Research Description

Epistemic Worries in Robert Kane's Libertarian Account of Moral Responsibility

The goal of my project is to evaluate Robert Kane's indeterministic account of free will. Kane is a philosophical libertarian he believes that free will is incompatible with determinism and that an indeterministic universe is needed for us to be considered free and responsible. Kane argues that in a causally deterministic universe, all of our actions have sufficient causes located far in the past, outside of our control. This lack of control seems to directly contradict our conception of moral responsibility. Thus, Kane appeals to quantum indeterminacy to support free will and responsibility.

However, those who believe moral responsibility and determinism are compatible have an argument of their own for Kane. These compatibilists point out that a libertarian like Kane is committed to saying that when an agent chooses A freely, there is another possible world, which is identical to the real world up until the point of the agent’s choice, in which the agent does not A. These critics argue that since there is nothing to explain the difference between these two worlds, that the agent voluntarily and intentionally doing A rather than not A is just a matter of luck or chance. Since we do not hold people responsible for luck or chance, indeterminism actually hinders our free will and moral responsibility.

Kane responds to this objection with a nuanced and scientifically respectable account of how indeterminism can lead to moral responsibility. Kane relies on the latest in neurology and quantum physics to argue that certain undetermined Self Forming Actions can ground free will and responsibility.

I will examine whether Kane has successfully avoided the 'luck or chance' criticism and whether we can hold people responsible based on the account he has given.