Journal of Undergraduate Research
Volume 8, Issue 6 - July / August 2007

Poland in the European Union and the European Consciousness of Poles:
Changing Perspectives on National Identity after Accession?

Anna Rutz and Alin Ceobanu

ABSTRACT

Poland’s changing self perception, will have an impact on the rest of Europe, as it was the largest accession country in the 2004 European Union (EU) enlargement and is not shy to voice its often much more conservative opinion in the EU meetings. The accession has had a tremendous impact on Poland, politically as well as socially and every individual has been confronted with the new circumstances. This paper gives an overview of the political and personal situation of Poles today. The current situation is embedded in its historical context, illustrating the evolution of Poles’ national identity over the course of its turbulent history. A general trend of the Poles’ national identity was found and it is predicted that they will gradually embrace the European identity while still retaining their own values. The European values will be an additional identity for Poles, opening the door for them to once again take part in the European discourse.

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning was [the] idea: we are coming back to Europe, we will live in Europe. But a moment later appeared the thesis that we had no reason to come in to Europe. First because we were in it the whole time; secondly, this Europe is not so beautiful. Because Europe means relativism, godlessness, drugs, pornography, abortion, divorces, homosexuality, in one word – Babylon, Sodom and Gomorra.
- Krzeminski, 2000

The relationship between membership in the European Union (EU hereafter) and the national identities of post-communist states is a central issue of the enlargement politics. The ongoing referendums about accession into the EU are indicative of the role played by popular perceptions about the congruency between national interests and perceived consequences of such membership. In Poland, like most countries of Eastern Europe, the interrelation between EU integration and national consciousness is a matter of political contestation between actors representing various interests and, oftentimes, even contending agendas. Poland’s "return to Europe" and accession into the EU was touted by politicians, intellectuals and the media alike as an economic, politic and social milestone (Kurczyewka 1999; Krzeminski 2000; Garton Ash 1999). The expected outcomes of this symbiosis were the following: economic prosperity, consolidation of the democratic process and strong affirmation of the civil society, as well as an embedding of the national norms and values into European principles.

Before 2004, the slogan "Back to Europe" was at the center of the accession process to the European Union. Two years after the accession, I embarked on a journey to explore the extent to which the expectations mentioned above were still part of the views held by the public. Has any of the initial euphoria survived the accession in 2004? Has the affective image of Europe been abandoned by both the Polish politicians and the public? And just how European do Poles feel today? This paper addresses these questions by focusing on the interplay between the national and European consciousness of Poles during three distinct time periods: (1) communism, (2) transition and pre-accession, and (3) post-accession. Dictated by the different socio-political, economic and intellectual contexts that characterizes each period, this historical approach permits a direct assessment of the relationship between the national and European identities of Poles.

There are three possible outcomes to the study of the relationship between Poland’s membership to the EU and its national identity. On the one hand, this relationship can be neutral, in which case neither phenomenon influences the other, so that one could conclude that they are completely independent from each other. On the other hand, it could be the situation that membership into the EU has a direct effect on Poles’ perception of national identity. Thus, the effect can be either positive or negative, which would indicate that the two phenomena are interconnected.

The comparative nature of this paper is further substantiated by personal fieldwork in the form of interviews and content analysis drawing upon several media outlets, also used by the political elite and influential intellectuals to send their message to the public. Even though this paper will concentrate on the more recent changes of Poland’s national identity starting with the rise of the communist regime in Poland, it is essential to place the upcoming debate in the larger historical context to ensure a better understanding of Poland’s current situation.

POLES' NATIONAL IDENTITY UNDER COMMUNISM

In the aftermath of World War II, Poland fell under the Soviet domination. Long gone but never forgotten were the days when Poland was a European player with a well contoured national identity. For centuries, Poles had perceived themselves to be the ‘chosen people,’ destined to ‘civilize the Slavs and save the world’ (Prizel 1998, pg. 57). Poland’s national identity, based on collective memories and a proud remembrance of what once was the Polish Empire survived many challenges and about a century of dominance by neighboring countries. Even after the World War II, when they were forced to joining the Communist camp, the Poles kept their dreams of independence alive. Despite the absolute and discretionary power exerted by an anti-national Communist regime, the Catholic value system and the strong hierarchical structure, deeply embedded in Poland’s social history, made it seemingly impossible to completely downplay the affirmation of national identity.

Poland’s national identity during Communism was further kept alive by a certain branch of intellectuals and other key figures, such as Priest Popiełuszko, or even certain politicians within the Communist party like Branislaw Gomułka. Preaching against the regime, Popiełuszko became a key figure among the few but courageous Polish dissidents, as the sermons he delivered were highly politicized and openly critical of Communism. He drew huge crowds and, even though he occupied a low key position within the clergy, he quickly acquired unofficial fame throughout Poland. Imprisoned for his actions, of which the Western media offered ample coverage, Popiełuszko was in the end brutally murdered by the Communist-controlled secret police. In the eyes of many Poles, his martyrdom was not in vain: Popiełuszko became a national symbol against the political oppression of the regime, an alternative to a reprimanded European identity, the embodiment of societas civilis (civil society), and a hope for the years to come.

On the other hand, Branislaw Gomułka, the first secretary of the Polish Communist Party, was a politician in love with his country and resilient of implementing Moscow-inspired policies. Even though he rejected Stalinist measures, Gomułka occupied the first office of the Party through the sixties, when he was removed from power due to international pressures. The promotion of a Polish brand of nationalism within the Communist platform kept the national ideal of a free Poland alive, as it oftentimes stood against? the internationalist intentions of the Communist doctrine.

In essence, the Catholic Church was the only institution that stood in strong opposition to the Communist regime and government, although disparate groups of intellectuals also assumed such a position. However, whereas the Polish Church became the symbol of a Communist-free type of national identity, intellectuals stressed their country’s history and kept alive the memory of an independent Poland with an unequivocal European destiny.

To prove Poland’s place in Europe, the groups of intellectuals under Communism drew upon the concept of Mitteleuropa (Middle Europe) and emphasized common geographic, religious and historical roots. Despite geographical proximity, contact with Western Europe was minimal during this period because of ideological differences and policies of insularity. The regime’s continuous attempts at silencing dissident individuals and increasing state interference in every day life, in order to keep the population under control and discourage free thinking, did not have the anticipated effect. Rather, many Poles had begun to mobilize and organize themselves, sometimes as underground activities, reaching out to the people and wanting to become more closely connected to the Western European countries. Ignoring the oppressive culture during Communism’s last days, a group of workers in Gdansk became vociferous and called for substantial reforms. This large and powerful labor movement, which aptly took the name ‘Solidarity,’ aimed at socio-economic and political reformism, in large part being inspired by Western models. Their continued resistance through striking and direct confrontation with the police forces was a source of national inspiration for the Poles. Their popularity grew exponentially, thanks in part to coverage by the Western media channels, but support among the Polish public was undeniable. Thus, the core of the Solidarity movement, led by Lech Wałęsa, capitalized on their popularity and was able to assemble the first government after the downfall of Communism, in 1989. In this way, their ideals and visions regarding the political and social future evolution of Poland towards Europe was cemented into practice, paving the way to a new era.

POLES’ NATIONAL IDENTITY DURING THE TRANSITION AND PRE-ACCESSION PERIOD

After the demise of communism, Poland entered a period of transition marked by a complete change in leadership. With the previous regime no longer in charge of the country’s national destiny (including its identity) and reinstatement of personal freedoms, grassroots organizations comprising civil society flourished. The emerging civil society, built on the legacy of Communist resistance, naturally resorted to the most enduring markers of national identity as its foundation. National values that left indelible imprints during the inter-war Polish society were revived, something that scholars refer to as "restorative nationalism." The forty or so years of communism represented an unnatural period in the European trajectory of the Polish society, because, in the words of Krzeminski (2000, pg. 2), "with the re-building of the political and economic system, the new state and society became reconnected with the evolution of the past."

Even though the Church and the intellectuals developed different inspirational models of nationalism following the demise of Communism, they both continued (and still do) to shape Poland’s identity. However, whereas previously they were more united in a common vision of a more democratic and less intrusive state, they now backed different visions of the future. Thus, the Church rooted for a strongly Catholic agenda, while the intellectuals favored a more secular and civic approach to the national identity question, as they had seen developed elsewhere in Western Europe. The relation that the Church has played along the road of Poland’s accession into the EU has been one filled with contradictions. Contradicting itself, the Church has been simultaneously supporting and discouraging the idea of EU membership, for various reasons.

Starting with these competing discourses concerning Poland’s future, the scenarios on the national identity of Poles began to diversify.

The closer and more attainable the EU accession got, the more the intellectuals realized that "an understanding of Europe as a [cultural] space rooted in antique civilization and in Christianity, whose symbols were Aachen and Rome – [is a] Europe [that] is simply non-existent" anymore (Krzeminski 2000, pg. 9). Somewhat disillusioned, they realized that the model of Europe that they had been looking to for inspiration was far from being flawless. With the help of certain media outlets and through the efforts of disgruntled commentators, the myth of Europe was living its last days, as the dreams about Poland’s return to and role within the continent were widely replaced by disappointment. In response to this, some intellectual camps started to reevaluate the current situation in Poland and refocused on Brussels and the EU institutions it hosts.

Such a trend became visible in the political arena, where political analysts recorded a split between two factions over the issue of joining or not joining and how to go about either solution. On the one hand, a number of parties identified themselves with the new vision developed by intellectuals, that of a secular and European state, in which the Catholic Church would have minimal powers. On the other hand, several other parties chose to capitalize on the Catholic Christian cultural background, suggesting a Church-steered secular state (Krzeminski 2000, pg. 4-5). The scenario advocated by the latter faction called for constructing "[the] Polish identity as a representation of traditional, Christian values […] [by stressing] the role of the Catholic Church in the nation’s heroic heritage and in the conservation of national consciousness" (Krzeminski 2000, pg. 10).

The quintessential example of party favoring the Church-steered secular state and, by extension, a specific nationalist vision, is the Law and Justice Party (PiS). Founded shortly before 2001, PiS "is EU-pessimist in word and deed, having opposed the speedy accession route taken by the current [(2002)] left-wing Polish government" (NNP, 07/10/2006, pg. 5). Its main electorate consists of those who lost out the most during the period of economic transition, in which Western-inspired measures of shock therapy caused alienation among the Poles. This part of the Polish society naturally resented these regulations, conceiving them to be the beginning of a loss of economic independence and national sovereignty. According to the PiS, "the EU should be based on strong unitary nation-states" (Kopecky 2002, pg. 16). Such a vision which would solve the brain drain problem, as continuing with the flow of laborers and products would not be possible to the same extent. PiS is capitalizing on the concerns of the general public, who ask themselves if Poland might not be better off without the EU and do not see any benefits or positive changes that would affect their livelihood in the long run.

Another new parliamentary party with a strong impact at the level of public opinion is the League of Polish Families (LPR). Its political platform is largely supported by the orthodox Catholic subculture around the radio station Radio Maryja, which touts itself as the "Catholic voice of your home." Getting the most out of the popular fear that accession into the EU might weaken or stand in opposition to the traditionally strong Catholic values in Poland, the LPR openly supports policy approaches that not only are anti-reform and anti-integration, but also pro-clerical. In its voting platform, this party claimed that, if elected, it would denounce the accession treaty because it would cost Poland 10 billion US Dollars and some 1 million jobs (Kurzer Überblick, 2006). Exhibiting a strong Catholic-nationalist orientation, LPR also capitalizes on anti-Semitic and anti-immigrant orientations of the Polish public, an alarming trend which is on par with the general attitudes found in most states of Western Europe. The LPR also embraced Euroscepticism, describing the EU in terms of a "speculative foreign capital" that will cause "the destruction of [the] Polish conscience and culture" (Kopecky 2002, pg. 16).

These two Eurosceptic parties coexist in the national arena together with other political organizations that have been actively promoting Poland’s ‘return to Europe’ and joining of the European Union. An example in this respect would be SdRP (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej), the party that was in power at the time when Poland became initiated as a full member state of the European Union (May 2004). Simply judging by this everlasting milestone, the above-named party can easily be identified as pro-European, considering that its political platform reflects the general plans and vision of the EU institutions.

It is worth mentioning in this context that all political parties during this period centered their ballots on the issue of accession, something which has helped solidify the gap between the two essentially opposing camps. One can conclude that Poland’s politicians, their platforms and visions of Poland’s future split along the lines of the country’s accession or non-accession into the EU. As observed by one scholar, many of the major political parties try to offset the European Union’s economic pressures and requirements by making "a point about defending Polish interests in the accession process, though […] this is sometimes more a matter of strategy than of ideological persuasion" (Kopecky 2002, pg. 15).

In sum, many Poles appear to be scared of the loudly voiced negative forecasts and predicaments produced by outspoken Eurosceptics, something which translates into a substantial waning of the initial euphoria associated with EU membership and predicated by the now-obsolete slogan of returning to Europe. Thus, it is no surprise that ordinary citizens have openly expressed their ambivalence vis-à-vis Poland’s accession into the EU. Revealing in this regard is a May 2001 poll indicating that the number of respondents in favor of accession has fallen to a record low (44%) in Poland, with the percentage of those rejecting it approaching 20% (Kopecky 2002, pg. 9).

POLAND'S NATIONAL IDENTITY AFTER THE 2004 ACCESSION INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION

The accession rhetoric has had a strong role in shaping political and socio-economic opinions regarding Poland’s national and European identity, but the question of what happened after the accession presents itself. When I traveled to Poland this past summer, I realized that the initial popular euphoria about the prospective admission into the EU has been pretty much extinguished. Similarly, the dream of a harmonious Europe with a Poland promoting more Europe-friendly policies appeared to have slipped away. Once the Law and Justice Party (PiS) acceded to political power and took over the presidency in 2004, it fought back the ongoing European economic reforms and stood strong against any attempts at deeper integration (Kopecky 2002, pg. 16). Important to mention in this context is the declaration given by Lech Wałęsa, former president and open supporter of the European integration process, to the July 10, 2007, edition of the German newspaper Nassauische Neue Presse: "The two Kaczynski brothers[the current President and the chief of the majority party] will destabilize everything and we [the pro-Europeans] will collect all the political debris that they will leave behind" (Gera, Vanessa "Heute neuer Premier", NNP 07/10/2006, pg. 5). In the same article, Wałęsa described the current national policies as "EU-skeptic, […] heavily burdening Poland’s foreign relations and limiting its options" (Gera, Vanessa "Heute neuer Premier", NNP 07/10/2006, pg. 5).

At the other end of the spectrum, the voices of discontent have been growing louder, as the public dissatisfaction with and disillusionment of an idealized vision of Europe has risen. Such conservative and anti-European sentiments are more pronounced in the rural areas, where people see no immediate benefits from their country’s admission into the EU. Poverty is especially prevalent in these regions, as not only farming is inefficient but most family-owned farms are also too small to feed their own families, let alone sell any surplus produce. Furthermore, exit polls indicated that it is the population in these rural areas that massively supported PiS and enabled the Kaczynski brothers to win, thereby altering Poland’s long-forged pro-European orientation. According to an article published by the Christian Science Monitor,this drastic turn is seen by the poor and those who lost out the most during the period of economic and political transition as the "victory for Poland’s have-nots" (08/29/06, pg. 4). At the same time, the common phraseology among certain intellectual and political circles is that of a "defeat for [the] liberalism that was bringing Poland closer to the rest of Europe" (Curry, Andrew "Poland takes conservative" Christian Science Monitor 08/29/06, pg. 4).

Another discourse that further sets apart Poland from the EU is the collective blame attributed to the Westerners for the massive migration of the Poles. Although the Polish political elites consider it highly unlikely that additional restrictions will be placed on free movement, in a BBC interview, the Polish Deputy Prime Minister Roman Giertych expressed his dissatisfaction with the continuous emigration of Poles and argued for the creation of programs curbing the brain drain (BBC "Polish Concern" Jul. 2006).

Anti-European and strong nationalist feelings are also fueled by nativism. Watching your own country being seemingly taken over by various international companies and not much of the profit being reinvested creates sentiments of anxiety about the future trajectory. But politicians stay optimistic, such as the mayor of Wroclaw, who reminds people of the current growth rates of about 7- 8% a year and asserts that things will get better in the future: "Most probably not today, not tomorrow, but the day after, we will need more people" (BBC, Polish Concern, Jul. 2006) . This development will admittedly take, in an ideal scenario, about 10 years, if Poland has not been too damaged by emigration and is capable of replacing its workforce.
The flipside to people leaving Poland because of low earning rates is of course the entering of foreign firms to produce at lower costs.

As a delegate for the German-Polish and German-Russian relations, Mr. Helm brought it together: This kind of foreign ownership in Poland is relatively high, triggering that industrial areas like Wroclaw look surprisingly much like German ones. He cautions, that this can have negative side effects socially, as the Poles do not see that a part of the profits are reinvested back into their country.

According to Dr. Neyer, a Germany-Poland expert at the Viadrina University, Frankfurt Oder, Poland is still today suffering the economic ‘Folge Kosten’ – the costs caused by the impediment of the chock therapy, which left the Polish economic system in shambles, with the attitude that, eventually, the market will straighten things out. According to him, there was a disconnection between the political policies and the people suffering under the period of socio-economic and political transition, because of the belief that the market will take care of it. In my interview with him, Dr. Neyer also drew attention to the fact, that the ‘Osterweiterung’ (the eastward enlargement of the EU) was a politically desired project and not one that was asked for by the general population of Europe. Before the enlargement, he said, this was a one-way love affair; whereas Poland was euphoric about the enlargement, the citizens of the Western European countries were worried about falling standards of living and an influx of illegal immigrants and cheap laborers. After the enlargement, the Poles too had to confront the bleak reality of being the "newest members of the large European family": the enthusiasm died down and the European Union was demystified, as desired changes failed to occur.

One example Dr. Neyer gave, which clearly points out the failures of the European Union, is that of the computer chip factory that was supposed to be built on the border between Germany and Poland, creating jobs for both countries in a region that badly needs them. As he called it, this was one of the ‘Elite Projekten,’ (elite-initiated programs that affect EU member states). After millions of Euros spent on this project, the computer chip factory was eventually built. Soon after, the planners realized that its geographical location was far off from any suppliers or contractors. The end result is that the building is still empty and never saw a single worker. Mr. Grimm, a citizen of Frankfurt Oder, commented in an interview on the failed project due to miscalculations: "Anything, even something less technically advanced, would have been better than a highly specified and technological advanced, but closed, company. It would have done the region some good" (Interviewed, 05/22/06, Frankfurt Oder).

As with the failed project mentioned above, people’s minimal enthusiasm with the process of EU enlargement underscores the gap between the Euro-elites and the masses. The President of the European Parliament, Josep Borrell Fontelles, addressed the general lack of excitement about the enlargement in a "Bürgerreform," on the 23rd of May 2006 in Frankfurt Oder (Germany), close to the bordering city of Słubice (Poland). "Unemployment", he said, "is not as high as it has been portrayed to be in the media, and it is reality now that Poland is in the EU. From here on, we will have to look forward, and be willing to work together, in order to build a slowly growing and long lasting euphoria for Europe."

CONCLUSIONS

Despite the many Eurosceptics, the fact is, as Josep Borrell Fontelles pointed out, that Poland has been a member country of the European Union since 2004 and will be so from now on. Did Poland assimilate to Western European mindsets and values, be it consciously or unconsciously, and if so, to what extend? As the introductory quote points out, Poland’s value system is, overall, more conservative and Catholic-based than that of the rest of Europe.

Pope John Paul II, a highly idolized and influential figure in Poland, spoke of his country’s different and comparatively more traditional values as of something that would enhance the EU and not hinder it. He was certainly supporting and encouraging the future membership in this interview, and also appeased those who feared the loss of Polish values due to accession. Did this happen? Does the rest of Europe value Poland for its differences? Leaving the presumed differences in values between Poland and Western Europe aside, doesn’t Poland share a European identity today? Poland exhibits many European values, as for example a democratically elected government, a strong civil society and an open system of national education. The EU, however, has been compared to a compassionate monster by ordinary Poles. Thus, at the already mentioned “Bürgerreform” on the 23rd of May 2006 in Frankfurt Oder, some Poles pointed out that the distance between Brussels and the huge inter-European apparatus, on the one hand, and ordinary individuals, on the other hand, is simply too big and still growing. In fact, seldom if ever do common people feel the impact of the EU in their daily life, and, more often than not, when they do feel it, it is negative. Therefore, it is no surprise that ordinary citizens will rally around the traditional values of a country and be supportive of an anti-European national identity.

In the words of Dr. Gesine Schwan, President of the Viadrina University, Frankfurt Oder, to understand the inter-relation between the European and national identities, one must first confront two other questions: What is Europe, anyway? And what is the European Union? True, only 60 years ago, the EU was an inconceivable dream, starting with the vision of lasting peace for the continent, and today it has become a reality. The EU, however, can be as present in the daily life of its citizens only to the extent that people are aware of their political surroundings.

The people of today’s Poland are no exception to this; in the aftermath of accession, the Poles find themselves torn “between Euro-skepticism and Euro-enthusiasm, [somewhere] between the cosmopolitan world view and the global one” (Kurczewska, pg. 4). When I was in Poland this past summer (2006), I met people who were pessimistic about the EU-tied destiny of their country. At the same time, I encountered individuals who were very enthusiastic about the new European status for their country; they were hardworking and striving to better their societal status and standard of living. For them, Europe quickly became part of reality, as it presented opportunities for a better life for each individual. One of my professors in Poland at the Szkoły Języka I Kultury Polskiej UJ, Kraków, Wiesława Stolarczyk, said in an interview dated July 20, 2006: “My husband works in Ireland, my son in England. Isn’t that what the European Union is supposed to be all about, the freedom to move on the continent, integrating, and working together peacefully?” Poles seem to live the European Ideal, more so than most Western Europeans, partially because their country does not yet offer the same economic opportunities. With the help of the European Union, businesses are thriving and the ever inventive Poles are making the best of what they are given.

As an answer to the question posed in the beginning of this paper, I will say that the Poles are currently torn between unfaltering enthusiasm vis-à-vis EU and open skepticism. Their perception of Europe has changed from an idealized one to a more tangible one, but they have certainly not turned completely against the EU. Furthermore, the public of Poland has not abandoned the affection for Europe, though one has to keep in mind that it is difficult if not impossible to generalize. Because of the new competition and stipulations by the EU, the segment of Polish society that is most affected by this is represented by the rural communities. On the other hand, they do get yearly support by the EU, so that overall the statement given by Janusz Lewandowski in the European Parliament, in the ‘Bürgerreform’(05/23/06, Frankfurt Oder) holds true: “Europe functions better than its reputation might suggest.” He added after a short pause: “The new younger generation will take it [Europe] for granted, and not for something far off and complicated, as many citizens do today.”

So, just how European do Poles feel today? As indicated throughout this paper, Poles have always felt part of Europe, even though, for centuries, the rest of Europe did not really consider them a part of it. One can really say that Poles are true Europeans; over the past three years, the Poles have become even more so. Rather than destabilizing Europe, the Poles have brought with them their national values, thereby contributing to an increase in diversity across the continent.

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People interviewed:

Mrs. Mądro, Darmstadt, Temporary Harvest Worker, 05/18/2006.
Mr. Helm, Berlin, CDU Abgeordneter, German specialist for Polish and Russian Relations, 05/21/2006.
Mr. Günter Grimm, Frankfurt Oder, retired factory worker, 05/22/2006.
Prof. Neyer, Frankfurt Oder, Professor of the Viadrina University, 05/23/2006.
Mrs. Anna Holz, Frankfurt Oder, Phd. Student, Viadrina University, 05/23/2006.
Prof. Rosenberg, Frankfurt Oder, Professor of the Viadrian University, 05/24/2006.
Mrs. Lisa Parczek, Diez, Polish citizen, lived in Germany for 30 years, 05/18/2006.
Prof. Stolarczyk, Kraków, Professor of the Szkoły Języka i Kultury Polskiej, UJ, 07/20/2006.

People, who spoke at the ‘Bürgerreform’ Frankfurt Oder, 03/05/2006:

Josep Borrell Fontelles, President of the European Parliament.
Prof. Dr. Gesine Schwan, President of the Viadrina University.
Günter Gloss, Staatsminister of the Auswärtige Amt, Representative for Europe.
Janusz Lewandowski, Member of the

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Poland in the European Union and the European Consciousness of Poles: Changing Perspectives on National Identity after Accession?