Tyler M. D'Andrea

Journal of Undergraduate Research
Volume 7, Issue 5 - May/June 2006

Terms of National Identity:
Nationalistic or Patriotic Tendencies in Vladimir Putin’s Political Rhetoric

ABSTRACT

Since a few years before the fall of the Soviet Union, there has been a gradual increase of nationalism in Russia. This is evident through the increase in popularity among the more nationalistic political parties and their leaders in Russian presidential and parliamentary elections. The present study focuses on evidence of nationalistic or patriotic sentiment in President Vladimir Putin’s political rhetoric. By comparing the use of terms of national identity in the rhetoric of Vladimir Zhirinovskii of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and of Gennadii Ziuganov of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation to the political rhetoric of President Putin, this study hopes to discover whether or not Mr. Putin has, in the years since his election to President, begun to take on a more nationalistic way of talking about political matters—or whether he can be identified as a less extreme, patriotic individual. The primary elements analyzed are those referring to Russians (the politicians’ constituents), the adjectives which translate as “Russian, ” terms used to refer to Russia as a country, the metaphor of family in Russian political rhetoric, and terms used to speak about foreigners or terrorists in Russia.

Overall, it is apparent through the analysis that Mr. Putin’s political speech mirrors, to some extent, that of both Mr. Zhirinovskii and Mr. Ziuganov; although, to a lesser extent, Mr. Putin does employ the use of the same terms as the other two subjects when referencing national identity. He also uses the political metaphor of family and the same terms as the others when talking about terrorists (“bandit”). His language thus shows evidence of what may be a nationalistic political agenda, but is more likely a patriotic one. This is an area which should be researched and discussed, because considering Mr. Putin’s political breadth, recent consolidations of power, and the populous’ support of nationalistic candidates in past elections, a more nationalistic president could lead to dire consequences for Russia and the rest of the world.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades, there has been a rise in nationalism in the Russian Federation. Evidence of this lies in the increase in popularity and power among rightist political parties following the fall of the Soviet Union. A trend of nationalism has spread so far as to affect Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia and of the more moderate and democratic party of Russia, Edinaia Rossiia. Any nationalistic sentiments in Mr. Putin are difficult to prove, but President Putin does reveal remnants of patriotic sentiments in his political rhetoric. Through a linguistic analysis of his State of the Union addresses over the first six years of his presidency, strong patriotic sentiment shines through when his rhetoric is compared to that of Vladimir Zhirinovskii of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and Gennadii Ziuganov of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF). The focus of the present study will be on terms of national identity, including the use of “we” or “us, ” adjectives meaning “Russian, ” references to Russia as a country and Russians as a people, the metaphor of family, and references to others (foreigners, terrorists, etc.).

The importance of this research can be found in the evolution of party power over the past fifteen years. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the LDPR was formed, a party adhering to the guidelines of a nationalistic agenda. The success of this party and its leader, Mr. Zhirinovskii, in elections—particularly presidential—shows that nationalism is a growing force in Russia (Solovyev & Klepikova, 1995, pp. xv-xxii). In addition to the successful LDPR, the beliefs and doctrines of the KPRF have—since the party’s formation—been growing more similar to the nationalistic movement in Russia (Devlin, 1999, p. 162-163; Yanov, 2001, p. 3). Along with the LDPR, the KPRF has grown in popularity among Russians, and thus also in recent elections. With this in mind, one must consider the possibility that the more centrist party of Russia, Edinaia Rossiia, could be following the same path. This party, with a party member occupying the highest political position of the country, has the greatest ability to exert influence on Russia’s population. And since, in Alexander Yanov’s words, “[Nationalism] will be just as big an obstacle to Russia’s integration into the world community after Communism as Communism itself” (2001, p. 3), it is vital that any remnant (present or future) of nationalism which President Putin may possess, be discovered, exposed, and analyzed.

METHODOLOGY

The goal of this study is to determine whether or not President Vladimir Putin of Russia uses terms, phrases or metaphors in his political rhetoric which positively contribute to the suspicion of a more nationalistic tilt or leaning in President Putin’s political ideology. The sources of the linguistic items which would be considered nationalistic are Vladimir Zhirinovskii of the LDPR, and Gennadii Ziuganov of the KPRF. The speech samples from these two leaders were obtained from East View, an online database of Russian periodicals. The subject matters of their samples covered national holidays, national security, domestic affairs, and international affairs. The total number of samples ranged from about thirteen to fifteen per subject. All samples were of the same time frame as that of President Putin’s tenure, namely 2000 through 2005. In analyzing the samples of these two speakers’ political rhetoric, terms of national identity (those referring to nation, citizenship, etc.) and their connotations were noted. These included utterances which were of a more marked usage and could be considered to have a nationalistic or strong patriotic undertone. Following the collection of these utterances, an analysis of President Putin’s rhetoric was appropriate.

Due to the abundance of President Putin’s speeches, press releases, declarations, et cetera, the best sources of analysis of his rhetoric were his six State of the Union Addresses, which he has given since his election to the Russian Presidency, from 2000 through 2005. Primarily because they are regular, the State of the Union Addresses are the most important, occurring annually at approximately the same time (between April and July) of each year. They are also of considerable and comparable lengths, thus allowing for abundant linguistic material, but also consistency from year to year. The addresses are the most widely broadcast and respected speeches of any president’s tenure, thus they are geared toward the entire population of the nation, not usually to any specific group within that nation. Finally, the addresses focus on any and all important issues which a nation has faced over the previous year, is facing at the time of the address, and will continue to face during the upcoming year; in other words, they are all-encompassing, covering a wide range of social, economic, and political topics.

SUBJECTS ON ANALYSIS

Vladimir Putin was born in Leningrad, Russia, in October of 1952. While growing up he pursued an ambitious education, receiving a law degree in 1975 and later receiving his doctoral degree in economics. Following his graduation, he was assigned by the Soviet government to work for the Committee for State Security (KGB). In addition to his service with the KGB, he also acted as Deputy Mayor in St. Petersburg under Mr. Anatoli Sobchak, a mayor of St. Petersburg and one of the leading liberal reformers during the glasnost period. In 1996, he began his service at the highest levels of government, employed in various positions of the executive branch. Finally, in late 1999, after serving a brief term as Russia’s Prime Minister, Mr. Putin began his tenure as President of Russia. He was officially elected in early 2000, was re-elected in 2004, and is currently serving his second term as Russia’s top administrative official (http://www.kremlin.ru).

Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovskii of the LDPR was born in Kazakhstan in 1946. Zhirinovskii has excelled academically, educated as a Turkish translator/interpreter, graduating with honors, and having earned a law degree. Zhirinovskii attempted to enter the political sphere in 1967 with a letter written to the Communist Party proposing reforms to the Soviet system. As an ultimate result of his activism, his career hopes were dashed in 1969 when he was accused of espionage, deported from Turkey, and thus prevented from joining the Communist Party. Zhirinovskii returned to politics at the end of the 1980s and in 1990 was chosen as chairman of the new Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). This position led to his nomination for president of Russia in 1991. In this election, eight percent of Russian voters cast a ballot for the rightist leader, leaving Zhirinovskii with the third highest number of votes. Late in 1993, the LDPR was successful in parliamentary elections, collecting twenty-five percent of votes and becoming the parliament’s majority party. For the two years following his second run for president, Zhirinovskii followed with declarations of his support of conflict with Chechnya and a proposal to close Russia off from the world to restore order and solve internal conflicts. Zhirinovskii has for many years and continues to act as the Deputy Speaker of the Duma, the Russian parliament (Solovyev & Klepikova, 1995, pp. xv-xxii).

Gennadii Andreevich Ziuganov was born in June of 1944. His life in the military and government began in 1963, when he joined the Soviet Army. Following about three years of service, he joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and shortly thereafter pursued an education in physics and mathematics, receiving his degree in 1969. About a decade later, he received a doctoral degree. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, he assisted in the founding the new Russian Communist Party (KPRF). In 1995 Mr. Ziuganov became the head of the KPRF. In 1996, he ran for President of Russia. He failed, but not before leaving an impression. In the initial election he received about one-third of the votes, and in the run-off election he received over 40% of votes. In 1999, he was elected to parliament for the third time in a row, this time for a seven-year term (http://www.kprf.ru).

NATIONALISM & PATRIOTISM

Nationalism is a political ideology, the essence of which has been debated for centuries. Nationalism places one’s country, culture, and interests above all others; this concept is not an ideology, but instead a national consciousness. Vladimir Sergeevich Solovyev, the famous religious philosopher and member of the Russian intelligentsia, stated over a century ago that “nationalism is about … blaming some foreign evil for one’s own failures” and that nationalism is a way of “pretending that Russia is the best just the way she is” (Yanov, 2001, pp. 2-3). It is obvious from these varying definitions that the most important aspect of nationalism is one’s own nation. Whether the nation is viewed as essential for societal life or whether one’s nation is superior over others, it can be agreed upon that nationalism promotes the idea that a citizen should rely on and be devoted to their own country, because their country is most important and most significant when being compared to other nations.

Patriotism is a similar but very different way of thinking. According to common usage, it is a love for or devotion to one's country,. Solovyev states that the difference between patriotism and nationalism lies in the fact that patriotism is “working to make Russia better” (Yanov, 2001, p. 2). In this same article, Yanov explains patriotism, stating that “love of the land one was born in is just as natural as love of one's parents or children” (Yanov, 2001, pp. 2-3). Historically, many nationalists have used the less marked term of “patriotism” to describe their line of thinking and ideology. They use this in order to lessen the negative connotations inherently attached to the term “nationalism”. The linguistic analysis which follows is meant to help determine where Mr. Putin lies ideologically, between these two concepts. Does his speech show more nationalistic or patriotic tendencies? Does he lie somewhere between the two? Or is he neither nationalistic nor patriotic?

RHETORICAL ANALYSIS

The present study’s linguistic focus of analysis centers on terms of national identity. This includes those terms which refer to or describe oneself as a member of a country, those which refer to the country itself, and the metaphor of family in Russian political rhetoric. Finally, terms which refer to the opposing side of national identity— namely “them” or the “others” —are also discussed.

An important factor to consider is how the politicians refer to inhabitants of Russia, their constituents. Consistent among all three subjects is the use of “grazhdanin,” meaning citizen, when referring to the Russian subjects. The constant use of this term marks it as the politically correct and neutral use. In analyzing the subjects’ use of the words “we,” “us,” or “our,” an interesting trend reveals itself. Common between the three subjects is that these words, which connote a collectivity, are used when the speakers discuss a task which needs to be accomplished or which has failed. For example, Mr. Zhirinovskii, when discussing international affairs, says, “… we have practically lost any influence in Europe, we have decreased to the minimum of our defenses, and in exchange have received obligations …” (Zhirinovskii, 2001, p. 2). In this excerpt, Zhirinovskii conveys the meaning that the loss of influence, the decrease in defenses, and the receipt of new obligations are all consequences of which “we” (his audience) are part. Mr. Putin employs similar rhetorical tactics in his speech. Consider the following excerpt from Mr. Putin’s 2002 State of the Union Address, “In a period of weakness—our weakness— …” Here, Mr. Putin places extra emphasis through repetition on the fact that the weakness is “our weakness”. He changes the meaning of the statement to share the feeling of obligation with his audience. Instead of the weakness being an abstract attribute of Russia’s state, the weakness is something of which all Russians are a part. In other words, Russia is experiencing a period of weakness, and thus so are all of its citizens, or vice versa. In addition to this specific example from Mr. Putin, there are a number of others in most of his State of the Union Addresses. These include a repetition of “we must”, “we can”, “our success”, and “our goal”. That which affects one—Russia or its people—is expressed by Mr. Zhirinovskii and Mr. Putin to affect the other.

There exist in the Russian language two adjectival terms which are translated in to English as “Russian.” In the context of cultural Russian, “russkii” is used. This term is most commonly used when saying “Russian language” (“russkii iazik”). When referring to something Russian that is governmental or in reference to the official nation, “rossiiskii” is used. This is most commonly used in “Russian Federation” (“Rossiiskaia Federatsiia”). Through the linguistic analysis, it becomes apparent that the former term, “russkii,” is the more marked term. All three speakers use “rossiiskii” almost consistently throughout, thus designating it as the politically neutral term.

Mr. Ziuganov presents one instance when speaking about the economy, in which he makes a clear differentiation between “russkii” and “rossiiskii,” “… personify such sacred ideas as Russia, the Russian (“russkii”), and the Russian (“rossiiskii”) people” (Ziuganov, 2003, p. 2).

With Mr. Putin, finding a use of the more ideologically marked “russkii” is much more difficult. In fact, despite the defined use of “russkii” when referring to culture and the use of “rossiiskii” when referring to government, there is an instance in Mr. Putin’s 2003 State of the Union Address when he mentions Russian culture as “rossiiskii” culture. Of his six State of the Union Addresses, there is only one instance of “russkii,” and it is used in reference to the “great Russian (‘russkii’) philosopher Ivan Il’ich.” This use is emphasizing the philosopher’s identity as ethnically or culturally Russian. The lexical item “great” exaggerates the adjective and contributes to the listeners’ pride in their national heritage.

For the majority of instances, all three subjects use terms such as “country” and “Russia” to refer to Russia. However, it is not uncommon for Mr. Zhirinovskii and Mr. Ziuganov alike to use synonymous terms when referring to their nation. A few examples would be “derzhava” (empire), “???????” (fatherland), and the most common among the three, “rodina” (motherland). All of these terms have a more marked meaning and use than that of the more neutral “country” or “Russia.” For example, Mr. Zhirinovskii said, “We are doing everything that depends on us in order for Russia to fulfill the status of a great world empire (derzhava) …” (Zhirinovskii, 2004, p. 5). Mr. Ziuganov, during a speech on International Women’s Day, an important Russian holiday, equates Russia to motherland (rodina) and fatherland (otchizna), “In difficult times you have always been hopeful and supportive for those who are not indifferent to the destiny of Russia, the Motherland (rodina), and the Fatherland (otchizna)” (Ziuganov, 2003, p. 1). Mr. Ziuganov in this instance is attempting to either equalize the varying terms despite their obviously differing ideological connotations, or he is attempting to escalate the level of nationalism behind his speech with each additional term he uses. Either way, this is an attempt by Ziuganov to normalize nationalistic rhetoric.

Mr. Putin does not make use of the above mentioned terms on a very regular basis. However, over the six years of his State of the Union Addresses, there are two notable instances in which he uses “rodina” and “derzhava”: “only … an effective and democratic government … is capable of creating the circumstances for the happy lives of people and the prosperity of our Motherland (rodina)” (Putin, 2000, p. 4). “The dignity of the ‘golden ruble’ was made equivalent to the dignity of the entire empire (derzhava)” (Putin, 2003, p. 9). These references to Russia are notable instances in Mr. Putin’s rhetoric.

A prevalent metaphor in Russian political rhetoric and one which strongly supports the connection and interdependence between Russia and its people is that of family. In an article in the 2003 publication of the Russian journal Russkaia Rech’, A. P. Chudinov states that the metaphorical relationship between Russia and the family has been used for a long time in Russian political rhetoric. He further states that this metaphorical relationship follows the traditionally established rules governing the relations between the government and its citizens. In other words, this metaphor is what ties the people of Russia to the accomplishments, failures, and goals of their governmental leaders. Chudinov goes on to argue that the members of the family are “us” (“svoi”), and out of necessity they are to resist “them” (“chuzhie”) (Chudinov, 2003).
Through analysis of any political rhetoric, particularly that of the present study’s subjects, it is not difficult to find instances of this metaphor’s use. Mr. Zhirinovskii uses the metaphor, stating “… for all families and citizens of Russia” (Zhirinovskii, 2002, p. 2). This is similar to the example earlier when Mr. Ziuganov paralleled the term “Russia” to “Motherland” and “Fatherland.” Mr. Zhirinovskii is equating families of Russia to citizens of Russia. Mr. Ziuganov employs the metaphor less directly, referring on more than one occasion to Byelorussia as a “brotherly republic.” This proposes that the relationship between the two nations is similar to that of a family, like brothers.

Mr. Putin uses—and to some extent explains—the metaphor of family in his 2000 State of the Union Address,
We are used to looking at Russia like a system of bodies of power or like a domestic entity. But Russia—it is above all people who regard it their home. Their happiness and dignified life is the main duty of those in power. (…) However, today in our home, we are far from comfort. There are still many for whom it is difficult to raise their children, and to assure their parents a dignified old age.

This paragraph, discussing the home, the difficulties which Russian families experience, and the Russian government’s relationship to these aspects of life, can easily be understood to apply to Russia. Mr. Putin blatantly calls Russia home, stating “… today in our home ….” “Children” can be understood as the population of Russia and its cultural growth and evolution. “Parents” and their “old age” can be interpreted as the future of Russia. Although this is the primary example of Mr. Putin’s from which it can be understood that references to family may in fact be references to Russia, there are numerous additional examples of this metaphor from all but two of his six State of the Union Addresses.

If considering the contribution of terms of national identity to the nationalistic sentiment of a politician, one must also consider what terms are used to refer to those who are identified as not belonging to the host group, in this case Russians. There are countless instances in political rhetoric in which a common enemy of the people or nation is identified. How politicians refer to this enemy is what is of interest. The common term used among the three subjects of this study when referring to an enemy is “bandit.” Mr. Zhirinovskii uses the term in the most marked manner, in reference to foreigners (i.e., non-terrorists) moving to Moscow: “In Moscow any citizen of the Russian Federation can purchase an apartment, just as any bandit or profiteer … can become a resident of the capital” (Zhirinovskii, 2002, p. 1).

Mr. Putin also uses “bandit,” but only when referring to terrorists. An example of his usage and evidence towards the definition of “bandit” as terrorist is present in Mr. Putin’s 2002 State of the Union Address when he states, “How many bandits and terrorists are there …?” It is feasible to conclude that “bandit” is simply the term used widely in Russia to refer to terrorists. However, the fact that the most powerful rightist leader and the most powerful democratic leader of Russia both employ the use of this term is noteworthy.

CONCLUSION

It is apparent that the speech of this study’s three subjects is similar in many regards. Of course, Mr. Putin employs the use of more nationalistically charged terms less commonly than those of Mr. Zhirinovskii or Mr. Ziuganov. What is important to note, though, is that Mr. Putin, the most powerful person in Russia, does show a weak tendency towards nationalism and a strong one towards patriotism in his rhetoric. The increase in popularity of nationalism in Russia over the past few decades, coupled with Mr. Putin’s re-election following his first term as President, must be considered when contemplating Russia’s future. As a former world superpower and the nation with the second largest arsenal of nuclear weapons, it is very important who leads that nation and whether their ideology is one that, as Vladimir Sergeevich Solovyev puts it, blames some foreign evil for their own failures.

REFERENCES

Chudinov, A. P. ‘Kul’tura Rechi. Novie Russkie Metafori’, Russkaia Rech’ (30 April 2003).
Devlin, Judith. Slavophiles and Commissars. Great Britain: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999.
Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Ofitsial’naia stranitsa Gennadiia Andreevicha Ziuganova, http://www.cprf.ru/personal/Ziuganov/.
Putin, Vladimir. 2000 – 2005. Poslanie Federal’nomu Sobraniiu Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Moscow: The Kremlin. http://www.kremlin.ru/sdocs/appears.shtml?type=63372 (accessed April 24, 2006).
Solovyev, Vladimir, and Elena Klepikova. Zhirinovsky: Russian Fascism and the Making of a Dictator. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1995.
Upravlenie press-sluzhbi i informatsii Prezidenta, President of Russia: Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/articles/V_Putin_eng.shtml.
Yanov, Alexander. ‘What makes Russia's integration into the world community easier:
Nationalism or patriotism? XVIII century Nation-Building or XXI century Federation-Building?’, Johnson’s Russia List, (04 April 2001).
Ziuganov, Gennadii. 2003. Sinovnii poklon. Sovetskaia Rossiia, March 7, 1.
Ziuganov, Gennadii. 2003. Ekonomika. Antichelovechnii biudzhet. Dialog-OD, November 30, 2.
Zhirinovskii, Vladimir. 2001. Polemicheskie zametki. Plan marshalla, chast’ 2, . Ili skol’ko stoit spokoinaia zhizn’ Evropi?. Trud, January 27, 2.
Zhirinovskii, Vladimir. 2002. O naselenii, zaniatikh I bezrabotnikh. V Rossii neobkhodima obshchenatsional’naia programma rosta ekonomiki. Nezavisimaia Gazeta, February 12, 1 – 2.
Zhirinovskii, Vladimir. 2004. Natsional’naia bezopasnost’ Rossii – glavnaia zadacha gosudarstva. Mariiskaia pravda, March 5, 5.

--top--

Back to the Journal of Undergraduate Research

Terms of National Identity: Nationalistic or Patriotic Tendencies in Vladimir Putin’s Political Rhetoric