odd Couple May Deserve an Oscar," *Rocky Mountain News*, November 13, 2002, p. A4.

draw on his banking and farming experience and provide fiscal responsibility in Washington. He identified himself closely with President Bush, backing his proposed tax cuts and crackdown against Saddam Hussein and terrorist networks. For his part, Feeley initially touted solutions to the water, growth, and transportation problems in the district, and also addressed corporate accountability, the high costs of prescription drugs, and his opposition to the Bush tax cut.

The two men were cognizant, though, that if race remained tight their campaigns would likely morph beyond their control, with party leaders in D.C. calling the shots. In early September, their worst fears were realized. The race quickly devolved into a mud-slinging battle, with most of the recriminating ads paid for with soft money flowing from the national congressional parties. As Election Day neared, Beauprez's campaign shifted gears, and the national party instigated a malicious "biographical campaign."¹⁴ Feeley, under the direction of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), tried to differentiate himself from Beauprez on abortion, Social Security, and gun control. Beauprez quickly countered by moderating his neo-privatization stance on Social Security and, more significantly, by playing up the character issue.

Money: Candidates, Parties, and Interest Groups

Candidates

Both candidates proved to be prodigious fundraisers. Beauprez amassed only a slight fundraising advantage, besting his Democratic foe by less than \$300,000, excluding the candidates' personal loans and contributions from the parties. Both candidates kick-started their primary races by lending their campaigns money. Beauprez secured three

¹⁴ Murphy, phone interview by Daniel Smith, 5 December 2002. Ironically, fellow Republicans had criticized Beauprez harshly on the character issue during the primary. Bill Scanlon, "Funding Feud in District 7," *Rocky Mountain News*, August 5, 2002, p. A14.

banker's loans totaling \$455,000 while Feeley lent his campaign \$56,000, taking out a second mortgage on his home. The loans enabled both campaigns to run television ads in the primaries, increasing their name recognition. Interestingly, the national parties viewed the candidates' personal antes differently. The NRCC badgered the Beauprez camp for being too profligate during the primary, while the DCCC encouraged Feeley to lend money to his campaign to demonstrate his commitment to run for Congress.¹⁵

Feeley's personal investment was rewarded by the DCCC when it selected the race its "top target." Just days after the primary, the national party conducted a "sniff test" at campaign headquarters. Like "a big stockbroker looking through a portfolio," the DCCC was convinced that Feeley could win, but it found the campaign to have "some problems"—from inadequate office equipment to poor message development.¹⁶ To rectify these identified shortcomings, in mid-August the party assigned Erik Greathouse to head the campaign, effectively displacing Feeley's longtime confidant, Beth Minahan. Working in tandem with the DCCC Midwest regional field director, who "spent lots of time on the ground" with the campaign, Greathouse formulated a strategic plan that included weekly conference calls with the DCCC and its media consultants. Feeley's staff drew heavily on the DCCC's "institutional knowledge," as the national party sent daily briefings to the campaign and helped the candidate gain command of the issues transpiring in D.C.¹⁷

¹⁵ The NRCC was "upset with Bob's tight fight" in the primary and chided Murphy, asking why he was "spending so much money" and telling him he needed to "manage [his] margin of victory." Murphy, interview, 12 October 2002; Greathouse, phone interview by Daniel Smith, 5 December 2002.

¹⁶ Greathouse, interview, 9 September 2002.

¹⁷ Matt Mosley, Feeley Campaign, Communications Director, phone interview by Daniel Smith, 13 November 2002.

The NRCC, while not directly involved in the primary, clearly wanted Beauprez to win the party nomination. Although it made no attempt to replace Beauprez's campaign manager—Sean Murphy, an experienced politico who had worked previously under Beauprez at the state party—the NRCC constantly monitored the campaign.¹⁸ The national party told Murphy that it would be priming the campaign with the “largest amount of money given to any race in the country,” unless the campaign committed “a catastrophic error.” At times the NRCC's intrusions plainly peeved Murphy, who muttered that the party's hands-on approach was intrusive: “They crawl up our ass on a daily basis.” The regional field office regularly badgered the campaign staff, asking, “What earned media did you get?” and “What's your cash on hand?” In addition, the NRCC sent several members of Congress and the Bush Administration to the district to stump for Beauprez, including individuals with little name recognition or perceived electoral value.¹⁹

The NRCC took full advantage of President Bush's popularity to raise money for Beauprez. In late September, Beauprez and the state GOP split \$1.5 million raised at a \$1,000 per plate luncheon with the president; the campaign pocketed more than \$600,000 of the total with the balance going to the state party.²⁰ A month later, on October 28, Air Force One cruised into Denver just long enough for Bush to hold a Republican pep rally.²¹ By the October 16 Federal Election Commission (FEC) reporting period,

¹⁸ In 1996 Murphy ran Representative Bob Schaffer's successful campaign in Colorado's Fourth District; two years later, he managed Bob Greenlee's unsuccessful bid to win Colorado's Second District. Murphy then served as Executive Director of the State Republican Party under Beauprez.

¹⁹ Murphy, interview, 12 October 2002.

²⁰ Murphy, interview, 5 December 2002. Some of the tickets for the Bush event sold for far less than the advertised \$1,000. Lynn Bartels, “\$1,000 Tickets to GOP Fund-raiser Sold at a Discount to Some Guests,” *Rocky Mountain News*, September 28, 2002, p. A8.

²¹ Karen Hughes, Bush's former presidential advisor, also flew into Denver to hold a “\$100-a-ticket” rally for Beauprez. Arthur Kane, “Bush Adviser Rallies for Beauprez,” *Denver Post*, October 23, 2002, p. B2.

Beauprez had raised \$1,013,310 (including his \$380,000 loan), with an impressive \$542,224 cash on hand, due largely to the star appeal of Bush. In contrast, Feeley had \$127,389 on hand for the final three week push. The Democrat had raised \$808,188 by mid-October (including his loan) and was aided by a string of high-profile Democrats who stumped for him, including Gephardt, House Minority Whip Nancy Pelosi (D-N.Y.), Senator Joe Lieberman (D-Conn.), and former Senator Bill Bradley (D-N.J.).²² (See Table 8.1).

Both candidates spent the bulk of their contributions on TV ad buys. In the final week, the two campaigns spent more than \$230,000 on television.²³ During the general election, Beauprez paid National Media \$646,330 to air three ads on Denver stations. Although Beauprez's camp wanted to broadcast more spots during the final week, the choice time slots were filled by other political candidates and ballot issue committees, so it instead paid National Media \$35,855 to air three last-minute radio ads (see Table 8.2).²⁴ Excluding a fundraising invitation to the September 27 luncheon with Bush, Beauprez spent no money on direct mail after the primary. For its part, the Feeley campaign paid Amour Media \$547,142 to produce and run three television ads in the general election. Feeley did no radio and little direct mail during the general election, as he "only [had] so much money for voter contact."²⁵

Parties

²² Ryan Morgan, "House Races Join Millionaire's Club," *Denver Post*, October 16, 2002, p. B2; Trent Seibert, "Stars to Come out in Colorado," *Denver Post*, September 20, 2002, p. A14.

²³ Beauprez spent \$166,070 on 151 TV spots and Feeley spent \$69,325 on 68 spots in the final week. Burt Hubbard and Katie Kerwin, "Onslaught of Political Ads Will Hit Airwaves," *Rocky Mountain News*, October 25, 2002, p. A8.

²⁴ Murphy, interview, 5 December 2002.

²⁵ Feeley also paid the Strategy Group \$36,519 to do nine direct mailings in the primary. Steven Stenberg, Strategy Group, Partner, phone interview by Daniel Smith, 12 December 2002.

It came as no surprise that the national parties' expenditures far outstripped the money spent by the two candidates. According to reports filed with the FEC and inquiries to the campaigns, the Republican state and federal parties spent roughly \$2.5 million in the Seventh District, dwarfing the approximately \$830,000 spent by the Democratic parties. Both national congressional campaign committees capitalized on the financial motivation to transfer money to the state parties, taking advantage of Colorado's favorable fixed ratio of hard to soft dollars.

The NRCC funneled nearly \$2.4 million in combined hard/soft dollars into the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (CRFCC). The party paid for a barrage of television and direct-mail issue ads touting Beauprez and slamming Feeley. According to Alan Philp, Executive Director of the Colorado Republican Party, the NRCC specified what to do with its transferred money "down to the dollar."²⁶ With the NRCC's contributions to the state party coming in two parts—78 percent in soft dollars and 22 percent in hard dollars, Colorado's designated hard/soft match—the CRFCC paid Strategic Media Services \$1.95 million to produce five televised issue ads. The NRCC also channeled approximately \$200,000 in hard/soft money through the CRFCC to Targeted Creative Communications to do fourteen direct-mail ads.²⁷ The NRCC also independently spent \$200,000 to purchase ten direct-mail ads.²⁸ Finally, the NRCC contributed \$38,000 (which was matched by the state GOP) to the state party's coordinated campaign; roughly \$58,000 was used to run another television ad through

²⁶ Alan Philp, Colorado Republican Party Executive Director, interview by Daniel Smith, Denver, Colo., 24 September 2002.

²⁷ Dan Hazelwood, Targeted Creative Consulting, President, phone interview by Daniel Smith, 3 December 2002.

²⁸ Mike South, Arena Communications Production Manager, phone interview by Daniel Smith, 3 December 2002.

Strategic Media Services with the remaining \$18,000 paying for one more targeted mailing.²⁹

The DCCC also used its state party as a conduit to pay for TV and direct-mail issue ads criticizing Beauprez and venerating Feeley. Unlike the NRCC, the DCCC made no independent expenditures. Rather, the national party transferred its federal and non-federal dollars directly to the state party's federal campaign fund.³⁰

Federal Election Commission records and interviews with media consultants indicate that the party spent \$47,577 to produce five TV issue ads and \$524,127 to air them.³¹ The DCCC (via the state party) also spent \$180,000 to produce and mail seven individual direct-mail pieces, which were developed in consultation with the Feeley campaign.³² Through the coordinated campaign, the party aired one late-running TV ad for \$50,000, which the Feeley campaign authorized.³³ Finally, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) paid \$38,000 via the state party to produce three narrowly targeted mail pieces to active voters (to seniors, young Republican women, and Latinos) that were posted only days before the election.³⁴

Interest Groups

²⁹ The NRCC and state party each put \$38,000 into the coordinated campaign; the state party then transferred the money to the NRCC. Most of the money, around \$58,000, was spent on a television ad; the remainder was put into a scathing direct-mail piece that dovetailed with the NRCC's soft money TV ad. Hazelwood, interview, 3 December 2002.

³⁰ In the words of the Colorado Democratic Party's executive director, the state party's accounting is "legal fiction," with the party creating separate financial accounts every election cycle to facilitate independent and collective decision making by candidates and state and national party officials. Mike Melanson, Colorado Democratic Party Executive Director, interview by Daniel Smith, Denver, Colo., 8 October 2002.

³¹ Kyle Osterhout, Media Strategies and Research, Vice President, phone interview by Daniel Smith, 10 December 2002.

³² According to Feeley's campaign manager, the NRCC already had sent three or four direct-mail pieces by October 7 to the DCCC's one piece. Greathouse, interview, 5 December 2002. The DCCC contracted with Mammen-Pritchard but was paid by the state party. Amy Pritchard, Mammen-Pritchard, Partner, phone interview by Daniel Smith, 17 October 2002.

³³ Mark Armour, Armour Media, President, phone interview by Daniel Smith, 10 December 2002.

³⁴ Stenberg, interview, 12 December 2002.

National interest groups generally kept their distance during the campaign, concentrating the bulk of their attention on the U.S. Senate race between Republican incumbent Wayne Allard and Democrat Tom Strickland. Tellingly, special interests ran no television and only a few radio ads featuring the candidates contesting the Seventh.³⁵ National Right to Life bought limited radio time, and Beauprez's Heritage Bank ran radio spots during the primary and general elections.³⁶ Neither the campaign nor specific political issues were addressed in the Heritage Bank ads (which aired on Clear Channel stations), but the tone of each preached integrity and trust, with Beauprez speaking during the final fifteen seconds. Three 527 organizations, all fronts for the pharmaceutical industry, each sent out a direct-mail piece, but overall, interest groups mailed less than half the total number of unique pieces sent by the parties.³⁷ Other interest groups, most notably the National Rifle Association (NRA), the Colorado AFL-CIO, the Colorado Education Association (CEA), and the Sierra Club, sent mailings to their members. While the amount spent on issue ads and internal communications is not disclosed, it is likely that less than \$100,000 was spent in the Seventh District by outside groups.

The Effects of Money: Ground War

Waging an effective ground war is crucial to electoral success in Colorado. During the 1990s, campaigns became increasingly front-loaded because county clerks were authorized to mail absentee ballot request forms to registered voters and open early

³⁵ In early September, Minahan stated that "every day I get on my knees and pray" that unions and pro-choice organizations will run issue ads on behalf of Feeley. Beth Minahan, Feeley Campaign Chair, interview by Daniel Smith, Lakewood, Colo., 9 September 2002.

³⁶ Republican opponents in the primary asked Beauprez to cancel his bank's ads, but Beauprez's campaign manager claimed that the ads were taped and scheduled well before he entered the race. Bill Scanlon, "Campaign Ads Stir Cries of Foul," *Rocky Mountain News*, July 11, 2002, p. A21. The Heritage Bank ads never surfaced as a salient issue during the general election; however, the Feeley campaign did file an unsuccessful complaint with the FEC. Greathouse, interview, 5 December 2002.

³⁷ National Right to Life spent approximately \$20,000 on its AM radio spot that supported Beauprez and Senator Wayne Allard.

voting centers (from October 21 to November 1) in an effort to trim voting queues on Election Day.³⁸ Beauprez, Feeley, and the state parties encouraged their core supporters to vote before the November election.³⁹ Early voting was especially pronounced in Jefferson County, with roughly half of those voting doing so with absentee ballots or at early voting stations.⁴⁰ Public opinion polls, including the third wave of the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy (CSED) Perfect Storm Election Study, found that over 50 percent of Republicans and Democrats who said they voted did so by casting absentee ballots or voting early.⁴¹ Early voting, though, appeared to benefit Beauprez because more registered Republicans voted early than Democrats.⁴² Feeley conceded that Beauprez and the state GOP did “a terrific job” motivating supporters to vote early, putting his campaign in “a rather shallow hole that we couldn’t climb out of.”⁴³

³⁸ By mid-October, Jefferson County had mailed 85,000 absentee ballots to voters (44,054 to Republicans, 26,910 to Democrats, and 13,815 to Unaffiliateds), accounting for 39 percent of active GOP voters, 30 percent of active Democrats, and 20 percent of Unaffiliateds. Lynn Bartels, “Early to Ballot Box,” *Rocky Mountain News*, October 17, 2002, p. A28.

³⁹ The candidates and parties checked daily with the county clerks to see who had voted and get a sense of whether Republicans, Democrats, or Unaffiliateds were casting ballots. “The universe of actual likely voters shrinks every day from now through Election Day,” Philp said in mid-October, as “candidates [and] both parties will try to avoid contacting Coloradans who have already voted.” Bartels, “Early to Ballot Box,” 17 October 2002. Purging those who voted early from direct-mail lists, however, was not always smooth because the county clerks were sometimes slow to provide updated voting records so the consultants could do “match-backs.” Stenberg, interview, December 12, 2002.

⁴⁰ Bernle, “Early Votes Coming in ‘Briskly,’” *Rocky Mountain News*, October 30, 2002, p. A19.

⁴¹ David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson, “Campaign 2002: ‘The Perfect Storm,’” Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy (www.csed.byu.edu [13 November 2002]). A poll conducted for Feeley by Harstad Strategic Research in August found that 62 percent of likely voters would vote early; of those early voters, 56 percent said they would mail in an absentee ballot, with another 6 percent saying they would vote at an early voting center. Minahan, interview, 9 September 2002.

⁴² Magleby and Monson, “Campaign 2002: ‘The Perfect Storm.’” An independent poll by Talmey-Drake Research and Strategy found that early voters were more likely to be Republicans (45 percent) than Democrats (32 percent) and that the average age of early voters was nearly ten years higher than election-day voters (55 to 46 years old). John Sanko, “Many Loyal Voters Won’t Line up Today,” *Rocky Mountain News*, November 5, 2002, p. A4.

⁴³ Peggy Lowe and Lynn Bartels, “Beauprez Grows Used to Close Calls,” *Rocky Mountain News*, November 23, 2002, p. A4.

In terms of mail, the NRCC relied on independent expenditures to produce ten hard-hitting pieces, half of which slammed Feeley and made no mention of Beauprez.⁴⁴ (See Tables 8.3 and 8.4). Post-election, Beauprez's campaign manager conceded many of the ads were "pure, harsh hate."⁴⁵ In concert with the state party, the NRCC financed fifteen more targeted direct-mail pieces. Although Beauprez sent no direct mail in the general election, his staff pre-approved each coordinated NRCC/state party mailing, including (albeit belatedly) a highly controversial piece featuring side-by-side photographs of a cigar-chomping lobbyist and a rabid dog. The oversized postcard inveighed, "What happens when you cross this [cigar-chomping lobbyist] with this [rabid dog]?" It answers, "You get Mike Feeley. And he wants to be your Congressman?" The tagline read: "He's just out for himself. He's everything wrong with politics today."⁴⁶

The "rabid dog" piece was clearly the nastiest direct-mail piece of the campaign. Feeley was so enraged that he sent a copy of it to Beauprez's home with a curt note. After the election, Feeley complained, "The Republican Party was pretty shameless. The distortion, the volume—that really wasn't attributable to Bob—was relentless."⁴⁷ Feeley did his best to make the caustic nature of the campaign an issue. The street-smart New Jersey native reasoned, "You can only sit back and let people smack you in the belly so many times.... You don't go to a gun fight and bring a knife." While Beauprez admitted privately that he was personally concerned about the negative tone, he defended the NRCC's calculated campaign of character assassination, saying Feeley "would do what

⁴⁴ Arena Communications, which produced the independent expenditure ads, never spoke with the Beauprez camp during the campaign and was "totally isolated" from the NRCC's field representatives. South, interview, December 3, 2002.

⁴⁵ Murphy, interview, 5 December 2002.

⁴⁶ Hazelwood, interview, 3 December 2002.

⁴⁷ Lowe and Bartels, "Beauprez Grows Used to Close Calls," November 23, 2002.

he had to [as a lobbyist] and take a shower the morning after.”⁴⁸ Internal polling by the GOP suggested that the campaign in the Seventh did not approach the viciousness of the U.S. Senate race, so the party saw no reason to limit its negative attacks: “We could have put a flame-thrower in [Feeley’s] ear,” an NRCC direct-mail consultant confided, “and we almost did!”⁴⁹

For its part, the DCCC financed no independent expenditure direct-mail ads and spent far less than the Republicans in its coordinated efforts with the state party. Routing its hard/soft money split through the state party, the DCCC paid for seven glossy direct-mail pieces, three of which assailed Beauprez for his stances on guns, abortion, and corporate corruption. One piece featured the same cigar-chomping lobbyist used by the NRCC in its infamous rabid dog piece. Another negative piece depicted a match lighting a copy of the Constitution on fire, with the tagline reading, “Bob Beauprez Wants to Ban All Abortion—EVEN in Cases of Rape and Incest.”⁵⁰

Get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts in the district fell under the umbrellas of the state parties, which were bolstered by soft money transferred from the national parties. Beauprez participated in the state Republican party’s 96-Hour program—outlasting the Republican National Committee’s (RNC’s) national 72-Hour Task Force—which was run out of Governor Owens’ campaign headquarters. Aided by a \$250,000 soft money contribution from the RNC, the state party’s 96-Hour program paid “volunteers” \$200 for their efforts and included 114 Oral Roberts University students bused in from

⁴⁸ Arthur Kane, “It’s Down, Dirty in 7th District,” *Denver Post*, 30 October 2002, p. A17.

⁴⁹ Hazelwood, interview, 3 December 2002.

⁵⁰ The abortion piece and another on Social Security were mailed to the twenty-eight-year-old wife of Beauprez’s campaign manager, even though she is an active Republican. Murphy, interview, 12 October 2002. Hazelwood also heard of the DCCC’s outreach to staunch Republican voters, prompting him to comment that their direct mail was “either very sophisticated or they used very sloppy, outdated registrations.” Hazelwood, interview, 3 December 2002.

Oklahoma.⁵¹ During literature drops, the students were seen talking on cellular telephones provided by the party and driving cars courtesy of a John Elway dealership.⁵² The NRCC also spent \$14,559 in hard money to target Latinos in a late surge of “robo-calls” strafing Feeley’s legislative and lobbying record.⁵³

The state Democratic Party ran its traditional “96-Day Campaign” in an effort to turn out its base. With more than eighty paid staff, the party mobilized over 5,000 volunteers statewide on Election Day, including more than 1,000 union members. Although it fell short of its \$3 million goal, the state party paid for generic absentee ballot request forms, GOTV literature, and phone banks imploring “lazy Dems” to vote. The party also expanded its Latino voter outreach, which included running Spanish language radio and TV spots aimed at “lazy Democratic Latinos.”⁵⁴ The party’s coordinated campaign was “pay to play,” with candidates, the national parties, interest groups, and the proponent of a ballot measure anteing up to participate.⁵⁵

Shying away from the expensive Denver television market, interest groups concentrated their electioneering efforts on the ground war but not nearly to the degree that many observers had expected. Targeting likely Republican voters, unaffiliated women, and especially seniors, several conservative groups sent oversized postcards highlighting issues at the heart of the campaign. National Right to Life mailed a small

⁵¹ Steve Truebner, Owens 2002, Organization Director, interview by Daniel Smith, Golden, Colo., 7 November 2002.

⁵² Chafee, interview, 7 November 2002.

⁵³ Michele Ames, “Wanted: Hispanic Vote,” *Rocky Mountain News*, August 27, 2002, p. A14; Michael Riley, “Program Aims to Coax Hispanics to Voting Booths,” *Denver Post*, October 30, 2002, p. A16.

⁵⁴ Melanson, interview, 8 October 2002. The DNC conducted a poll and focus groups in August that found running issue ads on Spanish-language TV was not effective. As Feeley’s primary election campaign manger put it, Latino voters “don’t watch Spanish TV.” Minahan, interview, 9 September 2002.

⁵⁵ Amendment 30, the Election Day registration initiative, was the only ballot-issue committee to buy in to the Democrat’s coordinated campaign. Congressional candidates Diana DeGette and Stan Matsunaka also participated in the coordinated campaign. The DCCC sponsored Feeley’s \$25,000 buy-in. An individual close to the Feeley campaign also gave the state party \$50,000 earmarked for Feeley, with the donor informally telling the party that “Feeley’s a good guy.” Greathouse, interview, 5 December 2002.

express advocacy postcard that placed a red heart next to Beauprez's staunch pro-life position. In addition to holding a political rally in Aurora in late October that featured Charlton Heston, the NRA sent four mailings (with a bumper sticker in one) to its Colorado members expressly supporting Beauprez because of his defense of the Second Amendment.⁵⁶ While the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce endorsed Beauprez, any electioneering activities they conducted fell well below the radar screen. The Colorado Christian Coalition was also a non-factor, distributing candidate slate cards to evangelical churches but issuing no other mailings.

More significantly, three sister 527 organizations—each a known shill for the pharmaceutical industry—used direct mail to counter Feeley's effort to criticize Beauprez's neo-privatization stance on Social Security and his ambiguous plan to rein in the rising costs of prescription drugs. The Seniors Coalition, America 21, and the 60 Plus Association collectively inundated the homes of older Republicans and independent voters with oversized postcards. None of these pieces mentioned Feeley. Clearly, the groups were not coordinating their efforts with the Republican candidate; each praised "Beuprez" (misspelling his name) for his work in behalf of seniors, with the 60 Plus Association even giving the Republican an "Honorary Guardian of Seniors Award." With military service a latent issue during the campaign, America 21, in a piece filled with

⁵⁶ Peggy Lowe, "Heston's Visit May Sway Tight Races," *Rocky Mountain News*, October 24, 2002, p. A36. Despite Beauprez's strong pro-gun stance, his staff did little to publicize the rally because many residents in the district find the NRA too extreme. Beauprez was not featured at the rally, and he arrived just as it was ending. Murphy, interview, 5 December 2002.

images of WWII servicemen, praised “Beuprez’s [sic] Commitment to Seniors,” and his willingness to “stand up for the Greatest Generation.”⁵⁷

Excluding organized labor, liberal interest groups were not as active on the ground as conservative groups. No national group surfaced to offset the mailings touting Beauprez’s support of seniors. Organized labor contacted its members door-to-door, over the phone, and via e-mail; it also provided manpower for the Democrats’ GOTV campaign. The CEA sent letters supporting Feeley to its members, and the Sierra Club sent an environmental scorecard to its members. The environmental group maintained a low profile, perhaps sensing that its endorsement of Feeley over the Green Party candidate, Dave Chandler, may have turned some voters away from the Democratic candidate.⁵⁸ On the periphery, local credit unions mailed postcards to their members supporting Feeley.⁵⁹ Finally, although it endorsed Feeley, the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL) focused its resources on the U.S. Senate race, sending no mailings in support of Feeley.⁶⁰

The Effects of Money: Air War

Despite the nearly \$4 million pumped into television ad buys in the Beauprez-Feeley contest, the spots were often drowned out by airwaves chock full of spots for other

⁵⁷ Feeley served in the Marine Corps; however, Beauprez never served in the military because of a medical exemption (bleeding ulcer). Though both candidates supported Bush’s war on terror and action in Iraq, Feeley stressed that the House needed another Marine and even crashed a Beauprez function with veterans. Peggy Lowe, “Rhetoric Heats up in 7th Race,” *Rocky Mountain News*, October 14, 2002, p. A14. Feeley also vowed to unveil “every chicken-hawk Republican running for office.” Peggy Lowe, “Bush’s Iraq Remarks Leave Feeley Furious,” *Rocky Mountain News*, September 26, 2002, p. A6.

⁵⁸ Chandler, who raised virtually no money for his campaign, was reprimanded by the national Sierra Club after he publicly voiced his displeasure for being overlooked. Following the rebuke, Chandler asked rhetorically, “Is the club even more aligned with the Democrats than I suspected?” Peggy Lowe, “Sierra Club Gives Officer Ultimatum,” *Rocky Mountain News*, October 12, 2002, p. A23.

⁵⁹ The involvement by credit unions was clearly an attempt to mitigate the Heritage Bank radio ads, as well as Beauprez’s role as past Chairman of the Independent Bankers of Colorado. Arthur Kane, “Beauprez Accused of Coercion,” *Denver Post*, October 22, 2002, p. A12.

⁶⁰ George Merritt, “Pro-choice Democrats Rally on Capitol Steps,” *Denver Post*, October 8, 2002, p. A10.

campaigns and ballot measures. An overwhelming number of ads were dedicated to the U.S. Senate melee, the reelection bids of Governor Owens and Attorney General Ken Salazar, and the particularly dyspeptic “No on 31” ballot issue campaign against the elimination of bilingual education. The barrage of negative ads on the airwaves clearly turned off voters and likely contributed to lower-than-expected statewide turnout.⁶¹ The CSED survey revealed that 70 percent of respondents thought the race for the Seventh District was “more” negative “compared to other recent political contests,” with 77 percent of respondents saying they “stopped paying attention” to the campaign ads.⁶²

The viciousness of the air war, however, was not attributable to special interests, as they ran no television spots naming either Seventh District candidate. While party insiders anticipated that outside interests—labor, pro-choice, and environmental groups backing Feeley, and the NRA, pro-life, and pharmaceutical companies supporting Beauprez—would storm the airwaves with negative ads, it never happened. Only the Council for Better Government, a 527 political organization, ran TV ads reaching voters in the district. The Kansas-based group spent \$33,200 to run two dozen non-candidate-specific ads targeting Latinos and blacks and encouraging voters to back the GOP.⁶³ (See Table 8.2).

The preponderance of money (roughly \$2.5 million) spent on television ads originated from the national parties, with most of it redirected through state party organizations. The DCCC spent \$621,704 on six issue ads supporting Feeley and trashing

⁶¹ Chris Frates, “Negative Ads Irritate Some,” *Denver Post*, October 31, 2002, p. A20; Ryan Morgan, “Turnout Was High in Pockets of State,” *Denver Post*, November 8, 2002, p. B1; Susan Greene, “Low Turnout of Minorities, Poor Splits Dems on Tactics,” *Denver Post*, November 10, 2002, p. A1.

⁶² Magleby and Monson, “Campaign 2002: ‘The Perfect Storm.’”

⁶³ All of the ads were aired on two Spanish-language stations in Denver, though a few were broadcast in English. KCEC-TV/KTFD-TV, Denver, Facsimile Transmittals from Access Advertising to Paul Chavez, 19 September 2002, in the station’s FEC public file.

Beauprez; the NRCC tripled the amount of its Democratic foe, spending \$1.946 million on six issue ads hammering Feeley and lionizing Beauprez. As Feeley noted ruefully in mid-September, “I think we’re getting a god-awful amount of television.”⁶⁴ Although some were deemed slanderous by the candidates, no ads were taken off the air by the stations.⁶⁵ The parties spent considerably more than the candidates on TV: Beauprez ran three ads for \$646,330 and Feeley ran four ads for \$547,142.

Half of the six issue ads underwritten by the NRCC and the state party were pure attack ads. While the NRCC ran a few positive ads beginning in mid-September, they took a decisively negative turn by early October. The GOP’s most spiteful TV spot opened with a black background and a spray of question marks dotting the screen. A grainy silhouette emerged, with the narrator asking, “What kind of person works for a group that wants to force people to pay rent in a nursing home up to ninety days after they die?” A grainy image of Feeley gradually appeared, with the narrator blasting the Democrat for lobbying on behalf of drug companies and nursing homes. The thirty-second ad closed by asking viewers to “call Mike Feeley” and ask, “What kind of person are you?” Another of the NRCC’s six issue ads, which began running in October, slammed “lobbyist Mike Feeley” for pushing for a bill backed by “a powerful drug industry group” that would have made “medicine by mail more expensive” and hurt seniors “who have to choose between food and medicine.” The spot was a clear indication that the GOP wanted to neutralize any courting of seniors by the Democrats.

The half dozen ads paid for by the DCCC (and coordinated with the state party) were nearly all negative, assailing Beauprez’s “extreme views” on abortion and gun

⁶⁴ Peggy Lowe, “GOP Airs First Ads in Crucial Contest,” *Rocky Mountain News*, September 18, 2002, p. A14.

⁶⁵ Trail Dust, “Beauprez Campaign Lambastes Feeley Ethics,” *Denver Post*, October 23, 2002, p. A19.

control. Feeley's internal polling found that both issues provided the Democrat with traction among Republican women and unaffiliated voters in the district.⁶⁶ DCCC money also partially funded the most ruthless assault against Beauprez, an ad produced by Armour Media titled, "Protect."⁶⁷ The ad accused the Republican of opposing a ban on so-called "cop-killer" bullets and broader controls on guns. The coordinated ad, which was authorized by the Feeley campaign, began running on October 29, a week before the election. Feeley "unveiled" the ad at the state capitol, accompanied by Representative Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) and several gun control activists and police officers.⁶⁸

Of Beauprez's three TV ads, his last, which ran the final week of the campaign, was perhaps the most effective. Titled, "That Smell," the spot was a ray of hope in an increasingly dark campaign, the first positive ad of the campaign to air in nearly two months. In the testimonial, Beauprez addressed the camera directly in his deliberate, plain-spoken manner. He lamented how a lot of negative things were said about him, and how, as a former dairy farmer, he recognized the smell. The ad closed with Beauprez asking voters for their support. Produced by National Media, the footage was actually shot in early September in a Denver city park not in the district. At that time, the Beauprez camp was accentuating to the public how it would wage a clean campaign, eschewing negative attacks. Clearly, though, Beauprez's staff (and the NRCC media consultants, who were also shooting footage that day), had the clairvoyance to anticipate how bitter the campaign would become.

⁶⁶ Keating, interview, 13 November 2002. According to the CSED poll, abortion was the major issue for 12 percent of likely voters by Election Day. A poll by Ciruli and Associates revealed that 15 percent of voters said they supported Feeley for his pro-choice stance, but 13 percent of voters supported Beauprez for his pro-life stance. Arthur Kane, "Near Tie in Race for 7th District," *Denver Post*, October 18, 2002, p. B1.

⁶⁷ Armour, interview, 10 December 2002.

⁶⁸ John Sanko, "Gun Ad Hits Beauprez," *Rocky Mountain News*, October 29, 2002, p. A22.

The Feeley campaign was absolutely “flabbergasted” by the “That Smell” spot, after Beauprez’s campaign of “character assassination.”⁶⁹ In response to Beauprez’s uplifting finale, Feeley dearly wanted to run a positive ad of his own, in which he would “go to [the] camera and make personal appeal,” but the Democrat did not have “\$250,000” to run an ad. His staff opted instead to keep airing an uncompromising pro-choice ad.⁷⁰ Following the election, Beauprez said he thought his last-minute positive spot put him over the top: “I think that resonated with people, I think that they wanted to hear from the candidate and not third parties.”⁷¹

Radio ads were infrequent during the campaign. The parties essentially did not use the medium, and only a couple interest groups aired ads. Beauprez ran three radio ads on Clear Channel stations during the last week of the campaign, turning to radio after they were unable to buy more television air time.⁷² One of Beauprez’s scripts was lifted directly from the NRCC’s television ad that criticized Feeley for lobbying on behalf of nursing home operators and against seniors.

Conclusion

In tight races, congressional candidates may have great difficulty running their own campaigns. The race for Colorado’s razor-close, delicately reapportioned Seventh District exhibits how Washington, D.C. party insiders are able to exert tremendous pressure on congressional candidates because of the national parties’ potent elixir of soft and hard money. Both the Beauprez and Feeley campaigns were financed, albeit indirectly, by their respective national parties. But the money came with strings attached.

⁶⁹ Greathouse, interview, 5 December 2002.

⁷⁰ Matt Mosley, interview, 13 November 2002.

⁷¹ Paola Farer and Susan Wells, “Beauprez Officially Declared Winner of 7th Congressional District,” *9News* (www.9news.com/storyfull.asp?id=9222, [11 December 2002]).

⁷² Murphy, interview, 5 December 2002.

Accompanying the staggering amount of outside money supplied by the NRCC and the DCCC were their tightly orchestrated campaign plans. The parties' external influence had the dual effect of distorting the local issues the two candidates initially had touted and inflaming the candidates' campaign rhetoric, making it more personal and spiteful. More worrisome, the parties' outside money contributed to the widening disconnect between the constituents residing in the district and the candidates who tirelessly campaigned to represent them.

Table 8.1
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures 2001–2002

Mike Feeley (D) - CO 7		Bob Beauprez (R) - CO 7	
Contributions from PACs	\$463,396	Contributions from PACs	\$443,402
Contributions from Individuals	\$542,597	Contributions from Individuals	\$899,776
Contributions from Party	\$15,700	Contributions from Party	\$54,320
Contributions/loans from the Candidate	\$56,000	Contributions/loans from the Candidate	\$455,000
Other Contributions	\$82,799	Other Contributions	\$303
Total Receipts	\$1,160,492	Total Receipts	\$1,852,801
Total Expenditures	\$1,147,759	Total Expenditures	\$1,827,119
Cash on hand as of 12/31/2002	\$12,732	Cash on hand as of 12/31/2002	\$25,681

Source: "2001-02 U.S. House and US Senate Candidate Info," *FECInfo*, 31 December 2002. At <http://www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_statedis.exe>, 08 June 2003.

Table 8.2
The Air War: Most Active Organizations
Collected Ad-buy Data in the Colorado 7th Congressional District Race
Democratic Allies

Type	Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
<i>Candidates</i>	Feeley for Congress	\$547,142	-	\$547,142	\$737,406
<i>Political Parties</i>	DCCC / Colorado Democratic Party	\$621,704	-	\$621,704	\$1,128,908

Republican Allies

Type	Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
<i>Candidates</i>	Bob Beauprez for Congress	\$646,330	\$35,855	\$682,185	\$976,174
<i>Political Parties</i>	NRCC / Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee	\$1,945,981	-	\$1,945,981	\$1,128,854
	NRCC / Republican State Central Committee of Colorado	\$58,000	-	\$58,000	\$463,236
<i>Interest Groups</i>	Council for Better Government	\$33,200	-	\$33,200	-
	National Right to Life	\$0	-	-	-
	Heritage Bank	\$0	-	-	-

Source: CMAG data and David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, CSED 2002 Soft Money and Issue Advocacy Database [dataset]. Provo, UT: Brigham Young University, Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy [producer and distributor], 2002; and CMAG data.

- Please see Appendix B for a more detailed data explanation.
- Regarding Democratic and Republican Allies, certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal.
- The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House or Senatorial candidates or ballot propositions not in the study’s sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study’s relevant House or Senate races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table.
- The ‘-’ for an organization only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.
- Because of the sheer volume of television and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete.
- This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with Table 8.3.

Table 8.3
The Ground War and Unique Ads: Most Active Organizations
Observed Activity in the Colorado 7th Congressional District Race
Democratic Allies

Type	Organization	Email	Mail	News	Person	Phone	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Candidates</i>	Feeley for Congress	5	1	-	2	2	-	4	14
<i>Political Parties</i>	DCCC/CO Democratic Party	-	7	-	2	-	1 ^a	6	16
	DNC/CO Democratic Party	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3
<i>Interest Groups</i>	Colorado AFL-CIO	2	1	-	1	1	-	-	5
	CO Education Assn	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
	Alliance for Retired Americans ^b	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
	GLBT Majority Vote Project	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	Members of the Romer Family	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	Planned Parenthood ^c	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
	Rocky Mountain Chapter of the Sierra Club	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	Sierra Club	-	-	-	-	-	1 ^d	-	1
	America's Credit Unions	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	Jeffco Schools Credit Union	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	Public Service Credit Union	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1

Republican Allies

Type	Organization	Email	Mail	News	Person	Phone	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Candidates</i>	Bob Beauprez for Congress	5	3	-	3	-	3	3	17
<i>Political Parties</i>	NRCC/CO Republican Federal Campaign Committee	-	15	-	1	-	-	5	21
	NRCC	-	10	-	-	2	-	1	13
	NRCC/Republican State Central Committee of CO	-	2	-	-	-	-	4	6
	CO State/Federal Victory 2002	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	3
	Local Republican Parties	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
	RNC	-	-	-	-	1 ^e	-	-	-
<i>Interest Groups</i>	Council for Better Govt	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	24
	NRA	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	4
	60 Plus Association	-	2	-	-	-	1 ^f	-	3

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National Right to Life	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	3
Unknown Organization	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2
America 21	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Arapahoe Republican Men's Club and Aurora Republican Forum	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
Christian Coalition	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
NFIB	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
The Seniors Coalition	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
US Chamber of Commerce ^g	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Heritage Bank	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2

Other Party Allies

Type	Organization	Email	Mail	News	Person	Phone	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Candidates</i>	Victor Good for Congress Committee	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1

SOURCE: David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, CSED 2002 Soft Money and Issue Advocacy Database [dataset]. Provo, UT: Brigham Young University, Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy [producer and distributor], 2002.

- ^a Mike Matthews, DCCC Political Director, interview by David B. Magleby and Nicole Carlisle, Washington, D.C., 12 November 2002.
- ^b Unspecified race involvement. Ed Coyle, Alliance for Retired Americans Executive Director, telephone interview by David B. Magleby and Quin Monson, 20 December 2002.
- ^c Unspecified race involvement. David Williams, Planned Parenthood Director of Action Fund and PAC, interview by David B. Magleby and Nicole Carlisle, Washington, D.C., 8 November 2002.
- ^d Margaret Conway, Sierra Club National Political Director, telephone interview by David B. Magleby and Quin Monson, 16 December 2002.
- ^e Marc Racicot, RNC Chairman, interview by David B. Magleby, Washington, D.C., 6 December 2002.
- ^f Jim Martin, 60 Plus Association President, interview by Quin Monson and Jonathan Tanner, Washington, D.C., 11 December 2002.
- ^g Unspecified race involvement. Bill Miller, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Political Director, interview by David B. Magleby and Quin Monson, Washington, D.C., 7 November 2002.
- Please see Appendix B for a more detailed data explanation.
- Data represent the number of *unique* pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made.
- Regarding Democratic and Republican Allies, certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was anti- or pro-conservative or liberal.
- This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with Table 8.2.

Table 8.4
Direct Mail: Ground War Expenditures in the
Colorado 7th Congressional District Race

Democratic Allies

Type	Organization	Direct Mail
<i>Political Parties</i>	DCCC / Colorado Democratic Party	\$180,000
	DNC / Colorado Democratic Party	\$38,000

Republican Allies

Type	Organization	Direct Mail
<i>Political Parties</i>	NRCC / Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee	\$200,000
	NRCC	\$200,000
	NRCC / Republican State Central Committee of Colorado	\$18,000

Source: FEC.

- Please see Appendix B for a more detailed data explanation.
- This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with Table 8.3.